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THE INDUSTRIAL DYNAMICS OF ORDER RATIONING, SHORTAGE GAMING, 
AND RETAIL PROMOTIONS DEMAND SHOCK: 
A DISCRETE EVENT SIMULATION EXPERIMENT 
 
by 
 
UIO IN SARA LIAO-TROTH  
 
(Under the Direction of Karl B. Manrodt) 
 
ABSTRACT 
This research investigates the impact of order rationing strategies, shortage 
gaming responses, and retail promotions demand shock on the long-term system 
performance of the inventory ordering and fulfillment process between competing 
retailers and a shared upstream manufacturer. The research addresses a need to 
understand the horizontal dynamics of competition for supply inventory among 
interconnected entities within business systems. It also expands understanding of the 
interactions between various manufacturer order rationing strategies and retailer shortage 
gaming responses, in the context of supply capacity constraints arising from a retail 
promotions demand shock. 
A discrete event simulation based on a US major appliance supply chain was 
developed. Results from the simulation experiment indicate a strong impact from order 
rationing strategies and shortage gaming responses on long-term outcomes such as 
demand variance, order fill rates, opportunity loss, and inventory carrying cost. In 
contrast, a single retail promotions demand shock has limited long-term impact on system 
2 
 
performance. 
Overall, the findings suggest that both vertical and horizontal entities within 
business systems are significantly impacted by each entity’s actions within the inventory 
ordering and fulfillment feedback loop. Also, interactions between manufacturer order 
rationing strategies, retailer shortage gaming responses, and retail promotions demand 
shock are complex, particularly when considered over time. There are both positive and 
negative impacts relative to each entity within the inventory ordering and fulfillment 
feedback loop. 
 
INDEX WORDS: Supply Chain Management, Simulation, Experiment, Order Rationing, 
Shortage Gaming, Retail Promotions, Demand Shock, Industrial Dynamics 
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
1.0 INTRODUCTION 
This research investigates the impact of order rationing strategies, shortage 
gaming responses, and retail promotions demand shock on the long-term system 
performance of the inventory ordering and fulfillment process between competing 
retailers and a shared upstream manufacturer. The research addresses a need to 
understand the horizontal dynamics of competition for supply inventory among 
interconnected entities within business systems. It also expands understanding of the 
interactions between various manufacturer order rationing strategies and retailer shortage 
gaming responses, in the context of supply capacity constraints arising from a retail 
promotions demand shock. 
This first chapter addresses the study of supply inventory competition in five 
sections. First, it provides the necessary background to justify a need for this research. 
Second, it defines the study’s research questions and objectives. Third, it describes the 
study’s contributions. Fourth, it proposes an appropriate research method with which to 
investigate the research questions. Finally, it presents this dissertation’s organization. 
 
1.1 BACKGROUND 
Forrester’s theory of industrial dynamics (1958; 1961), alternatively known as 
system dynamics, is the root of many key supply chain management concepts (Mentzer et 
al. 2001) such as the bullwhip effect (Lee et al. 1997) and the total cost paradigm (Ellram 
1995; Ellram & Siferd 1998; Stringfellow et al. 2008). The theory explains the dynamic 
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behavior of a system connected by flows of information, materials, and finances through 
an understanding of how feedback structures and cause-effect delays create change over 
time (Forrester 1968). In conceptualizing multiple business entities as a structural system 
with interdependencies, Forrester (1958; 1961) paved the foundation for the idea that one 
firm’s activities can impact another firm’s performance (Größler et al. 2008).  
Accordingly, research within the domain of supply chain management has sought 
to identify, describe, analyze, optimize, and mitigate the impact of interconnected 
business systems (Mentzer et al. 2001; Min & Zhou 2002). These business systems are 
often modeled as a simplified vertical or serial supply chain with one member per 
echelon (Morgan 2007). This allows for research to be tractable and to attribute causal 
inferences to relevant parties. However, most supply chains have multiple members 
within a given echelon, and there exists differences in results and findings from supply 
chain models that incorporate multiple horizontal entities compared to those modeling 
single entities within an echelon (Wan & Evers 2011). Often, horizontal entities share a 
common supplier and/or customers and their relationships are competitive in nature (Li 
2002). Moorthy (1985) describes the essence of competition as interdependence and 
conflict, where the consequences to a firm of taking an action depend not only on that 
firm’s actions but also on the actions of its competitors. However, conflicts of interest are 
also present among the interdependent firms, as the optimal action for each firm may 
differ from what is optimal for other firms (Moorthy 1985). As a result, it is likely that 
the decisions and actions of each retailer may impact not only their trading partner 
(manufacturer) but may also negatively impact other retailers as well (Almadoss et al. 
2008) through indirect linkages with the shared manufacturer. Unfortunately, the 
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presence of competing horizontal entities and their linkages to a focal vertical supply 
chain are rarely considered despite the existence of interconnected information, material, 
and financial flows (Li 2002; Wan & Evers 2011). 
One situation in which consideration of multiple, competing horizontal entities 
may be particularly relevant would be when demand exceeds supply and therefore 
customers within a horizontal echelon compete for supply inventory. A common issue 
when firms attempt to balance supply and demand involves retail promotions and 
production capacity (Coyle et al. 2013; Bowersox et al. 2013). Consider the following 
scenario: entities within a two-echelon (manufacturer and retailers) supply chain come 
together in a quarterly sales and operations planning meeting in order to determine final 
distribution of a branded product. Retailer 1, who buys a large proportion of the 
manufacturer’s product, demands a large amount of inventory above their order history 
due to a large retail promotions initiative they have planned for the coming quarter. This 
creates a shock in demand (Lummus et al. 2003; Tokar et al. 2011; Coyle et al. 2013), 
defined as sudden and temporary demand beyond that normally experienced by the 
manufacturer. The manufacturer, in attempting to accommodate this unplanned demand 
shock, must ration inventory capacity among their customers or fear damage to their 
ongoing relationship with Retailer 1, an important part of their business. In the process, 
other customers may receive less inventory than ordered and each can choose to react by 
competitively gaming their future orders (Lee et al. 1997) and inflating them in various 
ways to hedge against shortage of the branded product. As each customer competes for 
inventory from the manufacturer, it is likely that one horizontal entity’s inventory 
ordering actions will cause variance in other horizontal entities’ inventory actions in 
  
 26 
subsequent quarters according to Forrester’s theory of industrial dynamics (1958). Within 
the feedback structure of the inventory ordering and fulfillment process, these actions 
may impact the total demand variance experienced by the manufacturer, resulting in 
mismatches between supply and demand and therefore operational inefficiencies (Fisher 
1997; Lee 2004).  
The dynamic nature of horizontal competition for supply over time remains 
unclear because it requires not only a concurrent consideration of a manufacturer and 
horizontal entities (multiple retailers), but also the interactions of each entity’s choice of 
order rationing/shortage gaming strategies over time. Although Lee, Padmanabhan, and 
Whang (1997) mathematically demonstrated that order rationing and shortage gaming 
could lead to amplification of demand variance in a vertical supply chain (i.e. the 
bullwhip effect), the model assumed symmetric actions on the part of multiple retailers 
and did not allow for interaction of various competitive strategies. Moreover, while 
additional research on rationing and shortage gaming has confirmed the existence of 
various strategic choices within each area, they have proceeded in separate streams and 
do not consider interactions among horizontal entities. For example, in determining 
optimal policies for manufacturer order rationing, research assumes that there is no 
competition among retailers (e.g. Cachon & Lariviere 1999a) or that competing retailers 
will all respond similarly (e.g. Mallik & Harker 2004). Likewise, in exploring the 
behavioral basis of various shortage gaming strategies (e.g. Sterman 1989a; Croson & 
Donohue 2003; Nirajan et al. 2011), research has focused on individual level decision-
making and their impact on vertical supply chain entities rather than explore interactions 
among the horizontal entities within an echelon. 
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In summary, there is a need to explore the impact of supply inventory competition 
within a horizontal echelon in order to understand the full dynamics of business systems. 
In the context of supply inventory competition arising from a retail promotion demand 
shock, explicit investigation of the interactions between manufacturer order rationing and 
multiple retailers’ shortage gaming over time is a needed step in exploring the impact of 
inventory competition. 
 
1.2 RESEARCH QUESTIONS AND OBJECTIVES  
1.2.1 Research Questions 
Given the gap in literature regarding the impact of supply inventory competition, 
two research questions arise: 
1. Does supply inventory competition impact vertical industrial business systems? 
2. How can supply inventory competition impact the inventory ordering and 
fulfillment process in the context of a retail promotions demand shock over time? 
1.2.2 Research Objectives 
These research questions yield three research objectives. The objectives are:  
1. To examine the impact of supply inventory competition on the long-term 
performance of involved entities. 
2. To explore the dynamics of supply inventory competition over time in the 
context of retail promotions demand shock. 
3. To identify the interactive impact of various manufacturer order rationing 
strategies and retailer shortage gaming strategies on long-term system behavior. 
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1.3 RESEARCH CONTRIBUTION 
Results from this research will make several potential contributions. First, this 
research will fill a gap in the literature as few supply chain management studies explicitly 
investigate the impact of supply inventory competition among multiple horizontal entities 
on a connected upstream entity. Doing so will further test Forrester’s theory of industrial 
dynamics (1958; 1961) and increase understanding of the interconnected nature of 
business systems. This research will also complement vertically oriented supply chain 
management research by highlighting horizontally oriented inventory competition as an 
overlooked factor in supply chain management performance.  
Second, this research will expand understanding of order rationing and shortage 
gaming strategies through exploration of their overlooked interactions. Although previous 
research on order rationing has attempted to provide prescriptive advice regarding the 
optimal strategy for manufacturers to employ when faced with the need to ration orders, 
these analyses do not incorporate interaction with multiple retailers’ shortage gaming 
responses. Results of this research can provide additional insight regarding the relative 
effectiveness of various order rationing strategies that manufacturers can employ to 
counteract retailers’ shortage gaming and thus minimize the negative consequences of 
demand variance generated through supply inventory competition. 
Finally, this research will contribute to a greater understanding of the 
consequences of demand shock and subsequent supply inventory competition arising 
from marketing initiatives such as retail promotions. Despite the pervasive use of retail 
promotions to stimulate consumer demand (Blattberg et al. 1995), research specific to the 
demand impact of retail promotions is limited (Tokar et al. 2011). Literature regarding 
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retail promotions has largely focused on the consumer impact of retail promotions rather 
than the demand impact on upstream supply chain entities despite the importance of 
supply chains in making product available on retail shelves (Tokar et al. 2011). It is noted 
that the intensity and frequency of retail promotions have increased over time 
(Huchzermeier & Iyer 2006). Coupled with decreased inventory levels throughout the 
supply chain as a result of trends toward cost reduction and increased efficiency in the 
flow of goods (Weitz & Whitfield 2006), an unplanned demand shock arising from retail 
promotions poses significant management challenges to upstream supply chain entities 
and requires research attention. This research addresses that need. 
 
1.4 RESEARCH METHOD 
Discrete event simulation is chosen for this research. Simulation is a research 
method using computer software to model the operation of real-world processes, systems, 
or events (Law & Kelton 2000). It is the most appropriate method to investigate the 
interaction of complex variables and multiple elements of an interdependent system 
(Ballou 1989), a key component of this research. Specific to this research, simulation is 
also the method advocated by Forrester (1958; 1961) in understanding industrial 
dynamics. 
The method’s strengths include the ability to control the system under study 
through operator control of the simulation design and input parameters (Law et al. 1994), 
allowing for precise representation of the proposed inventory replenishment process. 
Simulation provides advantages over other methodologies in terms of the ability to be 
replicated such that “what if” analysis can be conducted, temporal advantage, and cost 
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(Ballou 1989; Manuj et al. 2009). This allows for the exploration of main and interactive 
effects from various manufacturer order rationing strategies and retailer shortage gaming 
responses within an inventory ordering and fulfillment process. 
 
1.5 ORGANIZATION OF DISSERTATION 
This dissertation is organized in five sections. Chapter 1 sets forth the research 
motivation, research questions and objectives, contribution, and rationale for the research 
methodology. Chapter 2 presents the literature review and develops the experimental 
design including the simulation’s process model, identifies independent and dependent 
variables, and proposes hypotheses. Chapter 3 discusses the research’s experimental 
design and data analysis, as well as the simulation’s parameters, assumptions, and 
validation / verification methods. Chapter 4 reviews the results of the experiments. 
Chapter 5 provides a conclusion of the research. 
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CHAPTER 2 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
2.0 INTRODUCTION 
This chapter synthesizes literature to establish a theoretical rationale for the 
research. First, the chapter reviews Forrester’s theory of industrial dynamics. Second, the 
chapter establishes gaps in the application of industrial dynamics in supply chain 
management research, particularly in regard to horizontal relationships and supply 
inventory competition. Third, the research discusses supply inventory competition and 
identifies three research elements of interest: manufacturer order rationing, retailer 
shortage gaming, and retail promotions demand shock. Finally, the chapter develops an 
experimental framework and research hypotheses through application of Forrester’s 
theory of industrial dynamics to the three research elements. 
 
2.1 FORRESTER’S THEORY OF INDUSTRIAL DYNAMICS 
Forrester’s theory of industrial dynamics provides the theoretical foundation of 
this research. This section reviews its origins, core tenets, and theoretical implications in 
order to provide a clear understanding of the theory. 
2.1.1 Origins 
Jay W. Forrester published the seminal article (1958) “Industrial Dynamics - a 
Major Breakthrough for Decision Makers” and book (1961) “Industrial Dynamics” 
following insights gained from a serendipitous project he conducted with the General 
Electric Corporation (Lane 2007).  
According to Lane (2007), managers at GE’s Kentucky appliance plant had 
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observed oscillations with a three-year period in their component inventories and 
workforce numbers. Although the oscillations were attributed to various exogenous 
effects such as business cycles and general “noise” from the market, efforts to eradicate 
the oscillations were unsuccessful. Forrester saw the situation as a system of multiple 
feedback loops through interviews with managers. Each feedback loop consisted of an 
inventory level, a manager’s collecting information on that level, the decision he then 
made and the subsequent effects on the level (Lane 2007). This insight was based on 
Forrester’s prior experience in systems engineering in the military, where his work with 
servomechanisms (a mechanical device that uses negative feedback systems to self-
regulate its actions) established a foundation for understanding how interconnected 
feedback control systems could result in counterintuitive effects (Lane 2007). 
When Forrester mapped the various inventory levels, actions, and therefore 
feedback loops, he confirmed that GE’s policies actually amplified existing oscillations. 
He observed that subjected to a single small change, the system was capable of 
generating endogenously large and sustained oscillations without complex external 
explanations (Lane 2007). Based on his model, Forrester was then able to design policies 
that GE’s managers could use successfully to calm the oscillations (Lane 2007).  
2.1.2 Core Elements 
“Industrial dynamics is the study of the information-feedback characteristics of 
industrial activity to show how organizational structure, amplification (in policies), and 
time delays (in decisions and actions) interact to influence the success of the enterprise” 
(Forrester 1961, p 13). 
The core tenet of industrial dynamics stems from the idea that economic and 
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industrial activities are closed-loop, information-feedback systems (Forrester 1961). In an 
information-feedback system, conditions are converted to information that is a basis for 
decisions that control action to alter the surrounding conditions (Forrester 1961). 
Information-feedback systems owe their overall behavior to three characteristics: 
structure, delays, and amplification (Forrester 1961). 
The structure of a system identifies the component parts and tells how the parts 
are related to one another. This describes the feedback loops relevant to the system of 
interest. These feedback loops can be related to the six types of interconnected flows 
(materials, orders, money, personnel, capital equipment, and information) that represent 
industrial activity. Forrester (1961) recommended that the inclusion of any specific flow 
into the system to be studied should be based on the management question to be 
answered. However, information flow is considered to be most important for inclusion as 
it is not only a stand-alone flow, but it is also the interconnecting tissue between all of the 
other flows. For example, in studying a production-distribution system such as GE’s 
appliance system, Forrester (1961) focused on flows and feedback loops of information 
(orders) as well as of physical goods at the factory, distributor, and retailer echelons. 
Delays refer to the time relationships between parts of the system (Forrester 
1961). Delays occur through the availability of information, in making decisions based on 
the information, and in taking action on the decisions. This is represented by time lags in 
the flows between component parts of the system. Within Forrester’s (1961) production-
distribution system example, delays of one week or more exist between various parts of 
the system, such as when a customer places an order and when goods are delivered. 
Amplification also exists throughout information-feedback systems, particularly in 
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the decision policies that control the rates of flow within these systems (Forrester 1961). 
Amplification is “a response from some part of a system which is greater than would at 
first seem to be justified by the causes of that response” (Forrester 1961, p 62). Order and 
inventory policies in the production-distribution system example are good examples of 
amplification forces. At any given component part of the system, policies to replace 
goods sold and orders to adjust inventories upward or downward as the level of business 
activity changes, all impact the rates of flow of information and goods throughout this 
system (Forrester 1961). 
2.1.2 Theoretical Implications 
Taken together, the pattern of system interconnection (structure), the time 
relationships between parts of the system (delays), and the impact of decisions and 
policies (amplification) all combine to determine the stability and behavior of 
information-feedback systems (Forrester 1961). A central premise of Industrial Dynamics 
(1961) is that these systems exhibit behavior as a whole that may not be evident from 
their individual parts. In addition, it is the interaction of these parts that impact the 
system’s behavior over time. Small changes from a single exogenous force may set into 
motion long-term effects from endogenous elements of the system. 
For example, within Forrester’s (1961) production-distribution system illustration, 
he demonstrated through simulation (tracing step by step the actual flow of orders, goods, 
and information and observing the series of new decisions that take place) that a simple 
10% increase in retail sales results in cycles of oscillation for order rates, factory output, 
factory warehouse inventory, and unfilled orders. Moreover, this model of a production-
distribution system showed increasing variance of orders between retailer, distributor, 
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and factory echelons after the 10% increase in retail sales. Over a year was required 
before all ordering and manufacturing rates stabilize to levels prior to the 10% increase in 
retail sales (Forrester 1961). 
Managerially, Forrester (1961) advocated the use of controlled simulation 
experiments to understand the industrial dynamics of a given system. By holding all 
conditions but one constant, managers have the ability to determine changes to 
endogenous elements that will positively impact the system of study. For example, 
additional experimental variations to the production-distribution system such as speeding 
up time for order handling, eliminating the distributor echelon, or changing inventory 
policies show that in the system under study, adjustments in inventory ordering policies 
led to greater system stability over time relative to managerial changes in order handling 
times or distribution network structure (Forrester 1961). Although Forrester’s example of 
a production-distribution system was most detailed, he also discussed how industrial 
dynamics could be applied to product life cycles, commodity industries, and the research 
and development process. In each case, the system of study should include mechanisms 
of interaction relevant to the management problem being investigated. In addition, 
Forrester also highlighted the importance of considering competition among firms in an 
industry because “the factors interlocking their behavior are sufficiently strong” (1961, 
p336) such that each firm is impacted by the actions of similar firms. 
2.1.3 Summary 
In summary, as the theoretical foundation of this research, industrial dynamics 
can explain the behavior of an interconnected system of information-feedback loops 
through interactions of its structure, time relationship delays, and amplification relevant 
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decision policies. In order to understand industrial dynamics, it is necessary to identify 
feedback loops that are relevant to the phenomena under study, which can encompass a 
wide range of business activity. 
Following, section 2.2 discusses the application of industrial dynamics within 
supply chain management research in order to identify the literature gaps that this 
research seeks to fill. 
  
2.2 INDUSTRIAL DYNAMICS IN SUPPLY CHAIN MANAGEMENT RESEARCH 
The previous section discussed Forrester’s theory of industrial dynamics as the 
theoretical foundation of this research. This section reviews the application of industrial 
dynamics within supply chain management research in order to identify the literature 
gaps that this research seeks to fill.  
2.2.1 Supply Chain Management Research 
Since Forrester’s initial publications (1958; 1961), the theory of industrial 
dynamics has expanded to a discipline of system dynamics that applies the theory’s core 
tenets to broader social systems in the domain of public policy, urban planning, social 
welfare and education (Forrester 2007a; 2008b; Lane 2007; Größler et al. 2008). The 
theory has also had a large impact in supply chain management. In defining supply chain 
management, Mentzer and colleagues (2001) identifies Forrester’s theory of industrial 
dynamics as the foundation for the discipline. Core elements of industrial dynamics, 
where interaction of flows impact interconnected business entities, are central to 
definitions of supply chain management (e.g. Coyle et al. 2013; Bowersox et al. 2013; 
Simchi-Levi et al. 2008). Broad streams of research that have explicitly acknowledged 
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roots in industrial dynamics include the bullwhip effect where demand variance is 
amplified as one travels upstream in a vertical supply chain (Mentzer et al. 2001; Lee et 
al. 2004), beer game simulations which investigate managerial misperceptions of 
feedback loops in the context of inventory management (Mentzer et al. 2001; e.g. 
Sterman 1989a; e.g. Sterman 1989b), as well as supply chain coordination models which 
attempt to align the actions of interconnected firms through incentives and contract 
mechanisms (Fugate et al. 2006; Cachon & Lariviere 2005). In each of these examples, 
industrial dynamics provides the rationale for supply chain management’s goals of 
coordination and alignment. 
2.2.2 Horizontal Elements 
Scholars have noted that supply chain management research often uses a dyadic 
buyer-supplier relationship or a simplified vertical/serial supply chain with one member 
per echelon to represent the supply chain management relevant interactions within 
industrial systems (e.g. Choi & Wu 2009; Wan & Evers 2011; Wathne & Heide 2004). 
However, real-world supply chains may be more complex than the linear, hypothetical 
supply chains (Morgan 2007). Real-world supply chains are increasingly described as 
large interconnected and decentralized networks with many participants linked by 
demand and supply relationships (Majumder & Srinivasan 2008). Firms may be part of 
several supply chains, can take different positions within different supply chains, and 
have a multitude of business relationships with firms beyond the strict vertical 
(upstream/downstream) movement of goods (Coyle et al. 2013; Mentzer et al. 2001; 
Bergenholtz & Waldstrom 2011). In addition, Forrester’s (1958; 1961) discussion of 
industrial dynamics did not constrain the theory to only vertical elements of a supply 
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chain. Rather, relevant entities should be considered based on their role in feedback loops 
of interest (Forrester 1958; 1961). 
Morgan (2007) warns about the advantages and disadvantages of taking a 
reductionist approach in representing real-life supply chains as a series of connected 
dyads. The advantage of this approach is that research can achieve focus by using a 
“ceritus paribus” argument. Nevertheless, the disadvantage is that research ignores the 
inherent variability of real world systems where causes of variability may originate 
outside the vertical dyadic relationship (Morgan 2007; Wathne & Heide 2004). For 
example; Lambert, Cooper, and Pagh (1998) identify both horizontal and vertical 
elements as important structural dimensions of a supply chain, because both the number 
of suppliers/customers represented within each echelon as well as the number of supply 
chain echelons considered will impact the ability of any given focal firm to effectively 
describe, analyze, and manage the supply chain when corporate resources are limited. 
Unfortunately, studies that consider entities beyond a single focal firm within a horizontal 
echelon are limited (Wan & Evers 2011; Li 2002), despite calls for greater attention on 
the network context in which dyadic relationships exist (e.g. Choi & Wu 2009; Wathne & 
Heide 2004) and Forrester’s (1958; 1961) original conceptualization of industrial 
dynamics. 
One exception, Wan and Evers (2011), provides empirical support for the value of 
incorporating multiple horizontal entities to a simplified vertical/serial supply chain 
model. Wan and Evers investigates how differences in the supply chain network structure 
impact the bullwhip effect (measured by the ratio of an upstream entity’s order variance 
to that of a downstream entity’s order variance), stockouts, and on-hand inventory. 
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Findings suggest that supply chain networks modeled with more than one retailer 
essentially split the impact of end-consumer demand at the retailer echelon. This action 
mitigates the bullwhip effect experienced by a shared upstream manufacturer by limiting 
the fluctuation of orders from any particular retailer (Wan & Evers 2011). In addition, 
stockouts at the retail echelon were also mitigated while on-hand inventories were found 
to be generally higher at the retailer echelon with models of two or three retailers 
compared to one retailer.  
Wan and Evers (2011) center their study on the demand-side phenomenon of 
order splitting among competing retailers as a context in which the addition of multiple 
entities within an echelon has an impact on supply chain performance. As such, their 
model assumes unlimited supply and no capacity constraints from the shared 
manufacturer in order to focus on the demand-side phenomenon of order splitting. The 
authors note that a more realistic situation would be if the manufacturer is constrained in 
supply capacity while serving multiple retailers (Wan & Evers 2011), since constraints on 
production capacity is more common than unlimited production capacity (Cachon & 
Lariviere 1999b; Van Mieghem 2003; Furuhata et al. 2006). If supply capacity is 
constrained, retailers may consistently compete for inventory due to the shared 
manufacturer’s limited supply (Li 2002). Overall, supply inventory competition is a 
promising area where consideration of multiple horizontal retailers is necessary, as there 
is still considerable ambiguity regarding the dynamics between supply capacity 
constraints and competition among horizontal entities (Wan & Evers 2011). 
2.2.3 Summary 
In summary, most supply chain management research has to date focused on a 
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simplified, vertical supply chain and have overlooked the impact of horizontal elements 
such as multiple, competing retailers within an echelon. Yet, the feedback loops of 
interest within industrial dynamics encompass both vertical as well as horizontal supply 
chain elements. One situation where multiple horizontal entities may be important to 
consider and model is when retailers compete for supply inventory from a shared 
manufacturer with constrained supply capacity. An explicit investigation of supply 
inventory competition between interconnected retailers and a shared manufacturer is thus 
the focus of this research. 
Following, section 2.3 discusses supply inventory competition and identifies the 
variables of interest in this research. 
 
2.3 SUPPLY INVENTORY COMPETITION 
The previous section identified supply inventory competition as an area where 
consideration of multiple entities within a horizontal echelon may impact the 
performance of interconnected retailers and manufacturer. This section discusses supply 
inventory competition in order to identify variables of interest in the research.  
2.3.1 Supply Inventory Competition 
Competition occurs among firms within a horizontal supply chain echelon in 
many forms. Often, competition refers to competing for sales/customers when firms 
provide competing, substitutable goods (e.g. Mahajan & van Ryzin 2001; Netessine & 
Rudi 2003; Carr & Karmarkar 2005; Zhao 2008; Krishnan & Winter 2010). However, 
firms also compete for supply inventory. This research focuses on competition for supply 
inventory as a natural context in which multiple, interconnected retailers may impact a 
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vertical supply chain. 
Supply inventory competition among horizontal entities (e.g. retailers) within an 
echelon occur when retailers who purchase the same good from a shared supplier (e.g. a 
single manufacturer) encounter supply/demand misalignment (Li 2002; Cachon 2001; 
Cachon & Lariviere 1999; Lee et al. 1997). Supply/demand misalignment arises when 
total demand exceeds supply, and results in competitive, reactionary behaviors on the part 
of the manufacturer and each retailer that are related through an inventory ordering and 
fulfillment feedback loop (Li 2002; Lee et al. 1997). 
2.3.2 Context of Supply/Demand Misalignment and Retail Promotions Demand Shock 
Supply and demand misalignment occurs when limits in manufacturer production 
capacity or uncertainty of production yield is coupled with demand uncertainty (Fisher 
1997; Lambert et al. 1998; Lee et al. 1997). In attempting to balance supply and demand, 
firms may address either part of the equation. When demand exceeds capacity but is 
known and stable, then additional manufacturing can be secured by either investing in 
more capacity internally or securing contract capacity externally (Coyle et al. 2013). If 
demand is uncertain, investment in additional capacity may result in additional costs over 
the long run (Coyle et al. 2013) and expansion can be time consuming (Furuhata & 
Zhang 2006). It is likely that a supplier “will not build an amount of capacity sufficient to 
cover every possible demand realization” (Cachon & Lariviere 1999b, p. 835) and in 
some industries such as the semiconductor industry, it is common to have a tight supply 
(Sun et al. 2011). Firms may also carry larger inventories in order to accommodate 
demand uncertainty, however trends within supply chain management to minimize 
inventory and emphasize efficient flow of goods have resulted in less inventory buffer to 
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accommodate sudden increases in demand (Weitz & Whitfield 2006).  
2.3.2.1 Retail Promotions Demand Shock 
Retail promotions are considered a real-world factor that causes or exacerbates 
supply/demand misalignment because it is a common form of demand uncertainty (Coyle 
et al. 2013; Bowersox et al. 2010, van Heerde & Neslin 2008; Tokar et al. 2011). Defined 
as temporary incentives targeted to consumers, retail promotions such as coupons, 
rebates, price discounts are used as a temporary means to competitively stimulate or 
shape consumer demand when retailers sell a common good (Blattberg et al. 1995). 
Retailers and their supply chains all benefit from retail promotions due to the immediate 
and substantial increase in sales when it an item is put on promotion (Ailawadi et al. 
2009). For retailers, the “lift” or increase in sales from consumer promotions can 
represent a large portion of a retailer’s revenue, and has been reported to account for 
anywhere from 25% of retailers’ sales in Great Britain (Gedenk et al. 2006) to 30% of a 
large national US retailer’s total sales (Ailawadi et al. 2007). The increase in consumer 
sales is also passed upstream to the manufacturer in the form of increased demand. 
Retail promotions can create a “shock” in the total demand experienced by the 
manufacturer due to its temporary nature (Coyle et al. 2013; Bowersox et al. 2010), 
particularly when promotional activity is initiated by the retailer rather than the 
manufacturer (Tokar et al. 2011). Retailers commonly make decisions regarding 
consumer promotions close to the time of execution and this timeframe rarely coincides 
with suppliers’/manufacturers’ order fulfillment schedules (Huchzermeier & Iyer 2006), 
resulting in a mismatch between supply and demand. In a case study on the demand 
management challenges in food supply chains, Adebanjo (2009) report that a retailer did 
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not finalize retail promotions decisions until four weeks before the start of the promotion 
despite the ten week lead time required by involved contract manufacturers, a significant 
disconnect in supply and demand needs.  
Although the demand management challenges of retail promotions are generally 
discussed as a problem within supply chain management (e.g. Coyle et al. 2013; 
Bowersox et al. 2010; Daugherty et al. 2002), limited empirical research exists 
addressing their impact on supply chains (Tokar et al. 2011). Most research has focused 
on the consumer-side impact of retail promotions because of the wide range of its impact 
on consumer behaviors such as brand switching, store switching, category switching, 
stockpiling, or increased consumption informs the evaluation of the short- and long-term 
effectiveness and profitability of a promotional initiative (Ailawadi et al. 2009; Gedenk et 
al. 2006; Uncles 2006; Blattberg 1995). 
2.3.3 Manufacturer Order Rationing and Retailer Shortage Gaming 
In the context of supply/demand misalignment when total demand exceeds 
supply, the literature describes actions on the part of manufacturers (manufacturer order 
rationing) and retailers (retailer shortage gaming) that interact within an inventory 
ordering and fulfillment feedback loop. 
2.3.3.1 Manufacturer Order Rationing 
A manufacturer must ration, or allocate their supply amongst the retailers when 
filling orders if they do not have enough supply to fill total demand (Hall & Liu 2010; 
Cachon & Lariviere 1999a; Lee et al. 1997). Manufacturer order rationing results in 
unfilled orders for some or all retailers, depending on the specific order rationing strategy 
employed (Cachon & Lariviere 1999a). Commonly discussed strategies include 
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proportional rationing, linear rationing, and uniform rationing (Cachon & Lariviere 
1999b). Proportional rationing dictate that retailers receive the same percentage of 
capacity as their relative demand is to total demand. Linear rationing shorts each retailer 
order by an equal absolute amount. If a negative allocation results for a retailer, then that 
retailer receives zero allocation and the process is repeated with the remaining retailers. 
Uniform rationing divides capacity equally among retailers. If any retailer orders less 
than their equally allocated share, they receive their full order and the remaining capacity 
is allocated equally among the remaining retailers. 
Literature within this research stream is normative in nature and utilizes analytical 
models in order to determine the best strategy the manufacturer can apply to maximize 
profit for themselves as well as their customer (retailer). Cachon and Lariviere (1999b) 
note that a proportional strategy is most intuitive and a commonly used scheme for 
managers to use in dividing capacity. However, differences may exist in each strategy’s 
impact on retailers’ ordering behavior. For example, Cachon and Lariviere (1999b) assert 
that both proportional and linear rationing is “order-inflating” whereas uniform rationing 
is “truth-inducing”. With either proportional or linear rationing, a retailer will always 
receive less than their order if supply is rationed and will thus have an incentive to 
strategically inflate orders to ensure they receive close to their actual need. With uniform 
rationing, there is no incentive for retailers to inflate their orders (Cachon & Lariviere 
1999b). 
The rationale is thus: both proportional and linear rationing is sensitive to total 
demand (the sum of all orders from all of the manufacturer’s customers) and can 
therefore be influenced by demand inflation by a retailer. A retailer will benefit by 
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receiving more inventory than they would normally if they inflate their order, such that 
their order is a larger portion of the total demand experienced by the manufacturer. In 
comparison, uniform rationing is not dependent on total demand but only the number of 
retailers that inventory must be allocated amongst. If the manufacturer chooses to employ 
uniform rationing, then retailers are seen to have no incentive to inflate their orders 
because the amount they will be rationed is independent of what each retailer orders 
(Cachon & Lariviere 1999b). Table 2-1 provides an illustration of the differences 
between the order rationing strategies. 
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Table 2-1 Comparison of Manufacturer Order Rationing Strategies 
Manufacturer Order Rationing Strategies 
 “Order-Inflating” “Order-Inflating” “Truth-Inducing” 
 Proportional 
 
Linear Uniform 
Rule A retailer receives the 
same percentage of 
capacity as their 
relative demand is to 
total orders 
Each retailer order is 
shorted an equal 
absolute amount 
Capacity is divided 
equally among 
retailers 
Calculation (Retailer’s Order /  
Total Orders) * 
Supply 
Retailer’s Order –  
((Total Order Amount-
Supply) /  
Number of Retailers) 
Supply /  
Number of Retailers 
Example: 
Retailer’s Actual Need = 150 units 
Manufacturer’s Supply = 500 units 
Number of Retailers Competing for Supply Inventory = 5 
Total Orders from Retailers = 600 units 
If Retailer 
ordered 
150 units 
= (150 / 600) * 500 
= 125 units allocated 
= 150 – ((600 – 500) / 5) 
= 130 units allocated 
= 500 / 5 
= 100 units allocated 
If Retailer 
ordered 
200 units 
= (200 / 600) * 500 
= 166.6 units allocated 
= 200 – ((600 – 500) / 5) 
= 180 units allocated 
= 500 / 5 
= 100 units allocated 
Conclusion Retailer benefits by 
inflating their order 
Retailer benefits by 
inflating their order 
Retailer does not 
benefit if they inflate 
their order 
 
Cachon and Lariviere (1999b) suggest that order-inflating strategies may be 
beneficial for increasing the manufacturer’s profits because it generally increases their 
capacity utilization by encouraging higher volume orders from retailers, and may be 
beneficial in increasing the retailer’s profits by ensuring that the rationing of capacity 
closely matches the retailer’s true needs. However, the authors state that their conclusion 
applies only if the retailer’s order inflation is moderate and orderly (consistent over time). 
If a retailer’s order inflation is moderate and orderly, an equilibrium that maximizes 
profit for both retailer and manufacturer can be determined within the analytical model. If 
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order inflation is rampant and unpredictable, equilibrium may not exist (Cachon & 
Lariviere 1999b) and therefore, it may not be possible to find an optimal solution for both 
parties. In this case, the truth-inducing uniform strategy may be beneficial for the 
manufacturer to use. However, it may not perform as well as the other strategies in 
matching retailers’ inventory fill with their orders because it essentially does not take into 
account each retailer’s relative demand (Cachon & Lariviere 1999b). 
Additional investigations in order rationing strategies have focused on rationing 
rules within specific industries or by investigating the performance of rationing rules 
under different model assumptions. For example, Karabuk and Wu (2005) discuss 
capacity allocation problems specific to the semiconductor industry and also conclude 
that there is an incentive for customers to manipulate demand information in order to 
increase their desired allocation. Mallik and Harker (2004) confirm that a proportional 
allocation strategy is prone to manipulation and discuss how a bonus payment mechanism 
for managers could elicit truthful demand. Furuhata and Zhang (2006) re-examine 
Cachon and Lariviere’s (1999b) conclusion regarding the ability of a proportional 
allocation mechanism to achieve analytical equilibrium if all retailers submit truthful 
orders. Their model is designed for situations where retailers compete for sales in a 
downstream market, in comparison to Cachon and Lariviere’s (1999b) model, which 
applies to situations where a single manufacturer supplies multiple numbers of retailers 
who enjoy local monopoly (exclusive distribution). When retailers compete for 
downstream sales, a proportional rationing rule may no longer yield an optimal 
coordination mechanism to maximize profits for all entities involved (Furuhata & Zhang 
2006).  
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Among this literature, competition among retailers is considered from a game 
theoretic perspective, which provides a framework to mathematically optimize the 
decisions of multiple entities when each decision affect other’s performance (Nagarajan 
& Sošić 2008; Chinchuluun et al. 2008; Cachon & Netessine 2004; Moorthy 1985). 
Within this perspective, it is assumed that retailers will behave rationally, and will choose 
an action in order to maximize their expected payoff. This leads to predictability in 
retailers’ actions (Cachon & Lariviere 1999a). However, some have noted that retailers, 
as human decision-makers, may not always behave optimally and can exhibit substantial 
heterogeneity in their choices (Chen et al. 2011; Almadoss 2008). Thus, the “best” 
strategy for a manufacturer to utilize in order to minimize demand variance when 
retailers behave rationally is unclear if each retailer deviates from what is considered 
optimal, or rational decision-making. 
2.3.3.2 Retailer Shortage Gaming 
When retailers are faced with supply shortage, affected retailers may shortage 
game and inflate their subsequent order to hedge against future shortage (Nirajan et al. 
2011; Sheffi 2010). Lee et al. (1997) recognize that proportional rationing creates an 
incentive for retailers to raise their orders above their desired need. Even so, they do not 
determine by how much the retailers will inflate their orders or if order inflation is 
predictable (Cachon & Lariviere 1999b). Differing levels of order inflation on the part of 
a retailer may result. In addition, the ordering decisions of any given retailer may be 
dynamic and change over time.  
Research on inventory ordering behavior report various types of inventory 
ordering behaviors that may translate to heterogeneity in order inflation: no gaming, 
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correction gaming and overreaction gaming.  
No gaming results when actual demand is ordered consistently, regardless of 
external cues (Nienhaus et al. 2006). The response can result from the retailer’s strict 
adherence to a base-stock policy (Croson & Donohue 2006), also called a 1 to 1 policy 
(Kimbrough et al. 2002). The strategy is seen as the best solution for minimizing cost in a 
serial supply chain system if other parameters (e.g. price) are stationary (Chen 1999), 
because there is no distortion of demand. Retailers essentially order exactly what they 
determine they need. 
Correction gaming results in order inflation that is grounded in the observed 
shortage. Nirajan, Wagner and Bode (2011) observe the use of a dynamic decision rule to 
order inventory from a case study of an Asian automotive steering systems producer. 
They propose a “correction” mechanism, whereby inventory decision-makers notices that 
their previous ordering decision does not result in the expected outcome, and therefore 
their propensity to over-order increases. When managers utilize a correction mechanism, 
they adjust actual demand by their perception of unmet demand from the recent past 
because they assume that orders from unmet demand will never be shipped. In addition, 
this type of over-ordering is proposed as a method of communicating to, or getting the 
attention of, an unreliable supplier (Nirajan et al. 2011). The authors assert that a 
correction mechanism provides an alternative theoretical explanation for non-optimal 
inventory behavior compared to supply line underweighting which was first advanced by 
Sterman (1989a; 2006). Supply line underweighting results in an inflation of orders based 
on a dynamic adjustment heuristic similar to Nirajan, Wagner and Bode’s (2011) 
correction mechanism. However, its rationale assumes that managers ignore the supply 
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line (filled orders in transit) when making current ordering decisions. Supply line 
underweighting is attributed to the cognitive limitations on the part of managers and the 
difficulties inherent in managing a complex dynamic system, as their most salient 
concern is an immediate lack of critically needed inventory (Sterman 2006; Croson & 
Donohue 2006). 
Overreaction gaming occurs when retailers aggressively inflate orders. Olivia and 
Goncalves (2006) propose that the experience of inventory shortage create a dramatic, 
vivid, and disruptive event in comparison to the experience of holding excess inventory. 
Likewise, Rong, Shen and Snyder (2008) observe through a Beer Game experiment that 
overreaction to supply-side inventory disruptions resulted in significant changes in 44 
percent of retailers’ ordering behavior. While a larger percentage of Beer Game 
participants inflated their orders during a supply disruption, some did the opposite, 
indicating that people respond to disruptions differently (Rong et al. 2008). 
2.3.4 Inventory Ordering and Fulfillment Feedback Loop 
Overall, retailer shortage gaming places demands on the supply system that 
inevitably leads to future unfilled orders or unreliable deliveries (Disney & Towill 2003) 
and may increase the total demand variance experienced by the supply system (Lee et al. 
1997). Increasing demand variance can lead to tremendous inefficiencies in the supply 
chain overall, arising from excess inventory investment, poor customer service, lost 
revenues, misguided capacity plans, ineffective transportation, and missed production 
schedules (Lee et al. 1997).  
Over time, order rationing and shortage gaming can be characterized as an 
information feedback loop, where the order fill experienced by each retailer may signal 
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supply shortage and trigger shortage gaming behaviors (Li 2002; Lee et al. 1997). These 
orders contribute to the total demand experienced by the manufacturer, which may then 
trigger additional shortage gaming on the part of retailers. The inventory ordering and 
fulfillment feedback loop is illustrated in Figure 2-1.  
 
Figure 2-1 Simplified Inventory Ordering and Fulfillment Feedback Loop 
 
2.3.5 Summary 
Within supply inventory competition, there are three relevant elements when 
investigating the impact of multiple horizontal entities on the performance of 
interconnected retailers and manufacturer. First, manufacturer order rationing and second, 
retailer shortage gaming, both represents the respective behavior that each entity may 
exhibit in situations of constrained supply capacity and retail promotions demand shock. 
Third, retail promotions demand shock represents a real-world event that exacerbates 
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constrained supply capacity, a prerequisite for supply inventory competition.  
These elements may impact various performance measures relevant to the 
inventory ordering and fulfillment feedback loop as suggested by Lee, Padmanabhan, and 
Whang (1997). Specifically, relevant performance measures include the total demand 
variance experienced by the shared upstream manufacturer, customer service measures 
such as order fill rate for the manufacturer as well as each affected retailer, excess 
inventory investment in the form of inventory carrying costs for the manufacturer, and 
lost revenues in the form of the manufacturer’s opportunity costs when they are unable to 
fulfill demand. 
Following, section 2.4 discusses the experimental framework and hypotheses for 
this research. 
 
2.4 EXPERIMENTAL DESIGN AND HYPOTHESES 
The previous sections highlighted two research gaps in the supply chain 
management literature in order to present a conceptual framework of this research. First, 
the literature review shows that the impact of horizontal entities within an industrial 
business system has not been adequately addressed in supply chain management research. 
Most studies have treated the dynamics of these systems from a simplified, vertical 
perspective and omitted its horizontal aspects. Yet, phenomena such as supply inventory 
competition involve horizontal elements such as multiple, competing retailers. To fill this 
gap, this research explores the impact of supply inventory competition with explicit 
consideration of multiple, competing retailers on the more commonly considered vertical 
supply chain relationship between a manufacturer and a focal retailer. 
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Second, the literature review suggests that supply inventory competition involves 
three main elements of manufacturer order rationing, retailer shortage gaming, and retail 
promotions demand shock when investigating the impact of multiple horizontal entities 
on the performance of interconnected retailers and manufacturer. Manufacturer order 
rationing and retailer shortage gaming both represents the respective behavior that each 
entity may exhibit in situations of constrained supply capacity and retail promotions 
demand shock. Retail promotions demand shock represents a real-world event that 
exacerbates constrained supply capacity, a prerequisite for supply inventory competition. 
These variables may impact the long-term performance of the overall inventory ordering 
and fulfillment process connecting each entity. However, the dynamic and interactive 
nature of the three factors involved in supply inventory competition remains unclear. 
There is no research that concurrently and explicitly considers a manufacturer and 
horizontal entities (multiple retailers) as well as the interactions of a manufacturer’s 
choice of order rationing strategies with multiple retailer’s response of shortage gaming 
in the context of constrained supply/retailer promotions demand over time.  
This research seeks to fill these gaps by using discrete event simulation modeling 
to examine the impact of supply inventory competition on the long-term performance of 
the inventory ordering and fulfillment process between a manufacturer and multiple 
retailers, explore the dynamics of supply inventory competition over time in the context 
of retail promotions demand shock, and identify the interactive impact of various 
manufacturer order rationing strategies and retailer shortage gaming strategies on long-
term system behavior. 
Forrester’s theory of industrial dynamics (1958; 1961) suggests that interaction of 
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the structural elements, time relationship delays, and amplification relevant decision 
policies will interact within an information feedback system to impact the stability and 
long-term performance of the system. Structural elements relevant to supply inventory 
competition consist of the manufacturer and multiple retailers. Delays, or time 
relationships, are represented by the cycle of inventory ordering and fulfillment. Decision 
policies are represented by three different order rationing strategies the manufacturer may 
employ as well as a range of order inflation response each retailer may exhibit. The long-
term performance of the system can be inferred from measures such as the demand 
variance experienced by the manufacturer, order fill rates for each affected retailer as 
well as order fill rates for the shared upstream manufacturer, and costs associated with 
supply / demand misalignment such as the manufacturer’s cost of lost opportunity when 
they are unable to fulfill demand and the manufacturer’s cost of carrying excess 
inventory. In addition, exogenous shocks to the system may set into motion sustained 
instability within the system itself. Retail promotions demand shock represents a real-
world example of exogenous shock to supply inventory competition.  
Three elements of manufacturer order rationing, retailer shortage gaming, and retail 
promotions demand shock are examined over multiple independent entities. As this 
research seeks to determine the impact of horizontal elements (additional retailers) on a 
focal vertical supply chain, one retailer is designated a “focal” retailer (Retailer 1) while 
the additional retailers collectively represent supply inventory competition when they 
engage in shortage gaming. Thus, four experimental factors are investigated. Table 2-2 
(below) shows the experimental design and hypotheses proposed in the research. 
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Table 2-2 Experimental Factors and Outcomes 
Experimental Factors Outcomes 
Manufacturer 
Order 
Rationing 
Strategies 
 
Focal 
Retailer 
Shortage 
Gaming 
 
Supply 
Inventory 
Competition 
(Shortage 
Gaming 
from Other 
Retailers) 
Retail 
Promotions 
Demand 
Shock 
a. manufacturer’s demand 
variance 
b. manufacturer’s order fill 
rate 
c. focal retailer order fill rate  
d. other retailers’ order fill 
rates 
e. manufacturer’s cost of lost 
opportunity to fill demand 
f. manufacturer’s inventory 
carrying cost 
Levels: 
-Proportional 
-Linear 
-Uniform 
Levels: 
-No Gaming  
-Correction Gaming 
-Overreaction Gaming 
Levels: 
-None 
-Promotions 
 
Within the context of the inventory ordering and fulfillment, Forrester’s industrial 
dynamics theory (1958; 1961) suggest that decision policies such as manufacturer order 
rationing strategies will impact performance by decreasing the stability of the system. 
This is represented by significant impact on relevant performance measures such as 
demand variance, order fill rates for all involved entities, and manufacturer’s costs. 
Literature investigating various order rationing strategies also detail the nature and 
operationalization of “truth-inducing” versus “order-inflating” strategies. Cachon and 
Lariviere (1999b) suggest that Uniform versus Proportional or Linear order rationing 
strategies will result in outcome differences. A Uniform strategy may be less effective in 
matching retailer’s inventory allocation to their demand because its outcomes do not take 
into account each retailer’s relative demand, and may result in wide differences between 
what a particular retailer orders and what they are allocated according to the Uniform 
strategy (Cachon & Lariviere 1999b). When compared to the use of either Proportional or 
Linear order rationing strategies, the use of a Uniform rationing strategy over time may 
exacerbate the detrimental impact of supply/demand misalignment in the system. Thus, 
the first two hypothesis are proposed: 
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H1 - Manufacturer order rationing strategies significantly impact long-term system 
performance in the form of: a. the manufacturer’s demand variance, b. the 
manufacturer’s order fill rates, c. focal retailer order fill rate, d. other retailers’ order 
fill rates, e. the manufacturer’s cost of lost opportunity, and f. the manufacturer’s 
inventory carrying cost.  
H2 - Uniform order rationing strategy, compared to either Proportional or Linear order 
rationing strategies, has a greater positive impact on: a. increasing the manufacturer’s 
demand variance, b. decreasing the manufacturer’s order fill rates, c. decreasing focal 
retailer order fill rate, d. decreasing other retailers’ order fill rates, e. increasing the 
manufacturer’s cost of lost opportunity, and f. increasing the manufacturer’s inventory 
carrying cost. 
Consistent with extant literature on order rationing and shortage gaming (e.g. Lee 
et al. 1997; Cachon & Lariviere 1999b; Nirajan et al. 2011; Olivia & Goncalves 2006; 
Rong et al. 2008), if the focal retailer inflates their order in response to shortage caused 
by manufacturer order rationing, total demand variance will increase. The increased 
demand variance will also translate to decreased fill rates and additional costs throughout 
the inventory order and fulfillment system, suggesting the following hypothesis: 
H3 - Focal retailer (Retailer 1) shortage gaming directly impacts long-term system 
performance by: a. increasing the manufacturer’s demand variance, b. decreasing the 
manufacturer’s order fill rates, c. decreasing focal retailer order fill rate, d. decreasing 
other retailers’ order fill rates, e. increasing the manufacturer’s cost of lost opportunity, 
and f. increasing the manufacturer’s inventory carrying cost. 
As the absolute amount of their order inflation increases, the increasing stress on 
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the system will be translated to additional detrimental impact on the long-term 
performance of the system. The two different shortage gaming responses identified in the 
literature rely on different decision rules on the part of each retailer. Correction gaming is 
a dynamic rule and reflects order inflation that is based in prior experience. The absolute 
amount of inflation may change and increase over time as the experience of inventory 
shortage is compounded quarter after quarter. In contrast, Overreaction gaming calls for a 
consistent inflation of each retailer’s actual demand if they were shorted in the previous 
quarter. Over time, the compounded inflation of Correction gaming compared to the 
consistent inflation of Overreaction gaming may result in higher absolute order inflation 
levels, suggesting the following hypothesis: 
H4 - For the focal retailer (Retailer 1), Correction shortage gaming when compared to 
Overreaction shortage gaming, has a greater positive impact on: a. increasing the 
manufacturer’s demand variance, b. decreasing the manufacturer’s order fill rates, c. 
decreasing focal retailer order fill rate, d. decreasing other retailers’ order fill rates, e. 
increasing the manufacturer’s cost of lost opportunity, and f. increasing the 
manufacturer’s inventory carrying cost. 
Forrester’s industrial dynamics theory (1958; 1961) also suggest that the 
interactions of additional entities involved in the inventory ordering and fulfillment 
feedback loop will contribute to system instability. If multiple retailers independently 
react to inventory shortage as a result of manufacturer order rationing, then the system 
should exhibit increased instability. In addition, research on order rationing strategies 
indicate that differences in the relative demand of inventory orders may impact order fill 
outcomes (Cachon & Lariviere 1999b) which suggest that retailers who order a large 
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volume of inventory can be differentiated from retailers who order a small volume of 
inventory. Therefore two hypotheses are proposed: 
H5 - Supply inventory competition, in the form of either Correction or Overreaction 
gaming by retailers other than the focal retailer directly impacts long-term system 
performance by: a. increasing the manufacturer’s demand variance, b. decreasing the 
manufacturer’s order fill rates, c. decreasing focal retailer order fill rate, d. decreasing 
other retailers’ order fill rates, e. increasing the manufacturer’s cost of lost opportunity, 
and f. increasing the manufacturer’s inventory carrying cost. 
H6 - Supply inventory competition from retailers ordering a larger volume compared to 
other retailers will exhibit a greater positive impact on: a. increasing the manufacturer’s 
demand variance, b. decreasing the manufacturer’s order fill rates, c. decreasing focal 
retailer order fill rate, d. decreasing other retailers’ order fill rates, e. increasing the 
manufacturer’s cost of lost opportunity, and f. increasing the manufacturer’s inventory 
carrying cost. 
Per Forrester’s industrial dynamics theory (1958; 1961), if an exogenous shock 
such as a retail promotions demand shock is added to the system, then the system will 
exhibit sustained instability and suggests the following hypothesis: 
H7 - Retail promotions demand shock directly impacts long-term system performance by: 
a. increasing the manufacturer’s demand variance, b. decreasing the manufacturer’s 
order fill rates, c. decreasing focal retailer order fill rate, d. decreasing other retailers’ 
order fill rates, e. increasing the manufacturer’s cost of lost opportunity, and f. 
increasing the manufacturer’s inventory carrying cost. 
Finally, a core concept of Forrester’s theory of industrial dynamics (1958; 1961) 
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is that interactions between structural elements, time relationship delays, and 
amplification relevant decision policies will impact the stability and long-term 
performance of the system. Interactions include various two-way, three-way, and a four-
way combination of the main factors: manufacturer order rationing, retailer shortage 
gaming for a focal retailer, retailer shortage gaming for multiple other retailers (supply 
inventory competition), and retailer promotions demand shock. Thus, the following 
hypotheses are proposed: 
H8 - The two-way interaction of manufacturer order rationing and focal retailer 
shortage gaming significantly impact long-term system performance in the form of: a. the 
manufacturer’s demand variance, b. the manufacturer’s order fill rates, c. the focal 
retailer’s order fill rate, d. other retailers’ order fill rates, e. the manufacturer’s cost of 
lost opportunity, and f. the manufacturer’s inventory carrying cost. 
H9 - The two-way interaction of manufacturer order rationing and supply inventory 
competition significantly impact long-term system performance in the form of: a. the 
manufacturer’s demand variance, b. the manufacturer’s order fill rates, c. the focal 
retailer’s order fill rate, d. other retailers’ order fill rates, e. the manufacturer’s cost of 
lost opportunity, and f. the manufacturer’s inventory carrying cost 
H10 - The two-way interaction of manufacturer order rationing and retail promotions 
demand shock significantly impact long-term system performance in the form of: a. the 
manufacturer’s demand variance, b. the manufacturer’s order fill rates, c. the focal 
retailer’s order fill rate, d. other retailers’ order fill rates, e. the manufacturer’s cost of 
lost opportunity, and f. the manufacturer’s inventory carrying cost 
H11 – The two-way interaction of focal retailer shortage gaming and supply inventory 
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competition significantly impact long-term system performance in the form of: a. the 
manufacturer’s demand variance, b. the manufacturer’s order fill rates, c. the focal 
retailer’s order fill rate, d. other retailers’ order fill rates, e. the manufacturer’s cost of 
lost opportunity, and f. the manufacturer’s inventory carrying cost 
H12 - The two-way interaction of focal retailer shortage gaming and retail promotions 
demand shock significantly impact long-term system performance in the form of: a. the 
manufacturer’s demand variance, b. the manufacturer’s order fill rates, c. the focal 
retailer’s order fill rate, d. other retailers’ order fill rates, e. the manufacturer’s cost of 
lost opportunity, and f. the manufacturer’s inventory carrying cost 
H13 - The two-way interaction of supply inventory competition and retail promotions 
demand shock significantly impact long-term system performance in the form of: a. the 
manufacturer’s demand variance, b. the manufacturer’s order fill rates, c. the focal 
retailer’s order fill rate, d. other retailers’ order fill rates, e. the manufacturer’s cost of 
lost opportunity, and f. the manufacturer’s inventory carrying cost 
H14 - The three-way interaction of manufacturer order rationing, focal retailer shortage 
gaming, and supply inventory competition significantly impact long-term system 
performance in the form of: a. the manufacturer’s demand variance, b. the 
manufacturer’s order fill rates, c. the focal retailer’s order fill rate, d. other retailers’ 
order fill rates, e. the manufacturer’s cost of lost opportunity, and f. the manufacturer’s 
inventory carrying cost 
H15 - The three-way interaction of manufacturer order rationing, focal retailer shortage 
gaming, and retail promotions demand shock significantly impact long-term system 
performance in the form of: a. the manufacturer’s demand variance, b. the 
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manufacturer’s order fill rates, c. the focal retailer’s order fill rate, d. other retailers’ 
order fill rates, e. the manufacturer’s cost of lost opportunity, and f. the manufacturer’s 
inventory carrying cost 
H16 - The three-way interaction of manufacturer order rationing, supply inventory 
competition, and retail promotions demand shock significantly impact long-term system 
performance in the form of: a. the manufacturer’s demand variance, b. the 
manufacturer’s order fill rates, c. the focal retailer’s order fill rate, d. other retailers’ 
order fill rates, e. the manufacturer’s cost of lost opportunity, and f. the manufacturer’s 
inventory carrying cost 
H17 - The three-way interaction of focal retailer shortage gaming, supply inventory 
competition, and retail promotions demand shock significantly impact long-term system 
performance in the form of: a. the manufacturer’s demand variance, b. the 
manufacturer’s order fill rates, c. the focal retailer’s order fill rate, d. other retailers’ 
order fill rates, e. the manufacturer’s cost of lost opportunity, and f. the manufacturer’s 
inventory carrying cost 
H18 – The four-way interaction of manufacturer order rationing, focal retailer shortage 
gaming, supply inventory competition, and retail promotions demand shock significantly 
impact long-term system performance in the form of: a. the manufacturer’s demand 
variance, b. the manufacturer’s order fill rates, c. the focal retailer’s order fill rate, d. 
other retailers’ order fill rates, e. the manufacturer’s cost of lost opportunity, and f. the 
manufacturer’s inventory carrying cost  
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CHAPTER 3 
RESEARCH METHODS 
3.0 INTRODUCTION 
This chapter sets forth the research method used to test the hypotheses in five 
sections. First, the chapter discusses why simulation is an appropriate research 
methodology. Second, the chapter provides an overview of the simulation model based 
on literature and interviews. Third, the chapter addresses the rigor of the simulation 
model. Fourth, the chapter details the experimental design including experimental 
scenarios, inputs, controls, and outputs of the model. Finally, the chapter concludes by 
describing the statistical techniques that will be used for data analyses. 
 
3.1 SIMULATION METHOD 
3.1.1 Overview 
This research uses discrete event simulation as an appropriate method to test the 
hypotheses under a controlled experimental environment. Specifically, this research uses 
ARENA, a dynamic simulation software tool that combines SIMAN simulation language 
with a graphics component (Kelton et al. 2010). 
Simulation refers to methods of studying a wide variety of models of real world 
systems by numerical evaluation using software designed to imitate the system’s 
operations or characteristics (Kelton et al. 2010; Forrester 1958; Forrester 1961). It is 
ideally suited for modeling complex systems such as supply chains over time (Evers & 
Wan 2012; Manuj et al. 2009) as well as for evaluating the interactions of multiple 
variables (Davis et al. 2007). Thus, explicit calls have been made for the increased use of 
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simulation modeling to study supply chain systems (e.g. Waller & Fawcett 2011; Min & 
Zhou 2002; Bowersox & Closs 1989). In addition, simulation can provide robust 
conclusions in investigations where tradeoffs between a specified set of alternatives (e.g. 
various order rationing strategies and shortage gaming responses) can be evaluated 
(Manuj et al. 2009).  
Simulations are often used for hypothesis testing, as is the case for this research, 
because its ability to be replicated provides separate observations (data points) to form 
the foundation for experimentation (Ballou 1989). In comparison to research 
methodologies such as surveys, experiments allow for a high level of precision and are 
appropriate for determining causality (Creswell 2007a; McGrath 1982; Highhouse 2009). 
A key advantage of simulations is their control, a necessary requirement for 
experimentation (Evers & Wan 2012; Davis et al. 2007; Kelton & Barton 2003; Forrester 
1961; Forrester 1958). An empirical test of any causal relationship needs to assess the 
statistical correlation between independent and dependent variables, the temporal 
precedence among these variables, and exclude the possibility of confounding variables 
(Bachrach & Bendoloy 2011). Experiments through simulation allow for the precise 
temporal sequencing of treatment and effects, and also allow for the randomization of 
spurious causes so that they do not correlate with the treatment (Siemsen 2011).  
Due to its inherent nature, simulations provide the precision, control, and 
temporal control appropriate for this research. The research seeks to answer two 
questions: 1. Does supply inventory competition impact vertical industrial business 
systems? and 2. How can supply inventory competition impact the inventory ordering 
and fulfillment process in the context of a retail promotions demand shock over time? In 
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order to answer these questions, it is first necessary to precisely examine situations where 
supply inventory competition can occur, when total demand exceeds supply in a system 
where multiple retailers purchase the same good from a shared manufacturer. Methods 
such as surveys may not be able to isolate the required context from possible confounding 
elements as well as a simulation might (Manuj et al. 2009; McGrath 1982). Second, as 
supply inventory competition involves conflicting actions from multiple parties 
(manufacturer and multiple retailers) and each has choices in their actions (various order 
rationing strategies and shortage gaming responses), it is necessary to identify and track 
each participant-choice scenario such that cause-effect relationships with outputs of 
interest can be determined. Methodologies such as analytical modeling with limits in 
mathematical tractability (Evers & Wan 2012), may not be able to adequately address the 
complex, interactive nature of this research. Finally, in order to understand the dynamics 
of supply inventory competition, the variables and outputs of interest must be observed 
and tracked over time, which is feasible for simulations (Kelton et al. 2010) and is ideal 
for understanding industrial dynamics (Forrester 1958; 1961). 
Simulations are logical representations of an actual system, and thus cannot 
ensure generalizability beyond the system under consideration (Evers & Wan 2012; 
Meredith 1998). As a representation of an actual system, some scholars have voiced 
concern that simulations can be unrealistic and therefore unable to yield valid theoretical 
insights (Chattoe-Brown 1998; Fine & Elsbach 2000 as cited in Davis et al. 2007). As a 
compromise between model complexity and reality, the supply chain should be modeled 
in such a way that it is reflective of key real-world dimensions (Min & Zhou 2002). This 
is accomplished through the use of real-world settings in the simulation model and real-
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world data to inform the simulation parameters (Manuj et al. 2009; Reiner 2005; Van der 
Zee & Van der Vorst 2005). The following sections detail the steps taken to ensure rigor, 
and both internal validity as well as external validity in the simulation research. 
3.1.2 Procedure for Rigorous Simulation Research 
Manuj, Mentzer and Bowers (2009) recommend eight steps to ensure rigor in 
simulation research. These steps are distilled and compiled from multiple sources on 
building simulation models. They are summarized in Table 3-1. 
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Table 3-1 Summary of Recommended Procedure for Rigorous Simulations 
Recommended Steps  Description 
1. Formulate the 
problem 
• State the research question and objectives precisely such that 
performance measures of interest, scope of the model, time 
frame and resources required may be determined accurately. 
2. Specify 
independent and 
dependent variables 
• Ensure that independent variables reflect the system 
parameters while dependent variables reflect the performance 
outputs of interest. 
• A comprehensive literature review and consultation with 
subject matter experts can help confirm that the identified 
variables are appropriate to the research questions and 
objectives. 
3. Develop and 
validate the 
simulation’s 
conceptual model 
• Identify the process that is being modeled based on literature 
and/or managerial interviews. 
• This process is an abstraction of the real-world system under 
investigation and is in the form of a 
mathematical/logical/verbal representation (Sargent 2011). 
• Identification of the relationships included in the model 
ensures that the model develops in accordance with the 
research question(s) and objectives. 
4. Define data 
requirements and 
establish sources for 
data collection 
• Establish data requirements in order to operationalize 
variables that reflect both experimental and fixed parameters 
of the model. This includes probability distributions of 
variables of interest, obtained from objective sources and/or 
managerial interviews. 
5. Develop and verify 
computer-based 
model 
• Develop a detailed sequence of events and crosscheck the 
model output against manual calculations in order to verify 
that the computer-based model behaves in the manner 
intended.  
6. Validate the 
computer-based 
model 
• Validate the computer-based model to ensure accuracy and 
reliability. 
• This can be done through consultation with subject matter 
experts, performing a structured walk-through and checking 
for reasonableness of results and performing sensitivity 
analysis. 
7. Perform 
simulations 
• Specify the number of independent replications required in 
order to ensure confidence in the data. 
• Additionally, run length and warm-up period is specified after 
conducting initial runs on the simulation. 
• Simulations are then run according to the experimental design 
and data is collected for each run. 
8. Analyze and 
document results 
• Establish appropriate statistical techniques, making sure to 
address the assumptions required for those techniques such as 
data normality and the absence of outliers. 
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Steps 1 and 2 were addressed in both Chapters 1 and 2. The following sections of 
this chapter will address Steps 3 through 7 by providing information regarding the 
development and validation of the simulation model, the data sources of experimental 
and fixed simulation parameters, as well as the verification and validation of the 
simulation itself. Step 8 is reported in Chapter 4. 
  
3.2 THE SIMULATION MODEL 
This section discusses the simulation setting including data from interviews, the 
supply chain structure, and the sequence of events. In order to ground the simulation in a 
real-world setting (Manuj et al. 2009; Reiner 2005; Van der Zee & Van der Vorst 2005), 
external face validity is provided through literature, publicly available industry data, and 
managerial interviews regarding the characteristics of the system under investigation. The 
simulation structure and event sequence reveals the logic and processes of the studied 
system and indicates how the simulation captures key characteristics of the real-world 
system. 
3.2.1 Simulation Setting 
The research is grounded in a real-world setting in order to ensure the 
applicability of its results (Manuj et al. 2009; Reiner 2005; Van der Zee & Van der Vorst 
2005). An appropriate setting for this research is a major household appliance supply 
chain based in the US, similar to Forrester’s original industrial dynamics research setting 
(1958; 1961). The setting is appropriate for several reasons. First, promotions are a large 
part of the appliance industry (Zimmerman 2012), which is appropriate for the research’s 
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context, objectives, and questions. Although manufacturers offer rebates directly to 
consumers, retailers also offer their own promotions in the form of temporary price 
discounts, free value-added services such as delivery and installation setup, or special 
financing options in order to incentivize consumers to purchase. These marketing 
initiatives are initiated by the retailer and are not always known in advance by 
manufacturers, thus representing the retail promotion demand shock under investigation 
in this research. 
Second, the market for major appliances is mature due to high penetration rates in 
US households (MarketLine 2012) and allow for reasonable representation of base 
consumer demand. Major appliance purchases occur primarily for replacement purposes 
and products such as refrigerators are characterized by a consistent annual seasonal 
pattern that can be derived from publicly available data. Although technological advances 
such as internet-enabled appliances are pursued by manufacturers as a way to impact 
consumer preference, new product innovations are only beginning to impact consumer 
demand (Bloomberg BusinessWeek Jan 26 2011). Overall, the market demand for major 
appliances is steady and mature. This limits the possibility of confounding factors in 
modeling base consumer demand, thus increasing the external validity of the simulation. 
Finally, due to the maturity of the industry, major appliance manufacturers’ 
supply chains are well known which allows for an accurate simulation model to be 
established. Major appliances manufacturers consist of several large firms. Collectively, 
the top three firms (Whirlpool, GE, and AB Electrolux) command over 80% market share 
in the US (Kelly 2012). Manufacturers typically sell directly to a consolidated set of 
customers, consisting mostly of national retailers (Webb 2011; Sagar 2003). According to 
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the Association of Home Appliance Manufacturers, the top nine retailers encompass 84% 
of appliance sales in 2011 (TWICE 2012). These retailers include department stores, 
home improvement or construction suppliers, electronics retailers and general 
merchandise retailers (TWICE 2012) who compete against each other on a national level. 
The large customers enjoy a degree of power within their relationships with appliance 
manufacturers due to their high volume activity and hands-on facilitation of consumer 
purchasing for high involvement “big ticket” appliances (Davis-Sramek et al. 2009).  
In summary, the maturity of the major appliances industry allows the simulation 
to be created based on a known supply chain structure with understood parameters (Webb 
2011). This allows the simulation to recreate important aspects of the supply chain with 
few assumptions in order to increase the simulation’s external validity (Webb 2011). 
Moreover, characteristics such as supply inventory competition within the customer 
echelon and the existence of retailer power within their relationship with manufacturers 
fit within the research’s contextual requirements. 
3.2.2 Data from Interviews 
Data from first-person interviews were utilized in order to provide a sound basis 
for the simulation design and inputs. Interviews are an important initial step in carrying 
out simulation research and should reflect the research context (Nyaga 2006). Therefore, 
individuals who are highly knowledgeable of inventory processes at two leading firms in 
the US major appliances industry (a leading major appliance manufacturer and a leading 
major appliance retailer) were asked to characterize important aspects of their inventory 
replenishment process such that information from third-party sources (e.g. industry data 
or literature) can be triangulated (Yin 2003) to build a robust simulation. 
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Two interviews were conducted. The first was with a consultant to a leading 
appliance manufacturer and the second was with a former Director of Logistics & 
Merchandise Buyer at a leading appliance retailer. Each interview was conducted 
following recommendations for qualitative research methodology (e.g. Corbin & Strauss 
2008; Creswell 2007; Bryman 2008; Yin 2003). Interviews were semi-structured with 
open-ended questions that allowed the participants to relate their understanding of the 
inventory ordering and fulfillment process. These types of questions enabled respondents 
to give a detailed narrative of events and sequences that are then reconstructed to develop 
a typical inventory replenishment process flow. During the interview, probing questions 
were asked to establish details (e.g. operational measures), which provided or 
corroborated publicly available information for the simulation design and inputs. 
Responses to these questions provided the basis for the design of a simulation model that 
replicates the inventory replenishment process in a major household appliance supply 
chain as closely as possible. Each interview lasted approximately one hour in length and 
were recorded and transcribed. The resulting transcripts were sent to each participant for 
verification of content. 
The simulation model requires knowledge of the supply chain structure in order to 
accurately depict the number of independent entities, the inventory ordering and 
fulfillment process in order to model a sequence of events, and key variable distributions 
in order to accurately reflect the system of interest. Data from interviews with a leading 
appliance manufacturer and a leading appliance retailer, coupled with third-party data, 
provided the following pertinent information on the: 1. supply chain structure, 2. 
manufacturer’s production capacity, 3. inventory ordering and fulfillment process, 4. 
  
 71 
manufacturer order rationing, 5. retailer shortage gaming, and 6. retail promotions 
activity. 
3.3.2.1 Supply Chain Structure 
Based on the interview, the manufacturer has nine primary customers; each 
customer is a national retailer who competes against the other retailers. The nine retailers 
vary by order volume in an approximate Pareto distribution with three classes of 
customer types (“A”, “B”, or “C” retailers). The manufacturer’s “A” customers are 
generally home repair or hardware stores or construction suppliers (Webb 2011). 
Manufacturing occurs generally in North America and each factory has its own 
distribution center. Customers either take delivery of product to their regional distribution 
centers or to a manufacturer’s regional distribution center (Webb 2011). Orders are 
communicated at a corporate level directly from retailer(s) to the manufacturer. 
The manufacturer has two major competitors who also sell similar products to 
national retailers. Although each manufacturer is in possession of a known brand, the 
retailer has observed that to a certain degree consumers will substitute products from 
competing manufacturers. Retailers who are unable to obtain inventory from a given 
manufacturer may turn to other manufacturers to substitute demand. 
3.2.2.2 Manufacturer’s Production Capacity 
The manufacturer produces near capacity in order to minimize unit production 
costs. In addition, excess capacity is limited as industry reports and investor 
communications confirm that the manufacturer has undergone periodic reorganization of 
manufacturing facilities in order to more closely match production capacity with demand 
(MarketLine 2012; Kelly 2012; Company X 10-K). Analysts report that industry capacity 
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is also constrained due to high fixed costs resulting from substantial manufacturing and 
assembly plants (MarketLine 2012). Unlike simpler consumer products, there seems to be 
limited possibility of outsourcing production for additional temporary capacity. For a 
single representative product such as refrigerators, approximately 90,000 units per quarter 
are representative of production capacity. This number is corroborated with third-party 
data, obtained from publicly available shipment data from the Association of Home 
Appliance Manufacturers (TWICE 2012) when the manufacturer’s market share (Kelly 
2012) is taken into account.  
3.2.2.3 Inventory Ordering and Fulfillment Process 
At a corporate level, sales and operations planning between manufacturer and 
retailers occur on a quarterly schedule. For the manufacturer, orders from all retailers are 
aggregated and considered simultaneously at the beginning of each quarter. At this time, 
total demand for the coming quarter is compared to available inventory and production 
capacity as the manufacturer produces based on a make to stock strategy (Webb 2011). 
Although both manufacturer and retailer are privy to shared POS data, the inventory 
replenishment process seems to be more focused on forecasted demand from the retailer. 
3.2.2.4 Manufacturer Order Rationing 
The manufacturer utilizes order rationing policies if their total demand exceeds 
supply for a given quarter. While the retailer is aware that order rationing occurs (for 
example, they can physically observe competitor’s stock of product that they themselves 
are shorted), they are not privy to the details of a specific order rationing policy. Thus this 
simulation is based on an asymmetric information context that most closely mirrors the 
real-life supply chain. 
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3.2.2.5 Retailer Shortage Gaming 
The retailer utilizes shortage gaming in order to ensure adequate fill rates. Order 
fill rates for appliances tend to be lower than other products stocked by the retailer. The 
retailer interview revealed that shortage gaming primarily occurs based on a correction 
heuristic on the part of the inventory manager with an inflation range of 20 to 25 percent 
over actual need, or can be significantly inflated as a tactic to obtain the manufacturer’s 
attention similar to the literature discussion on overreaction gaming. In the instance of 
overreaction gaming, an inflation range of 200 to 500 percent over actual need was given 
as examples of prior actions. This was used by the retailer to “make a point” to the 
manufacturer but also took into account the presence of promotions planned by the 
retailer, to “be ready, just in case”. Overall, the practice of shortage gaming is not 
explicitly acknowledged in the relationship between retailer and manufacturer. 
3.2.2.6 Retail Promotions 
The manufacturer experiences unplanned demand shock from retailer’s 
promotions. The retailer is generally aware of other retailer’s promotions activity through 
basic monitoring of competitor’s public actions as well as through inventory shortage 
from the manufacturer. When the retailer has a promotions initiative planned, they are 
reluctant to completely share this information due to fear that competitors will somehow 
anticipate the promotion through communication with the shared manufacturer. In 
anticipation of selling more units during a retail promotion, the retailer will increase their 
order from the manufacturer. While the amount of order increase is a function of the 
retailer’s promotional sales history, generally the lift in sales for the retailer would not 
exceed more than 50% of normal sales due to the nature of major appliances (a big ticket 
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item). When faced with increased demand from a retailer due to retail promotions, there 
is a back and forth process of negotiation and compromise regarding the amount the 
manufacturer can fill. The back and forth negotiation process was explicitly described as 
a “game” by the retailer. The retailer reports that rarely 100% of the retailer’s retail 
promotions order is filled whereas 80% of that order may be more feasible. The retailer is 
also pragmatic regarding the ability of the manufacturer’s largest customer to command 
better customer service and higher order fill from the manufacturer. As one of the 
manufacturer’s largest customers, the retailer also expects the manufacturer to recognize 
the importance of their high order volume compared to the manufacturer’s other 
customers. 
3.2.3 Simulation Structure and Sequence of Events 
Figure 3-1 shows the simulated supply chain based on data from interviews and 
industry reports. Order information (depicted with dashed lines) flows from each of nine 
retailers to the manufacturer. Product (depicted with solid lines) flows from the 
manufacturer to each retailer. The manufacturer’s two main competitors are represented 
by “Other Manufacturers” who fill demand from retailers that the focal manufacturer 
cannot meet each quarter. Figure 3-2 shows a flow chart of event sequences, based on 
data from interviews. 
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Figure 3-1 Simulated Supply Chain 
 
Figure 3-2 Simulation's Sequence of Events 
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On a typical simulated “day” which represents a quarterly period, the following 
event sequence occurs: 
Step 1. The manufacturer receives orders simultaneously from all retailers and aggregates 
all orders to determine total demand. 
Step 2. The manufacturer must determine if total demand exceeds supply. If it does not, 
then orders are filled based on each retailer’s order and Step 3 is skipped. If it does, then 
the process proceeds to Step 3. 
Step 3. The manufacturer fills orders based on one order rationing rule (determined by the 
experimental scenario). 
Step 4. Retailers receive their product. 
Step 5. Retailers determine if their order fill rate is less than 1. If it does not, then orders 
are placed based on true demand and Step 6 is skipped. If it is, then the process proceeds 
to Step 6. 
Step 6. Each retailer places their individual order based on true demand and a shortage 
gaming rule (determined by the experimental scenario). 
Step 7. The last event is collection of statistics. Fill rates and orders for each retailer are 
recorded. Individual statistics are then aggregated post experiment to calculate outcome 
variables. The system returns to the first event after the last event is complete, repeating 
the same sequence until the simulation period is over. This is repeated for a total of 30 
replications for each scenario (see section 3.3.5 Simulation Replications for detailed 
information). 
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3.3 RIGOR 
Sargent (2011) provides a comprehensive assessment of four types of simulation 
validity that ensure that the simulation works as intended, can be replicated, and its 
results can be applied to the system of interest with confidence. First, conceptual model 
validity tests that the theories and assumptions underlying the conceptual model are 
correct and that the mathematical, logical, and verbal model representation of the 
problem is “reasonable” for the intended purpose. Second, computer-based model 
verification ensures that the computer programming and implementation of the 
conceptual model are correct. Third, operational validity determines whether the model 
output behavior has sufficient accuracy for the research’s intended purpose. Finally, data 
validity ensures that data necessary for model building, model evaluation and testing, and 
conducting of model experiments are adequate and correct. In addition, the number of 
replications of each simulation scenario is an important indicator of rigor (Webb 2011; 
Law & Kelton 2000). Table 3-2 summarizes the techniques that will be used to ensure 
rigor in this research. 
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Table 3-2 Simulation Rigor 
Test Purpose  Technique Utilized 
Conceptual 
Model 
Validity 
Model representation 
is consistent with its 
intended application 
• Face validation 
• Supply chain structure based on 
characteristics of a major appliance supply 
chain 
• Characteristics determined through 
interviews, third-party data, and literature 
• Managers and academics reviewed the 
model 
Computer-
Based Model 
Verification 
Computer 
programming and 
computer model 
implementation are 
correct 
• Traces of each simulation activity compared 
to analytical hand calculations 
• Traces to verify relationships of the entire 
simulation 
Operational 
Validity 
Model output behavior 
has sufficient accuracy 
and consistency 
• Degenerate Tests 
• Parameter Variability-Sensitivity Analysis 
• Initialization bias testing 
Data Validity Data used in model 
building, evaluation, 
and testing are 
adequate and correct 
• Input parameters based on data from 
interviews, third-party sources and literature 
• Consistency checks and outlier screening 
Replications Sample size creates 
adequate statistical 
reliability 
• Sample size calculation (Law & Kelton 
2000, page 512) 
 
3.3.1 Conceptual Model Validity 
Sargent (2011) defines conceptual model validation as determining that the 
theories and assumptions underlying the conceptual model are correct and that the model 
representation of the problem entity is “reasonable” for the intended purpose of the 
model. 
A primary technique used to test conceptual validity is face validation (Sargent 
2011). Face validation has subject matter experts evaluate the conceptual model to 
determine if it is correct and reasonable for its purpose. This usually requires examining 
the process model or the set of model equations. In this research, the conceptual model 
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was verified through consultation with inventory ordering and fulfillment, major 
appliance supply chain, and simulation methodology subject matter experts. In addition, 
the use of empirical data from third-party sources bridges the gap between academic rigor 
and managerial applicability (Shafer & Smunt 2004). This research models 
characteristics of a major appliance supply chain in the US. The simulation is based on 
data derived from interviews, third-party sources, and literature. By utilizing data from 
different sources, the simulation ensures that face validity is established.  
3.3.2 Computer-Based Model Verification 
Computerized model verification is defined as assuring that the computer 
programming and implementation of the conceptual model are correct (Sargent 2011). 
Specifically, this is accomplished by testing if the model was programmed correctly in 
the ARENA simulation software.  
The primary technique used to determine that the model has been programmed 
correctly is trace validation. The outputs of different activities in the model are traced 
(followed) through the model to determine if the model’s logic is correct and if the 
necessary accuracy is obtained (Sargent 2011). Simulation outputs are compared with 
hand calculations to see whether the program passes information as intended (Law & 
Kelton 2000). A file with each simulation activity performed (e.g. order fill) was created 
and errors detected in the model were evaluated and fixed.  
Traces were also run to verify the entire simulation (Law & Kelton 2000; Sargent 
2011). Relationships between simulation inputs and outputs were tested using basic, 
deterministic values. These were, in turn, compared to analytical values. The traces 
through the system found no significant deviations from expected outcomes, thus 
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verifying the computer-based model. 
3.3.3 Operational Validity 
Operational validity is defined as determining that the model’s output behavior 
has sufficient accuracy for the model’s intended purpose over the domain of the model’s 
intended applicability (Sargent 2011). A number of validation techniques can be used to 
establish operational validity. Two techniques were used in this research: Degenerate 
Tests and Parameter Variability–Sensitivity Analysis. 
The degeneracy of the model’s behavior was tested by appropriate selection of 
values for the input and control parameters (Sargent 2011). The model exhibited a 
predictable behavior. For example, an increase in manufacturer production capacity such 
that it exceeds total demand resulted in 100 percent order fill rates. 
In parameter variability–sensitivity analysis, values of the input and internal 
parameters of a model were changed to extreme values to determine the effect upon the 
model’s behavior and its output. The extreme parameters caused no unexpected results 
suggesting that the simulation is internally consistent and valid. 
Initiation bias is also a threat to operational validity (Chen & Kelton 2008). 
Initiation bias occurs when the simulation goes through an initial warm-up period. 
Statistics collected during this period may bias output data from the steady state period. 
In order to identify this bias, a comparison of histograms of the performance variables for 
various run-lengths at independent time periods was made in order to identify the shortest 
run-time with stable histogram quartiles (Chen & Kelton 2008). Follow-on examination 
of simulation performance show that the simulation experienced a very limited 
initialization bias of one year as the simulation was programmed with initial primed order 
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fill rates of 100 percent. Based on this information, retail promotions demand shock was 
programmed to occur in Year 4, Quarter 2. Data for analysis for all scenarios was 
collected immediately post retail promotions demand shock for a total of 5 years.  
3.3.4 Data Validity 
Sargent (2011) defines data validity as ensuring that the data necessary for model 
building, model evaluation and testing, and conducting of model experiments are 
adequate and correct. This was done through internal consistency checks and screening 
for outliers. Examination of output data showed consistency in range and no outliers. 
3.3.5 Simulation Replications 
The number of replications in a simulation study represents sample size, which 
determines the accuracy of stochastic variables (Nyaga 2006). Law and Kelton (2000) 
provide a procedure to calculate the number of replications required to estimate 
population mean at a specified precision. This allows for the assumption regarding 
normality of results, thus improving accuracy and confidence in the results. According to 
Law and Kelton (2000, page 512), an approximate expression for the minimum number 
of replications, na*(β), required to obtain an absolute error of β is given by: 
na*(β) = min {i ≥ n: ti-1,1-α/2√(S2(n)/i) ≤ β} 
The value for na*(β) can be determined by interactively increasing i by one until a 
value of i is obtained for which ti-1,1-α/2√(S2(n)/i) ≤ β. For example, to estimate the 
manufacturer’s order fill rate with an absolute error, β, of 0.05 and a confidence level, α, 
of 90 percent, initial pilot runs of the most complex scenarios was done and initial mean 
(µ) and variance (S2) were computed. An S2 = 0.0104 was obtained. According to the 
formula above, a minimum of 14 replications was required. Critical values of t give t(13, 
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0.05) = 1.7709. Using the equation {i ≥ n: ti-1,1-α/2√(S2(n)/i) ≤ β}, a minimum of 14 
replications satisfy the ti-1,1-α/2√(S2(n)/i) ≤ β requirement. 
A large sample size indicates that estimated mean is closer to true mean and a 
large number of replications increases accuracy and confidence in simulation results 
(Nyaga 2006). A statistically large, thirty-replication sample size produces an estimate of 
actual relative error (the previously calculated confidence interval divided by the mean) 
of .031 or an α of 97 percent (Law & Kelton 2000, page 513). Therefore, thirty 
replications were run per experimental scenario following convention provided by extant 
simulation research (e.g. Closs et al. 2010; Nyaga et al. 2007). 
 
3.4 SIMULATION EXPERIMENTAL DESIGN 
3.4.1 Overview 
In simulations, the model processes experimental inputs in order for changes in 
outputs to be examined (Kelton et al. 2010). In this research, various combinations of 
order rationing and shortage gaming strategies for a manufacturer and its nine customers 
(retailers), as well as retail promotion demand shock, are modeled as the inputs. Then, the 
simulated supply chain based on fixed parameters acts as a control model. The resulting 
outputs are dependent variables that enable the research to make conclusions about the 
effects of horizontal competition and retail promotion demand shock on the demand 
variance experienced by the manufacturer. The following sections define the inputs, 
describe the fixed parameter supply chain model, and discuss the dependent variables. 
3.4.2 Experimental Parameters 
This research examines three major elements related to the topic of supply 
  
 83 
inventory competition: manufacturer order rationing strategies, retailer shortage gaming 
responses, and retail promotions demand shock. These elements translate to four 
experimental factors where retailer shortage gaming responses are split into a focal 
retailer’s shortage gaming responses and supply inventory competition that is comprised 
of multiple non-focal retailers’ shortage gaming responses. Within the experimental 
factor of supply inventory competition, multiple retailers within the real-world supply 
chain occupy different classes of customer types depending on order volume. “A” type 
customers are large-sized retailers, “B” type customers are medium-sized retailers, and 
“C” type customers are small-sized retailers.  
Overall, this translates to a total of six independent inputs: manufacturer order 
rationing; retailer shortage gaming for a focal retailer, retailer shortage gaming for each 
of the three classes of other retailers (“A”, “B”, or “C” customers by volume 
distribution); and retail promotion demand shock. There are three levels of manufacturer 
order rationing strategies, three levels of retailer shortage gaming strategies, and two 
levels of retail promotion demand shock. Thus, a 3x3x33x2 full factorial design yielding 
486 scenarios will be used to generate data and test hypotheses. A total sample size of 
14,580 observations result from 486 scenarios and 30 replications of each scenario. The 
experimental parameters are summarized in Table 3-3. 
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Table 3-3 Experimental Parameters 
Variable Simulates Categories Operationalization of the 
Categories 
Manufacturer 
Order Rationing 
Strategy 
(RATION) 
Actions of the 
manufacturer in 
order fulfillment 
if total demand 
exceeds supply 
for the given 
quarter 
3 Proportional = a customer 
receives the same percentage of 
capacity as their relative demand 
is to total orders 
Linear = each customer order is 
shorted an equal absolute 
amount 
Uniform = capacity is divided 
equally among customers 
Retailer Shortage 
Gaming Strategy 
(R1.GAME) 
(RA.GAME) 
(RB.GAME) 
(RC.GAME) 
Actions of each 
retailer in 
inventory 
ordering if their 
previous quarter’s 
order was shorted 
3 No Gaming = actual demand is 
ordered, no supply inventory 
competition 
Correction Gaming = each 
customer orders actual demand 
plus their unmet demand from 
the previous period 
Overreaction Gaming = orders 
are inflated significantly, 2 times 
actual demand 
Retail Promotions 
Demand Shock 
(PROMOTIONS) 
A large order by a 
large volume 
retailer, a 
minimum of 80% 
of which must be 
filled by the 
manufacturer 
2 No Promotions = None 
Promotions = Retail promotion 
demand shock, 1.5 times base 
demand for the focal Retailer 1 
 
3.4.2.1 Manufacturer Order Rationing Strategy 
Within simulation step 3, the manufacturer fills orders based on a single order 
rationing rule if total demand exceeds supply for the quarter. These rules are set per each 
experimental scenario and only one can be utilized within any given experimental 
scenario. The rule can either be a proportional, linear, or uniform rationing rule, each 
based on literature previously established in the literature review (e.g. Cachon & 
Lariviere 1999b). 
Proportional rationing dictates that retailers receive the same percentage of 
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capacity as their relative demand is to total demand. It is operationalized in the following 
manner: if a retailer’s order is x% of total orders, they receive x% of available capacity.  
Linear rationing shorts each retailer order by an equal absolute amount. It is 
operationalized as the difference between total orders and capacity, divided by the 
number of retailers. This amount is then subtracted from each retailer’s order. If a 
negative allocation results for a retailer, then that retailer receives zero allocation and the 
process is repeated with the remaining retailers.  
Uniform rationing divides capacity equally among retailers. It is operationalized 
by an equal division of available inventory and capacity by the manufacturer among the 
retailers; if any retailer orders less than their equally allocated share, they receive their 
full order and the remaining capacity is allocated equally among the remaining retailers. 
3.4.2.2 Retailer Shortage Gaming for Each Retailer 
Within simulation step 6, each retailer determines next quarter’s order amount 
based on a shortage gaming rule if they had experienced inventory shortage (i.e. their 
order fill rate was less than 1) in simulation step 5. Similar to the manufacturer’s order 
rationing strategy variable, these rules are set per each experimental scenario with only 
one utilized per retailer within any given scenario. However, based on the scenario, some 
retailers may utilize one rule whereas others may utilize another rule. The focal retailer 
(Retailer 1) and each class of retailer, based on their volume distribution (see section 
3.3.2.1 for discussion on the simulation’s supply chain structure), may each utilize 
different rules in a given scenario. For example, the focal retailer (represented by Retailer 
1), other “A” retailers (represented by Retailers 2 and 3), “B” retailers (represented by 
Retailers 4, 5, 6, and 7), and “C” retailers (represented by Retailers 8 and 9) can all react 
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differently to the manufacturer’s order rationing within a given scenario. Based on the 
literature reviewed in section 2.3.3.2 Retailer Shortage Gaming, the rule can either be 
one of no gaming, correction gaming, or overreaction gaming. 
No gaming is operationalized as ordering the retailer’s actual demand. Despite 
experiencing inventory shortage, the retailer does not react by inflating their next 
quarter’s order. Essentially, retailers utilizing this rule do not actively engage in supply 
inventory competition.  
Correction gaming is operationalized as a dynamic rule, where the retailer orders 
their actual demand plus their unmet demand from the previous period. Depending on the 
amount the retailer was just shorted, the absolute amount of order may vary within a 
given scenario. 
Overreaction gaming is operationalized as a significant inflation of actual 
demand. The retailer interview suggested that an inflation of 200 percent to 500 percent 
over actual need is feasible and has been used by the retailer in the past. For this 
simulation, Overreaction gaming was conservatively set at the low end of the inflation 
range suggested by the retailer interview, at 200 percent over actual need each quarter, in 
order to provide realistic bounds for the simulation. 
3.4.2.3 Retail Promotions Demand Shock 
The next experimental variable used in the simulation is retail promotion demand 
shock. Depending on the experimental scenario, there are two categories: No promotions 
and Promotions. When retail promotion demand shock is called for, a large volume 
retailer will demand a one-time large order from the manufacturer at the beginning of the 
simulation. This large order represents demand from a retailer’s marketing initiative such 
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as retail promotions.  
While a shock pattern is commonly discussed as a demand management issue 
arising from retail promotions (e.g. Coyle et al. 2013; Bowersox et al. 2010), specific 
data is limited. One study, utilizing historical sales information from a US Fortune 500 
consumer products company, report that retail promotional activity resulted in spikes of 
demand that were 5 times normal experienced by the manufacturer (Lummus et al. 2003). 
Adebanjo (2009) detail the promotional profile for two food products. Demand during 
inter-promotion periods was limited for both products and resulted in a demand pattern 
that consisted primarily of promotional spikes. Base demand ranged from 5 percent to 10 
percent of peak sales, suggesting that retail promotions increased demand by a factor of 9 
times normal (Adebanjo 2009). The interview with the retailer suggested that promotions 
demand varied. Although retailer primarily relied on prior promotions history to forecast 
upcoming promotions demand, a factor of 1.5 normal demand was discussed for large 
ticket item such as refrigerators. Given this information, the simulation conservatively 
sets retail promotions demand at 1.5 times the base demand for the focal retailer (Retailer 
1). If promotions demand within the scenario exceeds the base demand of a large retailer 
by a large factor (such as 5) as suggested by the literature, there is the possibility that it 
will exceed the total production of the manufacturer for each quarter.  
As discussed in section 3.3.3 Operational Validity, the demand shock will be 
applied in Year 4, Quarter 2 for appropriate scenarios. Once the retail promotions 
demand is ordered, the retailer interview suggested that the manufacturer and retailer 
undergo a series of negotiation regarding the order amount. In order to represent the back 
and forth interaction between the retailer and manufacturer and its final outcome (see 
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section 3.2.2.6 Retail Promotions), the simulation allows the manufacturer to fill the 
retail promotions demand order to a minimum of 80% if there is limited supply. If there 
is available supply for all, the entire promotions order is filled. The remaining orders 
from other retailers are then filled according to the scenario rules. This action is 
consistent with reports regarding the leverage large retailers possess in their relationships 
with appliance manufacturers. The high volume activity and hand-on facilitation of 
consumer purchasing for high involvement “big ticket” appliances ensures a degree of 
power for large retailers in their relationships with appliance manufacturers (Davis-
Sramek et al. 2009).  
3.4.3 Fixed Parameters 
The fixed parameters of the simulation reflect a simple inventory replenishment 
process for one product between a single manufacturer and nine retailers. These 
characteristics are based on data from interviews of a leading major appliance 
manufacturer and retailer, third-party industry reports, and literature. The fixed 
parameters are summarized in Table 3-4. 
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Table 3-4 Fixed Parameters 
Parameter Operationalization 
Unit of analysis • Firm level 
• Quarterly 
Manufacturer • Produces to capacity each quarter  
• 90,000 unit capacity/quarter for a single product 
• Unsold inventory is accrued 
• Orders are filled first out of accrued inventory and then 
capacity for existing quarter 
• Orders from retailers are batched and considered 
simultaneously every quarter 
• Order rationing strategies apply only when: (total demand) > 
(accrued inventory + capacity for quarter) 
Retailers • 9 total retailers 
• Each employ shortage gaming strategy only when previous 
quarter’s order fill rate < 1 
• Approximate Pareto distribution by order volume 
• “A” type: (3) retailers = 72% of order volume; 24% each 
• “B” type: (4) retailers = 24% of order volume; 6% each 
• “C” type: (2) retailers = 4% of order volume; 2% each 
Total Base Demand 
by Quarter 
• Seasonal pattern based on industry data 
• Q1 = TRIA(0.822, 0.825, 0.894) 
• Q2 = TRIA(1.005, 1.105, 1.197) 
• Q3 = TRIA(1.085, 1.145, 1.16) 
• Q4 = TRIA(0.866, 0.895, 1.028) 
• 432,000 units/year for a single product 
 
3.4.3.1 Unit of Analysis 
The unit of analysis for this simulation is firm level. Interviews revealed that sales 
and operation planning between the manufacturer and retailers occur on a quarterly basis, 
therefore each simulation “day” (where one cycle of the simulation’s sequence of events 
occurs) represents one quarter (three months) of time. 
3.4.3.2 Manufacturer 
Based on data from interviews and industry reports, the simulation models the 
manufacturer’s production as equal to capacity. In this simulation, capacity is set at 
90,000 units per quarter for a single product, per data from the manufacturer interview. 
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Any unsold inventory is accrued. Orders are filled first out of accrued inventory and then 
out of capacity for existing quarter. Orders from retailers are batched and considered 
simultaneously every quarter. Order rationing strategies apply only when total demand 
exceeds supply (accrued inventory plus capacity for quarter). Within the simulation, 
backorders are currently not considered in the inventory replenishment process for 
several reasons. The simulation seeks to identify the interaction between manufacturer 
order rationing and retailer shortage gaming. Factors such as backorders would confound 
the simulation’s attempt to isolate the main experimental factors. In addition, the 
inventory ordering and fulfillment process simulated takes place quarterly. Based on the 
interviews, a moderate level of product substitutability exists, thus within the time frame 
of a quarter, all unfilled demand can be filled by the manufacturer’s competitors (see 
section 3.3.2.1 Supply Chain Structure and Figure 3-2). 
3.4.3.3 Retailers 
Nine total retailers are modeled within this simulation. Each retailer employs 
shortage gaming only when shorted of inventory in the previous quarter, otherwise they 
order actual demand. The shortage gaming strategy employed by each retailer is 
determined by the experimental scenario. The nine retailers vary by order volume in an 
approximate Pareto distribution based on data from interviews and is similar to industry 
level data. Industry level data is obtained from TWICE (2012) who publishes a yearly 
ranking of top major appliance retailers based on their major appliances sales. The 
approximate Pareto distribution by order volume used in the simulation includes three 
“A” retailers who collectively order 72% of the manufacturer’s sales, each ordering 24% 
(Retailers 1, 2, and 3). Four other “B” retailers order a total of 24% of order volume, each 
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ordering 6% (Retailers 4, 5, 6, and 7). The last two “C” retailers order a total of 4% of 
order volume, each ordering 2% (Retailers 8 and 9). Table 3-5 shows data from TWICE 
(2012) as well as the modeled order volume distribution. 
 
Table 3-5 Retailer Order Volume Distribution 
 2011 Major 
Appliance 
Sales  
($ millions) 
Percentage Cumulative 
Percentage 
Simulation 
Distribution of 
Order Volume 
Retailer 1 $  7,280 30 % 30 %  24 % 
Retailer 2 $  5,390 22 % 52 %  24 % 
Retailer 3 $  3,390 14 % 66 %  24 % 
Retailer 4 $  1,800   7 % 74 %    6 % 
Retailer 5 $     795   3 % 77 %    6 % 
Retailer 6 $     771   3 % 80 %    6 % 
Retailer 7 $     556   2 % 83 %    6 % 
Retailer 8 $     214   1 % 84 %    2 % 
Retailer 9 $     194   1 % 85 %    2 % 
Total Major 
Appliance 
Sales 
$ 24,198   100 % 
Data from AHAM/TWICE 2012 
 
3.4.3.4 Total Base Demand by Quarter 
Base demand represents consumer demand experienced by the retailer(s) and is 
essentially the amount needed for true replenishment of inventory for one product. For 
this research it is modeled on refrigerators which represent the largest product category 
within major appliances (Kelly 2012), based on two factors: 1. a seasonal pattern, which 
allows for a description of quarterly activity relative to other quarters, and 2. an 
estimation of unfilled orders, which allows for the establishment of base demand relative 
to manufacturer production capacity. 
Base demand is modeled with a seasonal pattern, based on the Association of 
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Appliance Manufacturer’s reports of manufacturer’s shipment data (TWICE 2012). 
Although this data represents activity at the manufacturer echelon and may not 
necessarily reflect end consumer demand, the pattern of quarterly activity based on an 
annual mean can be used to characterize differences between quarters. Analysis of this 
data from 2005 through 2011 shows consistent differences by quarter when compared to 
each year’s quarterly mean. Quarter 1 and Quarter 4 shipments are less than the mean 
whereas Quarter 2 and 3 exceed the mean. Industry reports tie major appliances activity 
to housing activity (e.g. MarketLine 2012; Kelly 2012). As many US homeowners either 
purchase or move to a new rental home in the spring and summer months but do not 
change housing in the winter months, the seasonal pattern observed from manufacturer’s 
refrigerator shipments is reasonable. Table 3-6 shows data by quarter. Figure 3-3 exhibits 
the seasonal pattern based on manufacturer’s refrigerator shipments. Based on this data, 
the simulation adjusted each quarter’s mean to account for the observed seasonal pattern. 
The quarterly seasonal pattern was operationalized via a triangular distribution based on 
the observed minimum value, mode, and maximum value for each quarter (see Table 3-
6). The following distributions were used: Q1 = TRIA(0.822, 0.825, 0.894), Q2 = 
TRIA(1.005, 1.105, 1.197), Q3 = TRIA(1.085, 1.145, 1.16),  and Q4 = TRIA(0.866, 
0.895, 1.028). 
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Table 3-6 Manufacturer's Shipment of Refrigerators as a Percentage of Annual 
Quarterly Mean 
  Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 
2005 82.2% 100.5% 114.5% 102.8% 
2006 89.4% 107.2% 114.5% 88.9% 
2007 86.1% 110.1% 113.1% 90.7% 
2008 85.0% 114.3% 114.1% 86.6% 
2009 82.2% 109.7% 116.0% 92.1% 
2010 82.9% 119.7% 108.5% 88.9% 
2011 87.3% 110.5% 111.5% 90.7% 
2012 83.6% 110.0% 111.7% 94.6% 
2005-2012 84.8% 110.3% 113.0% 91.9% 
Standard deviation 2.6% 5.5% 2.4% 5.0% 
Minimum value 82.2% 100.5% 108.5% 86.6% 
Mode 82.5% 110.5% 114.5% 89.5% 
Maximum value 89.4% 119.7% 116.0% 102.8% 
Data from AHAM 
 
 
Figure 3-3 Seasonal Pattern of Manufacturer's Refrigerator Shipments 2005-2011 
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In addition to a seasonal pattern, base demand must be based on absolute 
numbers. An estimation of unfilled orders allows for the establishment of base demand 
relative to manufacturer production capacity. Data from interviews indicated that order 
fill rates for major appliances were 80% to 90% overall. This is corroborated by current 
information from the Manufacturer’s Shipments, Inventories, and Orders Survey for 
2008-2010 collected by the U.S. Census Bureau (2012), which shows consistent unfilled 
orders for household appliance manufacturing. Therefore, this simulation model base 
demand at 120% of the manufacturer’s annual production capacity. If production capacity 
for a single product is set at 90,000 units per quarter, annual capacity equals 360,000 
units (360,000 = 90,000 units per quarter x 4 quarters). Base demand for a single product 
is therefore set at 432,000 units per year (432,000 = 360,000 units x 120%), or 108,000 
units/quarter (108,000 = 432,000 units per year ÷ 4 quarters). 
3.4.4 Dependent Variables 
The dependent variables measured in this research are: long-term demand 
variance for the manufacturer, the manufacturer’s order fill rate, the focal retailer’s order 
fill rate, order fill rates for other “A”, “B”, and “C” type retailers, the manufacturer’s cost 
of lost opportunity from unfilled demand, and the manufacturer’s cost of carrying excess 
inventory. See Table 3-7. 
Long-term demand variance represents the variability of total demand 
experienced by the manufacturer over a given time period, calculated for a similar time 
period after retail promotions demand shock. Five years post retail promotions demand 
shock was used and all measures of the dependent variables were aggregated for this time 
period. Total demand is the sum of all nine retailer’s orders for a given quarter. High 
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variance in demand suggests greater difficulty for the manufacturer in matching supply 
with demand and can result in operational inefficiencies such as the need to hold excess 
inventories and poor customer service (Fisher 1997; Lee 2004). Long-term demand 
variance is calculated by the coefficient of variation measure, a building block of vertical 
bullwhip demand amplification calculations (Fransoo & Wouters 2000;  McCullen & 
Towill 2002) where: 
Coefficient of variation of total demand = standard deviation /average value 
Order fill rates indicate how successful a firm is in completing customer orders 
(Coyle et al. 2013). An order with an item missing is considered incomplete. Therefore, 
order fill rates measure complete shipments as a percentage of total orders. This is done 
for the manufacturer as well as for each retailer. Order fill rate is a common measure of 
manufacturer service performance and provides evidence of a firm’s ability to fulfill their 
customers’ expectations. The measure is what manufacturers typically use when 
evaluating their customer service performance. In addition, order fill rates are common 
measures for retailers in evaluating their supplier’s performance. Lower service levels 
suggest a firm’s difficulty in balancing demand and supply. Particularly for firms that 
segment their customers by profit contribution, monitoring order fill rates for customers 
enables the firm to track and establish corrective measures for the high impact customers 
(Closs et al. 2010). 
The manufacturer’s cost of lost opportunity from true unfilled demand represents 
the unfilled potential units that are truly needed by the retailers, regardless of order 
inflation. It is calculated by subtracting the quarterly order fill amount from the total true 
demand. The quarterly average over five years is reported. A high relative amount of lost 
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opportunity suggests a need for the manufacturer to address the constraint of supply 
capacity. 
The manufacturer’s cost of carrying excess inventory also represents excess cost 
arising from difficulties in matching supply to demand from quarter to quarter. Inventory 
carrying cost is the expense associated with maintaining inventory and is generally 
calculated by multiplying an inventory carrying cost factor by average inventory cost 
(Bowersox, Closs, Cooper, and Bowersox 2013). Bowersox, Closs, Cooper, and 
Bowersox (2013, p155) suggest that a conservative carrying cost factor is 20% of the 
average inventory value. As the unit of analysis for this simulation is quarterly and the 
focus of this outcome is on identifying additional cost arising from carrying inventory 
from one quarter to the next, average quarterly inventory value of excess inventory is 
calculated by multiplying the amount of excess inventory recorded the end of each 
quarter by an estimated cost per unit of inventory. The estimated cost per unit of 
$1215.04 was determined by multiplying the mean suggested retail price of this 
manufacturer’s range of refrigerators ($1412.84, manufacturer’s website as of 4/13/2013) 
with the cost of goods sold suggested by the firm’s 10K annual report from the years 
2009 through 2012 (86%). Consistent with the time frame of investigation for all 
dependent variables, this outcome represents the cumulative cost of carrying inventory 
for a total of five years (section 3.3.3 Operational Validity). A high inventory carrying 
cost suggests a need for the manufacturer to address their ability to match supply with 
demand closely. 
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Table 3-7 Dependent Variables 
Measure Calculation 
Coefficient of Variation 
for Total Demand 
(CV) 
= Standard Deviation/Average Value 
Manufacturer Order Fill 
Rate  
(M.OFR) 
= Total Orders Filled/Total Demand for Manufacturer 
Retailer 1 Order Fill 
Rate  
(R1.OFR) 
= Total Orders Filled/Demand for the focal retailer 
represented by Retailer 1 
Retailers “A” Order Fill 
Rate  
(RA.OFR) 
= Total Orders Filled/Demand for type “A” retailers such as 
Retailer 2 and Retailer 3 
Retailers “B” Order Fill 
Rate  
(RB.OFR) 
= Total Orders Filled/Demand for type “B” retailers such as 
Retailer 4, Retailer 5, Retailer 6, and Retailer 7 
Retailers “C” Order Fill 
Rate  
(RC.OFR) 
= Total Orders Filled/Demand for type “C” retailers such as 
Retailer 8 and Retailer 9 
Opportunity Loss From 
True Unfilled Demand 
(OPP.LOSS) 
= Quarterly Total True Demand – Quarterly Total Order Fill 
Amount 
Quarterly Inventory 
Carrying Cost 
(C.COST) 
= Quarterly Excess Inventory * Inventory Carrying Cost 
Percentage of 20% * Average MSRP for refrigerator of 
$1,412.84 * COGS for 1 refrigerator unit of 86% 
 
3.5 DATA ANALYSIS 
After all data is collected, analysis will be done to determine differences between 
scenarios in order to test the research hypotheses. Multivariate analysis of variance 
(MANOVA) and univariate analysis of variance (ANOVA) will be used to test the main 
and interactive impact of independent variables on dependent variables.  
MANOVA is a dependence technique that measures differences for two or more 
dependent variables based on a set of categorical variables acting as independent 
variables (Hair et al. 2010). The ANOVA technique tests for differences in means 
between groups and allows for detection of interaction effect between two variables (Hair 
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et al. 2010). Both techniques enable comparison of groups formed by categorical 
independent variables, allowing comparison of the experimental conditions in the set of 
dependent variables.  
The detailed analysis of the data follows in Chapter 4. 
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CHAPTER 4 
RESULTS ANALYSIS 
4.0 INTRODUCTION 
This chapter presents the study’s results in four sections. First, the chapter 
discusses assumptions for MANOVA tests and reviews the data’s conformity to those 
assumptions. Second, the chapter details the multivariate results from the simulation. 
Third, the chapter presents the univariate results. Finally, the chapter reviews results from 
hypothesis testing.  
 
4.1 MANOVA ASSUMPTIONS 
MANOVA is a dependence technique that measures the differences for two or 
more metric dependent variables based on a set of categorical variables acting as 
independent variables (Hair et al. 2010). For the multivariate procedures of MANOVA to 
be valid, the underlying data is assumed to (1) be randomly sampled from a population 
and have independent observations, (2) follow a multivariate normal distribution for the 
set of dependent variables, and (3) have equal variance-covariance matrices, and (4) 
exhibit linearity among variables (Hair et al. 2010). Although there is evidence that these 
tests are robust with regard to these assumptions, particularly when sample sizes are large 
and groups are even in size (Hair et al. 2010), the data is examined with respect to each 
assumption. All statistical tests were run on IBM SPSS Statistics, version 21. 
4.1.1 Random Sampling and Statistical Independence 
Lack of independence among observations is the most serious violation of 
MANOVA assumptions (Hair et al. 2010). Lack of independence may be caused by 
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gathering data within group settings. A common experience may cause that subset of 
individuals with the common experience to have answers that are somewhat correlated. 
In this study, the data consist of all scenarios generated from a full factorial design of the 
independent variables. A total of 486 scenarios (3x3x33x2) were run with 30 replications 
per scenario. This yielded a total sample size of 14,580. The experimental design used 
independent scenarios and independent replications with random seeds for data 
generation (Schriber & Brunner 2012), ensuring that data for each replication is not 
related to each other. Thus, the assumption for random sampling from the population and 
for statistical independence between scenarios is met. 
4.1.2 Normality and Outlier Analysis 
Multivariate normality assumes that joint effect of two variables is normally 
distributed, however as no direct test of multivariate normality is available each variable 
is tested for univariate normality (Hair et al. 2010). Results from the Kolmogorov-
Smirnov tests of normality show that the dependent variables and the standard normal 
distributions are not the same (see Table 4-1). However, the statistic is highly sensitive to 
large samples (Hair et al. 2010, p. 74) such as this study’s. Thus additional information is 
examined with respect to the data’s departure from normality. 
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Table 4-1 Kolmogorov-Smirnov Test of Normality for Dependent Variables 
Kolmogorov-Smirnov Test of Normality with Lilliefors Significance Correction 
Dependent Variable Statistic df Significance 
Coefficient of Variation for Total Demand (CV) 0.190 14580 0.000 
Manufacturer Order Fill Rate (M.OFR) 0.055 14580 0.000 
Retailer 1 Order Fill Rate (R1.OFR) 0.114 14580 0.000 
“A” Retailers Order Fill Rate (RA.OFR) 0.095 14580 0.000 
“B” Retailers Order Fill Rate (RB.OFR) 0.217 14580 0.000 
“C” Retailers Order Fill Rate (RC.OFR) 0.219 14580 0.000 
Opportunity Loss From Unfilled Demand 
(OPP.LOSS) 0.191 14580 0.000 
Quarterly Inventory Carrying Cost (C.COST) 0.528 14580 0.000 
 
Descriptive statistics provide additional information (see Table 4-2). In particular, 
skew and kurtosis information show that all but one dependent variable (C.COST) falls 
within recommended guidelines. Hair and colleagues (2010, p. 36) suggests that skew 
statistics outside the range of negative one to one are substantially skewed. The skew for 
C.COST is 7.286, indicating the data is substantially biased toward higher C.COST 
levels. This dependent variable is also peaked in shape, with a kurtosis of 60.196, which 
is greater than the recommended cutoff of seven (West, Finch, & Curran 1995). While 
the F statistic is robust to deviations from skew, it is sensitive to kurtosis departures and 
can be greatly influenced by outliers (Lindeman 1974), and therefore outliers were 
examined.  
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Table 4-2 Descriptive Statistics for Dependent Variables 
Descriptive Statistics 
Dependent 
Variable N Mean 
Std 
Deviation Skew 
Std 
Error Kurtosis 
Std 
Error 
CV 14580 0.121 0.044 0.966 0.02 0.148 0.041 
M.OFR 14580 0.481 0.189 0.083 0.02 -1.809 0.041 
R1.OFR 14580 0.526 0.226 -0.085 0.02 -1.087 0.041 
RA.OFR 14580 0.526 0.228 -0.298 0.02 -0.896 0.041 
RB.OFR 14580 0.578 0.354 -0.121 0.02 -1.287 0.041 
RC.OFR 14580 0.525 0.394 0.003 0.02 -1.546 0.041 
OPP.LOSS  14580 43671.989 22053.851 0.514 0.02 -0.362 0.041 
C.COST 14580 $427 $2,571 7.286 0.02 60.196 0.041 
 
Outliers for each dependent variable was determined through examination of their 
respective standardized scores. Hair et al. (2010) suggest that for samples over twenty, 
cases with a standard score outside the range of negative four to four to be considered 
outliers. All but one dependent variable’s standardized scores met the above criteria (see 
Table 4-3). C.COST exceeded the recommended range with an upper standardized score 
of 12.02. Additional investigation revealed that for this dependent variable, cases with 
standardized scores over four consist of a small percentage (1.9% = 288 cases out of 
14,580 cases) of the relevant sample. These cases are evenly distributed across groups 
within independent variable PROMOTIONS (see Table 4-4). However, outliers for this 
dependent variable occur disproportionately more within scenarios utilizing a Uniform 
manufacturer order rationing strategy than either Proportional or Linear strategies. In 
addition, in scenarios where retailers do not shortage game, there are higher instances of 
outliers compared to scenarios with either Correction or Overreaction shortage gaming. 
These cases represent extreme but important information in illustrating the differential 
impact of various independent variable groups. In these cases, the simulation shows 
instances where the manufacturer incurred a high level of C.COST by carrying inventory 
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over to a subsequent quarter. 
The sensitivity of MANOVA results was tested by removing the outliers and 
comparing the results with results from the full data set. No significant differences were 
observed between MANOVA results for both sets of data. Still, readers may assume 
diminished confidence in univariate C.COST analysis due to the non-normality of 
C.COST values in the dataset.  
In conclusion, the assumption of normality is violated by the data. However, 
violations of this assumption have little impact with larger sample sizes and particularly 
when outliers are minimized (Hair et al. 2010, p. 71). Therefore, the benign impact of the 
C.COST outliers and size of dataset satisfy the requirements for multivariate analysis. 
 
Table 4-3 Standard Score Ranges for Dependent Variables 
Standard Score Ranges 
Dependent Variable N Minimum Maximum Mean Std Deviation 
Zscore:  CV 14580 -1.805 2.769 0 1 
Zscore:  M.OFR 14580 -1.781 1.969 0 1 
Zscore:  R1.OFR 14580 -1.977 1.780 0 1 
Zscore:  RA.OFR 14580 -1.886 1.765 0 1 
Zscore:  RB.OFR 14580 -1.939 1.193 0 1 
Zscore:  RC.OFR 14580 -1.334 1.205 0 1 
Zscore:  OPP.LOSS  14580 -1.211 2.534 0 1 
Zscore:  C.COST 14580 -0.166 12.024 0 1 
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Table 4-4 Quarterly Inventory Carrying Cost Outlier Distribution Across 
Independent Variables 
C.COST Outliers 
Independent Variable Levels N Percent 
Manufacturer Order 
Rationing Proportional 28 10% 
(RATION) Linear 26 9% 
 Uniform 234 81% 
  288 100% 
    
Retailer 1 Shortage Gaming No Gaming 288 100% 
(R1.GAME) Correction Gaming 0 0% 
 Overreaction Gaming 0 0% 
  264 100% 
    
Retail Promotions No Promotions 144 50% 
(PROMOTIONS) Promotions 144 50% 
  288 100% 
    
A Retailers Shortage 
Gaming No Gaming 288 100% 
(RA.GAME) Correction Gaming 0 0% 
 Overreaction Gaming 0 0% 
  288 100% 
    
B Retailers Shortage 
Gaming No Gaming 132 46% 
(RB.GAME) Correction Gaming 78 27% 
 Overreaction Gaming 78 27% 
  288 100% 
    
C Retailers Shortage 
Gaming No Gaming 130 45% 
(RC.GAME) Correction Gaming 80 28% 
 Overreaction Gaming 78 27% 
  288 100% 
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4.1.3 Equality of Variance-Covariance Matrices 
Equality of variance-covariance matrices refers to the assumption that dependent 
variables exhibit equal levels of variance across the range of independent variables. 
Levene’s test of homogeneity of variance is used to test this assumption. Results show 
the test is significant for all of the dependent variables at the p<0.001 level, which 
suggests that the data fails the assumption of equal variances.  
Commonly, Box’s M test also provides a singular statistic to determine if there is 
equality of the group covariance matrices by comparing each independent variable’s 
group singular covariance matrix with the total covariance matrix (IBM 2011). However, 
in order for SPSS to compute and report this statistic, there must be variance in all groups 
within each independent variable (IBM 2011). Examination of each independent 
variable’s group covariance matrices shows zero variance for C.COST when A Retailers, 
representing Retailers 2 and 3, shortage games, thus SPSS does not report a covariance. 
The remaining covariance matrices show variation across groups. Box’s M test, run 
without C.COST, rejects the null hypothesis that the observed covariance matrices of the 
dependent variables are equal across groups (p<0.001). This result is not surprising as the 
test is sensitive to departures of normality. Overall, the data generally violates the weak 
assumption of variance-covariance matrices. However, the presence of relatively equal 
sample sizes among the groups mitigates any violations of this assumption (Hair et al. 
2010). 
4.1.4 Linearity 
Linearity is an implicit assumption of all multivariate techniques based on 
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correlational measures of association such as MANOVA (Hair et al. 2010). Bartlett’s test 
of sphericity was used to test for non-linear relationships. The test indicates that 
significant inter-correlations exist (Chi-Square = 94545.34 df = 28, p<0.001), justifying 
the use of MANOVA. 
4.1.5 Proceed with Multivariate Analysis 
The decision to proceed with MANOVA analysis is based on several reasons. 
First, the data meets the most important assumption, that of independence of observations 
through the experimental design and simulation’s use of random seeds for each 
independent replication. Second, while the data exhibits non-normality, this violation of 
assumption is deemed acceptable due to the mitigating influence of the study’s large 
sample size and benign impact of outliers. Third, while the data generally does not meet 
the assumption of equality of variance-covariance matrices, this violation is also 
mitigated by the equal sample sizes in all treatment groups. Finally, the data meets the 
implicit assumption of linearity. Overall, the data conforms to the most critical 
requirements of MANOVA and violations of assumptions have been mitigated. 
Therefore, it is appropriate to use MANOVA to test the study’s hypotheses. 
 
4.2 MULTIVARIATE RESULTS 
In this study, six independent variables are tested across 486 scenarios: 
Manufacturer Order Rationing Strategy at three levels (RATION); Retailer 1’s Shortage 
Gaming Strategy at three levels (R1.GAME); A Retailers’ Shortage Gaming Strategy at 
three levels (RA.GAME); B Retailers’ Shortage Gaming Strategy at three levels 
(RB.GAME); C Retailers’ Shortage Gaming Strategy at three levels (RC.GAME); and 
Retail Promotions Demand Shock at two levels (PROMOTIONS). A Retailers represents 
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Retailers 2 and 3; B Retailers represents Retailers 4, 5, 6 and 7; and C Retailers 
represents Retailers 8 and 9; which refer to the order volume based categorization of each 
retailer by the manufacturer (see section 3.3.2.1 Supply Chain Structure and section 
3.4.3.3 Retailers). These multiple, non-focal retailers collectively represent supply 
inventory competition. Each scenario is replicated 30 times, resulting in a total sample 
size of 14,580. 
There are eight dependent variables: the coefficient of variation of total demand 
experienced by the manufacturer (CV), the manufacturer’s total fill rate (M.OFR) the 
focal retailer’s order fill rate (R1.OFR), A Retailers’ order fill rate (RA.OFR), B 
Retailers’ order fill rate (RB.OFR), C Retailers’ order fill rate (RC.OFR), the 
manufacturer’s loss of opportunity from not meeting actual unfilled demand 
(OPP.LOSS), and the manufacturer’s quarterly cost of carrying inventory (C.COST). The 
dependent variables represent the aggregation of quarterly data for a period of five total 
years, collected post retail promotions demand shock. 
MANOVA tests were run on IBM SPSS Statistics, version 21. This study reports 
Pillai’s Trace statistics for MANOVA tests. Pillai’s Trace is calculated as the sum of the 
variance that can be explained by the calculation of discriminate variables (Hair et al. 
2010). In comparison with Wilke’s Lambda, Hotelling’s trace, and Roy’s Largest Root 
MANOVA tests, Pillai’s Trace is the most robust test when MANOVA assumptions are 
not met.  
MANOVA results are reported in Tables 4-5 through 4-10, separated by main 
effects and each set of two-way, three-way, four-way, five-way, and six-way interactions. 
Each table presents seven columns.  
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The first column, “Effect”, shows independent variables and the interactions 
between independent variables.  
The second column, “F-ratio”, reports on the significant effect of each 
independent variable on the multivariate. A larger F statistic indicates a greater likelihood 
that mean differences are due to something other than chance.  
The third and fourth columns, “degrees of freedom”, show the numbers used to 
obtain observed significance levels of the multivariate test.  
The fifth column “Significance,” shows the p-value, which is the conditional 
probability that a relationship as strong as the one observed in the data would be present 
if the null hypotheses were true (probability of making a Type 1 error).  
The sixth column, “Partial ETA Squared”, represented by “Partial η2”, shows the 
proportion of total variability in the dependent multivariate that is accounted for by 
variation in the independent variable. It excludes other factors from total non-error 
variations (Cohen 1973; Levine & Hullett 2002; Pierce et al. 2004). Partial η2 essentially 
measures the magnitude of the observed relationships between variables, with values 
ranging from zero to one. Larger values indicate stronger effect. Conservative 
benchmarks for effect sizes suggest partial η2 value cutoffs of 0.2 for small effects, 0.5 for 
medium effects, and 0.8 for large effects (Cohen 1988). These are indicated with asterisks 
(*** = large effect size, ** = medium effect size, * = small effect size). 
The seventh column, “Observed Power”, shows the power of the test or the ability 
to reject the null hypotheses when it is actually false (chance of making a Type II error). 
High observed power values over 0.9 are recommended. For all significant effects, all 
power values are over 0.9. 
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In MANOVA, interaction terms represent joint effect and must be examined 
before interpreting main effect (Hair et al. 2010). Following are the multivariate 
interactions and main effects. 
4.2.1 Multivariate Results – Six-Way Interactions 
There were no significant six-way interactions (see Table 4-5). 
Table 4-5 Multivariate Results - Six-Way Interaction 
Multivariate Tests – Six-Way Interactions 
Effect F Hypothesis df Error df Sig. 
Partial 
η2 
Observed 
Power 
RATION * 
R1.GAME * 
PROMOTIONS * 
RA.GAME * 
RB.GAME * 
RC.GAME 
0.305 256 112,752 1.000 0.001 0.921 
Partial η2: *** Large effect size, ** Medium effect size, * Small effect size 
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4.2.2 Multivariate Results – Five-Way Interactions 
Among five-way interactions, the interaction between RATION * 
PROMOTIONS * R1.GAME * RA.GAME * RB.GAME and the interaction between 
RATION * R1.GAME * RA.GAME * RB.GAME * RC.GAME is significant at p<0.001 
(see Table 4-6). However, the effect sizes are very small (partial η2 = 0.007) and small 
(partial η2 = 0.251), respectively. 
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Table 4-6 Multivariate Results - Five-Way Interactions 
Multivariate Tests – Five-Way Interactions 
Effect F Hypothesis df Error df Sig. Partial η
2 Observed Power 
RATION * 
PROMOTIONS * 
R1.GAME * 
RA.GAME * 
RB.GAME 
5.825 128 112,752 0.000 0.007 1.000 
RATION * 
PROMOTIONS * 
R1.GAME * 
RA.GAME * 
RC.GAME 
0.359 128 112,752 1.000 0.000 0.809 
RATION * 
PROMOTIONS * 
R1.GAME * 
RB.GAME * 
RC.GAME 
0.332 128 112,752 1.000 0.000 0.762 
RATION * 
PROMOTIONS * 
RA.GAME * 
RB.GAME * 
RC.GAME 
0.269 128 112,752 1.000 0.000 0.624 
RATION * 
R1.GAME * 
RA.GAME * 
RB.GAME * 
RC.GAME 
147.914 256 112,752 0.000 0.251 * 1.000 
PROMOTIONS * 
R1.GAME * 
RA.GAME * 
RB.GAME * 
RC.GAME 
0.425 128 112,752 1.000 0.000 0.897 
Partial η2: *** Large effect size, ** Medium effect size, * Small effect size 
 
  
  
 112 
4.2.3 Multivariate Results – Four-Way Interactions 
Nine different types of four-way interactions are significant at p<0.001, most with 
very small effect sizes (partial η2 < 0.2) (see Table 4-7). For these interactions, each 
accounts for less than two percent of the overall (effect and error) variance. The 
interactions are: 
RATION * PROMOTIONS * R1.GAME * RA.GAME;  
RATION * PROMOTIONS * R1.GAME * RB.GAME;  
RATION * PROMOTIONS * RA.GAME * RB.GAME; 
RATION * R1.GAME * RA.GAME * RB.GAME; 
RATION * R1.GAME * RA.GAME * RC.GAME; 
RATION * R1.GAME * RB.GAME * RC.GAME; 
RATION * RA.GAME * RB.GAME * RC.GAME; 
PROMOTIONS * R1.GAME * RA.GAME * RB.GAME; and  
R1.GAME * RA.GAME * RB.GAME * RC.GAME. 
Of note, the interaction of RATION * RA.GAME * RB.GAME * RC.GAME is 
the only one with a small effect size (partial η2 = 0. 279) while the interaction of 
RATION * R1.GAME * RA.GAME * RB.GAME is the only one with a medium effect 
size (partial η2 = 0.577).  
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Table 4-7 Multivariate Results - Four-Way Interactions 
Multivariate Tests – Four-Way Interactions 
Effect F Hypothesis df Error df Sig. Partial η
2 Observed Power 
RATION * 
PROMOTIONS * 
R1.GAME * 
RA.GAME  325.176  64  112,752  0.000 0.156 1.000 
RATION * 
PROMOTIONS * 
R1.GAME * 
RB.GAME  7.984  64  112,752  0.000 0.005 1.000 
RATION * 
PROMOTIONS * 
R1.GAME * 
RC.GAME  0.448  64  112,752  1.000 0.000 0.706 
RATION * 
PROMOTIONS * 
RA.GAME * 
RB.GAME  16.846  64  112,752  0.000 0.009 1.000 
RATION * 
PROMOTIONS * 
RA.GAME * 
RC.GAME  0.153  64  112,752  1.000 0.000 0.215 
RATION * 
PROMOTIONS * 
RB.GAME * 
RC.GAME  0.107  64  112,752  1.000 0.000 0.152 
RATION * 
R1.GAME * 
RA.GAME * 
RB.GAME  1,199.750  128  112,752  0.000 0.577 ** 1.000 
RATION * 
R1.GAME * 
RA.GAME * 
RC.GAME  218.238  128  112,752  0.000 0.199 1.000 
Partial η2: *** Large effect size, ** Medium effect size, * Small effect size 
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Table 4-7 Multivariate Results – Four-Way Interactions (continued) 
Multivariate Tests – Four-Way Interactions 
Effect F Hypothesis df Error df Sig. Partial η
2 Observed Power 
RATION * 
R1.GAME * 
RB.GAME * 
RC.GAME  214.667  128  112,752  0.000 0.196 1.000 
RATION * 
RA.GAME * 
RB.GAME * 
RC.GAME  341.673  128  112,752  0.000 0.279 * 1.000 
PROMOTIONS * 
R1.GAME * 
RA.GAME * 
RB.GAME  5.106  64  112,752  0.000 0.003 1.000 
PROMOTIONS * 
R1.GAME * 
RA.GAME * 
RC.GAME  0.391  64  112,752  1.000 0.000 0.620 
PROMOTIONS * 
R1.GAME * 
RB.GAME * 
RC.GAME  0.401  64  112,752  1.000 0.000 0.636 
PROMOTIONS * 
RA.GAME * 
RB.GAME * 
RC.GAME  0.325  64  112,752  1.000 0.000 0.509 
R1.GAME * 
RA.GAME * 
RB.GAME * 
RC.GAME  214.833  128  112,752  0.000 0.196 1.000 
Partial η2: *** Large effect size, ** Medium effect size, * Small effect size 
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4.2.4 Multivariate Results – Three-Way Interactions 
There are sixteen significant three-way interaction effects, each significant at 
p<0.001(see Table 4-8). They are:  
RATION * PROMOTIONS * R1.GAME;  
RATION * PROMOTIONS * RA.GAME;  
RATION * PROMOTIONS * RB.GAME;  
RATION * R1.GAME * RA.GAME;  
RATION * R1.GAME * RB.GAME;  
RATION * R1.GAME * RC.GAME;  
RATION * RA.GAME * RB.GAME; 
RATION * RA.GAME * RC.GAME; 
RATION * RB.GAME * RC.GAME; 
PROMOTIONS * R1.GAME * RA.GAME; 
PROMOTIONS * R1.GAME * RB.GAME; 
PROMOTIONS * RA.GAME * RB.GAME; 
R1.GAME * RA.GAME * RB.GAME; 
R1.GAME * RA.GAME * RC.GAME; 
R1.GAME * RB.GAME * RC.GAME; and 
RA.GAME * RB.GAME * RC.GAME. 
Three interactions, RATION * R1.GAME * RA.GAME (partial η2 = 0.662), 
RATION * R1.GAME * RB.GAME (partial η2 = 0.439), and RATION * RA.GAME * 
RB.GAME (partial η2 = 0.512) exhibit medium effects on dependent variables. Seven 
additional interactions, RATION * PROMOTIONS * R1.GAME (partial η2 = 0.283), 
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RATION * PROMOTIONS * RA.GAME  (partial η2 = 0.289), RATION * R1.GAME * 
RC.GAME  (partial η2 = 0.220), RATION * RA.GAME * RC.GAME  (partial η2 = 
0.282), PROMOTIONS * R1.GAME * RA.GAME (partial η2 = 0.278), R1.GAME * 
RA.GAME * RB.GAME (partial η2 = 0.491), and RA.GAME * RB.GAME * RC.GAME 
(partial η2 = 0.214) exhibit small effects on dependent variables. 
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Table 4-8 Multivariate Results - Three-Way Interactions 
Multivariate Tests – Three-Way Interactions 
Effect F Hypothesis df Error df Sig. Partial η
2 Observed Power 
RATION * 
PROMOTIONS * 
R1.GAME  695.841  32  56,360  0.000 0.283 * 1.000 
RATION * 
PROMOTIONS * 
RA.GAME  714.411  32  56,360  0.000 0.289 * 1.000 
RATION * 
PROMOTIONS * 
RB.GAME  38.702  32  56,360  0.000 0.022 1.000 
RATION * 
PROMOTIONS * 
RC.GAME  0.498  32  56,360  0.992 0.000 0.533 
RATION * 
R1.GAME * 
RA.GAME  3,452.408  64  112,752  0.000 0.662 ** 1.000 
RATION * 
R1.GAME * 
RB.GAME  1,376.501  64  112,752  0.000 0.439 ** 1.000 
RATION * 
R1.GAME * 
RC.GAME  497.342  64  112,752  0.000 0.220 * 1.000 
RATION * 
RA.GAME * 
RB.GAME  1,847.326  64  112,752  0.000 0.512 ** 1.000 
RATION * 
RA.GAME * 
RC.GAME  692.789  64  112,752  0.000 0.282 * 1.000 
RATION * 
RB.GAME * 
RC.GAME  391.563  64  112,752  0.000 0.182 1.000 
PROMOTIONS * 
R1.GAME * 
RA.GAME  679.585  32  56,360  0.000 0.278 * 1.000 
Partial η2: *** Large effect size, ** Medium effect size, * Small effect size 
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Table 4-8 Multivariate Results – Three-Way Interactions (continued) 
Multivariate Tests – Three-Way Interactions 
Effect F Hypothesis df Error df Sig. Partial η
2 Observed Power 
PROMOTIONS * 
R1.GAME * 
RB.GAME  13.249  32  56,360  0.000 0.007 1.000 
PROMOTIONS * 
R1.GAME * 
RC.GAME  0.485  32  56,360  0.994 0.000 0.518 
PROMOTIONS * 
RA.GAME * 
RB.GAME  17.835  32  56,360  0.000 0.010 1.000 
PROMOTIONS * 
RA.GAME * 
RC.GAME  0.175  32  56,360  1.000 0.000 0.173 
PROMOTIONS * 
RB.GAME * 
RC.GAME  0.157  32  56,360  1.000 0.000 0.157 
R1.GAME * 
RA.GAME * 
RB.GAME 
 
1702.252  64  112,752  0.000 0.491 * 1.000 
R1.GAME * 
RA.GAME * 
RC.GAME  273.526  64  112,752  0.000 0.134 1.000 
R1.GAME * 
RB.GAME * 
RC.GAME  297.222  64  112,752  0.000 0.144 1.000 
RA.GAME * 
RB.GAME * 
RC.GAME  479.876  64  112,752  0.000 0.214 * 1.000 
Partial η2: *** Large effect size, ** Medium effect size, * Small effect size 
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4.2.5 Multivariate Results – Two-Way Interactions 
There are fourteen significant two-way interaction effects, each significant at 
p<0.001(see Table 4-9). They are:  
RATION * PROMOTIONS;  
RATION * R1.GAME; 
RATION * RA.GAME;  
RATION * RB.GAME;  
RATION * RC.GAME;  
PROMOTIONS * R1.GAME; 
PROMOTIONS * RA.GAME;  
PROMOTIONS * RB.GAME;  
R1.GAME * RA.GAME; 
R1.GAME * RB.GAME; 
R1.GAME * RC.GAME; 
RA.GAME * RB.GAME;  
RA.GAME * RC.GAME; and  
RB.GAME * RC.GAME. 
Four interactions exhibit large effects on dependent variables. They are: RATION 
* R1.GAME (partial η2 = 0.981), RATION * RA.GAME (partial η2 = 0.994), RATION * 
RB.GAME (partial η2 = 0.758), and R1.GAME * RA.GAME (partial η2 = 0.952). Four 
additional interactions, RATION * PROMOTIONS (partial η2 = 0.513), RATION * 
RC.GAME (partial η2 = 0.501), R1.GAME * RB.GAME (partial η2 = 0.711), and 
RA.GAME * RB.GAME (partial η2 = 0.777) exhibit medium effects on dependent 
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variables. Lastly, five interactions exhibit small effects on dependent variables. They are: 
PROMOTIONS * R1.GAME (partial η2 = 0.495), PROMOTIONS * RA.GAME (partial 
η2 = 0.494), R1.GAME * RC.GAME (partial η2 = 0.309), RA.GAME * RC.GAME 
(partial η2 = 0.433), and RB.GAME * RC.GAME (partial η2 = 0.264). 
Table 4-9 Multivariate Results - Two-Way Interactions 
Multivariate Tests – Two-Way Interactions 
Effect F Hypothesis df 
Error 
df Sig. Partial η
2 Observed Power 
RATION * 
PROMOTIONS  1,856.053  16 
 
28,176  0.000 0.513 ** 1.000 
RATION * 
R1.GAME  91,906.426  32 
 
56,360  0.000 0.981 *** 1.000 
RATION * 
RA.GAME 
 
272,386.165  32 
 
56,360  0.000 0.994 *** 1.000 
RATION * 
RB.GAME  5,502.769  32 
 
56,360  0.000 0.758 *** 1.000 
RATION * 
RC.GAME  1,766.011  32 
 
56,360  0.000 0.501 ** 1.000 
PROMOTIONS 
* R1.GAME  1,727.322  16 
 
28,176  0.000 0.495 * 1.000 
PROMOTIONS 
* RA.GAME  1,720.108  16 
 
28,176  0.000 0.494 * 1.000 
PROMOTIONS 
* RB.GAME  48.054  16 
 
28,176  0.000 0.027 1.000 
PROMOTIONS 
* RC.GAME  0.416  16 
 
28,176  0.979 0.000 0.288 
R1.GAME * 
RA.GAME  34,600.144  32 
 
56,360  0.000 0.952 *** 1.000 
R1.GAME * 
RB.GAME  4,328.942  32 
 
56,360  0.000 0.711 ** 1.000 
R1.GAME * 
RC.GAME  786.593  32 
 
56,360  0.000 0.309 * 1.000 
RA.GAME * 
RB.GAME  6,127.974  32 
 
56,360  0.000 0.777 ** 1.000 
RA.GAME * 
RC.GAME  1,346.294  32 
 
56,360  0.000 0.433 * 1.000 
RB.GAME * 
RC.GAME  632.681  32 
 
56,360  0.000 0.264 * 1.000 
Partial η2: *** Large effect size, ** Medium effect size, * Small effect size 
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4.2.6 Multivariate Results - Main Effects 
All main effects are significant at p<0.001 (see Table 4-10). The main effects are 
RATION, PROMOTIONS, R1.GAME, RA.GAME, RB.GAME, and RC.GAME. All 
significant main effects exhibit large effects with the exception of RC.GAME, which 
exhibits a medium effect (partial η2 = 0.748). 
 
Table 4-10 Multivariate Results - Main Effects 
Multivariate Tests - Main Effects 
Effect F Hypothesis df 
Error 
df Sig. Partial η
2 Observed Power 
RATION 2,644,014.358  16 
 
28,176  0.000 0.999 *** 1.000 
PROMOTIONS  24,940.878  8 
 
14,087  0.000 0.934 *** 1.000 
R1.GAME  389,999.311  16 
 
28,176  0.000 0.996 *** 1.000 
RA.GAME  967,289.002  16 
 
28,176  0.000 0.998 *** 1.000 
RB.GAME  73,179.561  16 
 
28,176  0.000 0.977 *** 1.000 
RC.GAME  5,231.046  16 
 
28,176  0.000 0.748 ** 1.000 
Partial η2: *** Large effect size, ** Medium effect size, * Small effect size 
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4.3 UNIVARIATE RESULTS 
This section discusses univariate test results for interaction and main effects. 
Univariate tests evaluate the relationship between independent variable interactions or an 
independent variable on a single dependent variable. Statistics and plots are shown for 
significant relationships only. 
4.3.1 Univariate Results – Four-Way and Five-Way Interactions 
There were no significant univariate six-way interactions. Five-way interactions 
are shown in Table 4-11. Four-way interactions are shown in Table 4-12.  
Significant five-way interactions include RATION * PROMOTIONS * 
R1.GAME * RA.GAME * RB.GAME and RATION * R1.GAME * RA.GAME * 
RB.GAME * RC.GAME. For RATION * PROMOTIONS * R1.GAME * RA.GAME * 
RB.GAME, partial η2 values (partial η2 < 0.2 for all) indicate a very small effect of the 
five-way interaction on all dependent variables. For RATION * R1.GAME * RA.GAME 
* RB.GAME * RC.GAME, partial η2 values indicate a very small effect (partial η2 < 0.2) 
of the five-way interaction on CV, M.OFR, RA.OFR, OPP.LOSS, and C.COST. The 
five-way interaction’s relationship to R1.OFR and RB.OFR exhibit small effects (partial 
η2 = 0.213 and partial η2 = 0.297 respectively) while the relationship with RC.OFR 
exhibit medium effects (partial η2 = 0.597). 
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Table 4-11 Univariate Results - Five-Way Interactions 
Between Effects Tests – Five-Way Interactions 
Source Dependent Variable F df Sig. Partial η
2 Observed Power 
RATION * 
PROMOTIONS * 
R1.GAME * 
RA.GAME * 
RB.GAME 
CV 3.786 16 0.000 0.004 1.000 
M.OFR 6.019 16 0.000 0.007 1.000 
R1.OFR 6.040 16 0.000 0.007 1.000 
RA.OFR 8.240 16 0.000 0.009 1.000 
RB.OFR 4.718 16 0.000 0.005 1.000 
RC.OFR 2.549 16 0.001 0.003 0.995 
 
RATION * 
R1.GAME * 
RA.GAME * 
RB.GAME * 
RC.GAME 
CV 7.095 32 0.000 0.016 1.000 
M.OFR 59.195 32 0.000 0.118 1.000 
R1.OFR 119.289 32 0.000 0.213 * 1.000 
RA.OFR 59.541 32 0.000 0.119 1.000 
RB.OFR 185.943 32 0.000 0.297 * 1.000 
RC.OFR 653.253 32 0.000 0.597 ** 1.000 
OPP.LOSS 15.990 32 0.000 0.035 1.000 
C.COST 6.577 32 0.000 0.015 1.000 
Partial η2: *** Large effect size, ** Medium effect size, * Small effect size 
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There were nine different significant four-way interactions totaling 66 significant 
relationships with dependent variables (see Table 4-12). The first four-way interaction, 
RATION * PROMOTIONS * R1.GAME * RA.GAME show a significant effect at p 
<0.001 on all dependent variables with the exception of C.COST. Partial η2 values 
indicate a very small effect on all outcomes with the exception of medium effects on the 
manufacturer’s order fill rate (partial η2 = 0.666) and small effects on the manufacturer’s 
opportunity loss (partial η2 = 0.227). 
The second four-way interaction, RATION * PROMOTIONS * R1.GAME * 
RB.GAME, show a significant effect on CV, M.OFR, R1.OFR, RA.OFR, RB.OFR, and 
RC.OFR at p<0.001. Partial η2 values indicate a small effect on all significant outcomes. 
The third four-way interaction, RATION * PROMOTIONS * RA.GAME * 
RB.GAME, show a significant effect on CV, M.OFR, R1.OFR, RA.OFR, RB.OFR, AND 
RC.OFR (p<0.001) as well as on OPP.LOSS (p<0.01). Partial η2 values show a very 
small effect on significant dependent variables. 
The fourth four-way interaction, RATION * R1.GAME * RA.GAME * 
RB.GAME, show a significant effect on all dependent variables (p<0.001). Partial η2 
values show that effects are large for M.OFR, R1.OFR, RA.OFR, RB.OFR, and RC.OFR 
(partial η2 = 0.809, 0.875, 0.888, 0.889, and 0.811 respectively). There was a medium 
effect on OPP.LOSS (partial η2 = 0.701) a small effect on CV (partial η2 = 0.411). 
The fifth four-way interaction, RATION * R1.GAME * RA.GAME * RC.GAME, 
show a significant effect on all dependent variables (p<0.001). However, partial η2 values 
show that effects were very small for CV, M.OFR, R1.OFR, RA.OFR, and C.COST. 
Partial η2 values indicate small effects for RB.OFR, RC.OFR, and OPP.LOSS (partial η2 
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= 0.272, 0.324, and 0.204 respectively). 
The sixth four-way interaction, RATION * R1.GAME * RB.GAME * 
RC.GAME, show a significant effect at p<0.001 for CV, M.OFR, R1.OFR, RA.OFR, 
RB.OFR, RC.OFR and C.COST. There was also a significant effect at p=0.05 for 
OPP.LOSS. All effect sizes were very small, with the exception of RC.OFR (partial η2 = 
0.486). 
The seventh four-way interaction, RATION * RA.GAME * RB.GAME * 
RC.GAME, show a significant effect at p<0.001 for all dependent variables. Partial η2 
values show that most effects are very small. However, partial η2 for RC.OFR indicates a 
medium effect (partial η2 = 0.627). There were also small effects for RA.OFR and 
RB.OFR (partial η2 = 0.220 and 0.260 respectively). 
The eighth four-way interaction of PROMOTIONS * R1.GAME * RA.GAME * 
RB.GAME show a significant effect on five dependent variables: CV (p<0.01), M.OFR 
(p<0.001), R1.OFR (p<0.001), RA.OFR (p<0.001), RB.OFR (p<0.001), and RC.OFR 
(p<0.05). Partial η2 values show that the effects are very small for all significant 
relationships.  
Lastly, the ninth four-way interaction of RI.GAME * RA.GAME * RB.GAME * 
RC.GAME show a significant effect on all eight dependent variable at p<0.001. Partial η2 
values show that the effects are very small for all significant relationships with the 
exception of the relationships with RB.OFR and RC.OFR (partial η2 = 0.205 and 0.392 
respectively). See Table 4-12 (below). 
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Table 4-12 Univariate Results - Four-Way Interactions 
Between Effects Tests – Four-Way Interactions 
Source Dependent Variable F df Sig. Partial η
2 Observed Power 
RATION * 
PROMOTIONS * 
R1.GAME * 
RA.GAME 
CV 121.268 8 0.000 0.064 1.000 
M.OFR 3519.923 8 0.000 0.666 ** 1.000 
R1.OFR 48.834 8 0.000 0.027 1.000 
RA.OFR 85.069 8 0.000 0.046 1.000 
RB.OFR 67.038 8 0.000 0.037 1.000 
RC.OFR 100.077 8 0.000 0.054 1.000 
OPP.LOSS 517.604 8 0.000 0.227 * 1.000 
 
RATION * 
PROMOTIONS * 
R1.GAME * 
RB.GAME 
CV 8.525 8 0.000 0.005 1.000 
M.OFR 7.661 8 0.000 0.004 1.000 
R1.OFR 10.368 8 0.000 0.006 1.000 
RA.OFR 10.214 8 0.000 0.006 1.000 
RB.OFR 6.832 8 0.000 0.004 1.000 
RC.OFR 5.621 8 0.000 0.003 1.000 
 
RATION * 
PROMOTIONS * 
RA.GAME * 
RB.GAME 
CV 6.020 8 0.000 0.003 1.000 
M.OFR 5.947 8 0.000 0.003 1.000 
R1.OFR 24.784 8 0.000 0.014 1.000 
RA.OFR 7.324 8 0.000 0.004 1.000 
RB.OFR 11.645 8 0.000 0.007 1.000 
RC.OFR 8.769 8 0.000 0.005 1.000 
OPP.LOSS 3.340 8 0.001 0.002 0.978 
 
RATION * 
R1.GAME * 
RA.GAME * 
RB.GAME 
CV 613.796 16 0.000 0.411 * 1.000 
M.OFR 3733.862 16 0.000 0.809 *** 1.000 
R1.OFR 6174.474 16 0.000 0.875 *** 1.000 
RA.OFR 6977.102 16 0.000 0.888 *** 1.000 
RB.OFR 7085.440 16 0.000 0.889 *** 1.000 
RC.OFR 3778.357 16 0.000 0.811 *** 1.000 
OPP.LOSS 2067.289 16 0.000 0.701 ** 1.000 
C.COST 8.962 16 0.000 0.010 1.000 
Partial η2: *** Large effect size, ** Medium effect size, * Small effect size 
 
  
  
 127 
Table 4-12 Univariate Results – Four-Way Interactions (continued) 
Between Effects Tests – Four-Way Interactions 
Source Dependent Variable F df Sig. Partial η
2 Observed Power 
RATION * 
R1.GAME * 
RA.GAME * 
RC.GAME 
 
CV 13.161 16 0.000 0.015 1.000 
M.OFR 89.817 16 0.000 0.093 1.000 
R1.OFR 205.736 16 0.000 0.189 1.000 
RA.OFR 127.901 16 0.000 0.127 1.000 
RB.OFR 329.402 16 0.000 0.272 * 1.000 
RC.OFR 422.115 16 0.000 0.324 * 1.000 
OPP.LOSS 225.856 16 0.000 0.204 * 1.000 
C.COST 6.577 16 0.000 0.007 1.000 
 
RATION * 
R1.GAME * 
RB.GAME * 
RC.GAME 
CV 7.305 16 0.000 0.008 1.000 
M.OFR 153.781 16 0.000 0.149 1.000 
R1.OFR 168.251 16 0.000 0.160 1.000 
RA.OFR 78.391 16 0.000 0.082 1.000 
RB.OFR 147.191 16 0.000 0.143 1.000 
RC.OFR 832.354 16 0.000 0.486 * 1.000 
OPP.LOSS 1.643 16 0.050 0.002 0.928 
C.COST 6.577 16 0.000 0.007 1.000 
 
RATION * 
RA.GAME * 
RB.GAME * 
RC.GAME 
CV 44.278 16 0.000 0.048 1.000 
M.OFR 334.143 16 0.000 0.275 1.000 
R1.OFR 126.669 16 0.000 0.126 1.000 
RA.OFR 247.773 16 0.000 0.220 * 1.000 
RB.OFR 309.347 16 0.000 0.260 * 1.000 
RC.OFR 1481.890 16 0.000 0.627 ** 1.000 
OPP.LOSS 9.862 16 0.000 0.011 1.000 
C.COST 6.577 16 0.000 0.007 1.000 
 
PROMOTIONS * 
R1.GAME * 
RA.GAME * 
RB.GAME 
CV 2.582 8 0.008 0.001 0.925 
M.OFR 8.888 8 0.000 0.005 1.000 
R1.OFR 7.670 8 0.000 0.004 1.000 
RA.OFR 11.830 8 0.000 0.007 1.000 
RB.OFR 7.190 8 0.000 0.004 1.000 
RC.OFR 2.028 8 0.039 0.001 0.835 
Partial η2: *** Large effect size, ** Medium effect size, * Small effect size 
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Table 4-12 Univariate Results – Four-Way Interactions (continued) 
Between Effects Tests – Four-Way Interactions 
Source Dependent Variable F df Sig. Partial η
2 Observed Power 
R1.GAME * 
RA.GAME * 
RB.GAME * 
RC.GAME 
 
CV 15.734 16 0.000 0.018 1.000 
M.OFR 117.387 16 0.000 0.118 1.000 
R1.OFR 200.231 16 0.000 0.185 1.000 
RA.OFR 109.170 16 0.000 0.11 1.000 
RB.OFR 227.134 16 0.000 0.205 * 1.000 
RC.OFR 568.640 16 0.000 0.392 * 1.000 
OPP.LOSS 36.261 16 0.000 0.040 1.000 
C.COST 25.226 16 0.000 0.028 1.000 
Partial η2: *** Large effect size, ** Medium effect size, * Small effect size 
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4.3.2 Univariate Results – Three-Way Interactions 
Three-way interactions with significant relationships to dependent variables are 
shown in Table 4-13. There were sixteen different significant three-way interactions, 
totaling 121 significant relationships with dependent variables. Of these relationships, 
eight different three-way interactions with 31 significant relationships to dependent 
variables show partial η2 values over 0.5, indicating at least a medium effect. Due to the 
simulation’s large sample size, small differences between groups are statistically 
significant. For clarity of interpretation, the remaining discussion on three-way univariate 
results will focus on those relationships with a medium or large effect size in order for 
differences of practical significance to be identified. 
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Table 4-13 Univariate Results - Three-Way Interactions 
Between Effects Tests – Three-Way Interactions 
Source Dependent Variable F df Sig. Partial η
2 Observed Power 
RATION * 
PROMOTIONS * 
R1.GAME 
 
CV 1656.887 4 0.000 0.320 * 1.000 
M.OFR 16184.144 4 0.000 0.821 *** 1.000 
R1.OFR 19908.509 4 0.000 0.850 *** 1.000 
RA.OFR 228.088 4 0.000 0.061 1.000 
RB.OFR 244.536 4 0.000 0.065 1.000 
RC.OFR 303.044 4 0.000 0.079 1.000 
OPP.LOSS 3044.577 4 0.000 0.464 * 1.000 
 
RATION * 
PROMOTIONS * 
RA.GAME 
CV 200.767 4 0.000 0.054 1.000 
M.OFR 3692.540 4 0.000 0.512 ** 1.000 
R1.OFR 84.411 4 0.000 0.023 1.000 
RA.OFR 26.178 4 0.000 0.007 1.000 
RB.OFR 7.427 4 0.000 0.002 0.997 
RC.OFR 7.072 4 0.000 0.002 0.995 
OPP.LOSS 1064.024 4 0.000 0.232 * 1.000 
 
RATION * 
PROMOTIONS * 
RB.GAME 
CV 10.878 4 0.000 0.003 1.000 
M.OFR 8.596 4 0.000 0.002 0.999 
R1.OFR 84.214 4 0.000 0.023 1.000 
RA.OFR 7.959 4 0.000 0.002 0.998 
RB.OFR 18.810 4 0.000 0.005 1.000 
RC.OFR 11.131 4 0.000 0.003 1.000 
 
RATION * 
R1.GAME * 
RA.GAME 
CV 12429.933 8 0.000 0.876 *** 1.000 
M.OFR 85459.478 8 0.000 0.980 *** 1.000 
R1.OFR 25619.439 8 0.000 0.936 *** 1.000 
RA.OFR 12709.178 8 0.000 0.878 *** 1.000 
RB.OFR 41605.610 8 0.000 0.959 *** 1.000 
RC.OFR 14478.031 8 0.000 0.892 *** 1.000 
OPP.LOSS 34528.358 8 0.000 0.951 *** 1.000 
C.COST 436.363 8 0.000 0.199 1.000 
Partial η2: *** Large effect size, ** Medium effect size, * Small effect size 
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Table 4-13 Univariate Results – Three-Way Interactions (continued) 
 
Between Effects Tests – Three-Way Interactions (continued) 
Source Dependent Variable F df Sig. Partial η
2 Observed Power 
RATION * 
R1.GAME * 
RB.GAME 
 
CV 808.205 8 0.000 0.314 * 1.000 
M.OFR 5575.053 8 0.000 0.760 ** 1.000 
R1.OFR 2850.775 8 0.000 0.618 ** 1.000 
RA.OFR 10148.888 8 0.000 0.852 *** 1.000 
RB.OFR 19500.939 8 0.000 0.917 *** 1.000 
RC.OFR 11673.150 8 0.000 0.869 *** 1.000 
OPP.LOSS 291.643 8 0.000 0.142 1.000 
C.COST 8.962 8 0.000 0.005 1.000 
 
RATION * 
R1.GAME * 
RC.GAME 
 
CV 13.900 8 0.000 0.008 1.000 
M.OFR 113.262 8 0.000 0.06 1.000 
R1.OFR 483.324 8 0.000 0.215 * 1.000 
RA.OFR 100.127 8 0.000 0.054 1.000 
RB.OFR 555.711 8 0.000 0.240 * 1.000 
RC.OFR 1242.975 8 0.000 0.414 * 1.000 
OPP.LOSS 291.643 8 0.000 0.142 1.000 
C.COST 6.577 8 0.000 0.004 1.000 
 
RATION * 
RA.GAME * 
RB.GAME 
 
CV 3069.678 8 0.000 0.635 ** 1.000 
M.OFR 20990.799 8 0.000 0.923 *** 1.000 
R1.OFR 46240.787 8 0.000 0.963 *** 1.000 
RA.OFR 18855.015 8 0.000 0.915 *** 1.000 
RB.OFR 35604.310 8 0.000 0.953 *** 1.000 
RC.OFR 28834.381 8 0.000 0.942 *** 1.000 
OPP.LOSS 1314.385 8 0.000 0.427 * 1.000 
C.COST 8.962 8 0.000 0.005 1.000 
 
RATION * 
RA.GAME * 
RC.GAME 
CV 79.098 8 0.000 0.043 1.000 
M.OFR 327.327 8 0.000 0.157 1.000 
R1.OFR 362.611 8 0.000 0.171 1.000 
RA.OFR 379.134 8 0.000 0.177 1.000 
RB.OFR 2459.907 8 0.000 0.583 ** 1.000 
RC.OFR 4406.020 8 0.000 0.714 ** 1.000 
OPP.LOSS 88.298 8 0.000 0.048 1.000 
C.COST 6.577 8 0.000 0.004 1.000 
Partial η2: *** Large effect size, ** Medium effect size, * Small effect size 
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Table 4-13 Univariate Results – Three-Way Interactions (continued) 
 
Between Effects Tests – Three-Way Interactions (continued) 
Source Dependent Variable F df Sig. Partial η
2 Observed Power 
RATION * 
RB.GAME * 
RC.GAME 
 
CV 213.890 8 0.000 0.108  1.000 
M.OFR 116.230 8 0.000 0.062 1.000 
R1.OFR 99.475 8 0.000 0.053 1.000 
RA.OFR 91.145 8 0.000 0.049 1.000 
RB.OFR 475.275 8 0.000 0.212 * 1.000 
RC.OFR 3149.434 8 0.000 0.641 ** 1.000 
OPP.LOSS 107.490 8 0.000 0.058 1.000 
C.COST 6.577 8 0.000 0.004 1.000 
 
PROMOTIONS * 
R1.GAME * 
RA.GAME 
 
CV 32.268 4 0.000 0.009 1.000 
M.OFR 1847.529 4 0.000 0.344 * 1.000 
R1.OFR 247.479 4 0.000 0.066 1.000 
RA.OFR 132.548 4 0.000 0.036 1.000 
RB.OFR 95.505 4 0.000 0.026 1.000 
RC.OFR 96.299 4 0.000 0.027 1.000 
OPP.LOSS 456.271 4 0.000 0.115 1.000 
 
PROMOTIONS * 
R1.GAME * 
RB.GAME 
 
CV 5.329 4 0.000 0.002 0.974 
M.OFR 29.488 4 0.000 0.008 1.000 
R1.OFR 29.865 4 0.000 0.008 1.000 
RA.OFR 36.353 4 0.000 0.010 1.000 
RB.OFR 22.505 4 0.000 0.006 1.000 
RC.OFR 11.743 4 0.000 0.003 1.000 
OPP.LOSS 5.223 4 0.000 0.001 0.971 
 
PROMOTIONS * 
RA.GAME * 
RB.GAME 
 
CV 3.333 4 0.010 0.001 0.847 
M.OFR 10.310 4 0.000 0.003 1.000 
R1.OFR 54.193 4 0.000 0.015 1.000 
RA.OFR 5.740 4 0.000 0.002 0.982 
RB.OFR 10.035 4 0.000 0.003 1.000 
RC.OFR 5.807 4 0.000 0.002 0.983 
OPP.LOSS 9.742 4 0.000 0.003 1.000 
Partial η2: *** Large effect size, ** Medium effect size, * Small effect size 
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Table 4-13 Univariate Results – Three-Way Interactions (continued) 
 
Between Effects Tests – Three-Way Interactions (continued) 
Source Dependent Variable F df Sig. Partial η
2 Observed Power 
R1.GAME * 
RA.GAME * 
RB.GAME 
 
CV 2181.891 8 0.000 0.553 ** 1.000 
M.OFR 4534.104 8 0.000 0.720 ** 1.000 
R1.OFR 6613.250 8 0.000 0.790 ** 1.000 
RA.OFR 8398.440 8 0.000 0.827 *** 1.000 
RB.OFR 8165.012 8 0.000 0.823 *** 1.000 
RC.OFR 5205.591 8 0.000 0.747 ** 1.000 
OPP.LOSS 6186.086 8 0.000 0.778 ** 1.000 
C.COST 34.766 8 0.000 0.019 1.000 
 
R1.GAME * 
RA.GAME * 
RC.GAME 
 
CV 7.930 8 0.000 0.004 1.000 
M.OFR 82.985 8 0.000 0.045 1.000 
R1.OFR 172.604 8 0.000 0.089 1.000 
RA.OFR 106.072 8 0.000 0.057 1.000 
RB.OFR 406.610 8 0.000 0.188 1.000 
RC.OFR 313.415 8 0.000 0.151 1.000 
OPP.LOSS 420.911 8 0.000 0.193 1.000 
C.COST 25.226 8 0.000 0.014 1.000 
 
R1.GAME * 
RB.GAME * 
RC.GAME 
 
CV 5.771 8 0.000 0.003 1.000 
M.OFR 216.297 8 0.000 0.109 1.000 
R1.OFR 225.667 8 0.000 0.114 1.000 
RA.OFR 96.023 8 0.000 0.052 1.000 
RB.OFR 232.481 8 0.000 0.117 1.000 
RC.OFR 609.926 8 0.000 0.257 * 1.000 
OPP.LOSS 5.213 8 0.000 0.003 0.999 
C.COST 25.226 8 0.000 0.014 1.000 
 
RA.GAME * 
RB.GAME * 
RC.GAME 
 
CV 98.516 8 0.000 0.053 1.000 
M.OFR 355.690 8 0.000 0.168 1.000 
R1.OFR 126.621 8 0.000 0.067 1.000 
RA.OFR 225.125 8 0.000 0.113 1.000 
RB.OFR 340.836 8 0.000 0.162 1.000 
RC.OFR 1339.197 8 0.000 0.432 * 1.000 
OPP.LOSS 32.566 8 0.000 0.018 1.000 
C.COST 25.226 8 0.000 0.014 1.000 
Partial η2: *** Large effect size, ** Medium effect size, * Small effect size 
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4.3.2.1 Interaction of RATION * PROMOTIONS * R1.GAME 
The first three-way interaction with at least medium effect sizes, RATION * 
PROMOTIONS * R1.GAME show a significant effect at p<0.001 on CV, M.OFR, 
R1.OFR, RA.OFR, RB.OFR, RC.OFR, and OPP.LOSS. Partial η2 values indicate large 
effects on the manufacturer’s order fulfillment rate (partial η2 = 0.821) and Retailer 1’s 
order fill rate (partial η2 = 0.850). There were also small effects on the manufacturer’s 
demand variance (partial η2 = 0.320) and the manufacturer’s opportunity loss (partial η2 = 
0.464). See Table 4-13. Following, profile plots are shown for those relationships with at 
least a medium sized effect. 
Figure 4-1 shows the profile plot of RATION * PROMOTIONS * R1.GAME effect 
on M.OFR while Figure 4-2 shows the profile plot of RATION * PROMOTIONS * 
R1.GAME effect on R1.OFR. 
The three-way interaction of manufacturer rationing strategy, retail promotions 
demand shock and focal retailer shortage gaming most strongly impacts order fill rates 
for the manufacturer as well as the focal retailer as evidenced by the large effects of the 
significant relationships (Table 4-13). Specifically, when the manufacturer utilizes a 
Uniform strategy and the focal retailer responds with Correction gaming, a retail 
promotions demand shock results in higher order fill rates for both parties compared to 
No promotions (Figures 4-1 and 4-2). These results, while also reflected in the two-way 
interactions of RATION * PROMOTIONS (see section 4.3.3.1) and PROMOTIONS * 
R1.GAME (see section 4.3.3.6), are counterintuitive. A retail promotions shock is 
hypothesized to set off a feedback cycle of excessive demand and low order fill (see 
section 2.4 Experimental Design and Hypotheses). However, the higher rather than lower 
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estimated marginal means under a retail promotions demand shock may be due to the 
simulation parameters. The simulation allows Retailer 1 to gain directly from ordering 
additional inventory for their retail promotions because the single retail promotions order 
is met by the manufacturer at a minimum of 80 percent order fill (see section 3.4.2.3 
Retail Promotions Demand Shock). Subsequent quarters within the simulation are subject 
to the normal functioning of inventory ordering and fulfillment per each scenario’s rules, 
which, with all else being equal, yields mean order fulfillment rates at 43 percent for the 
manufacturer (see Figure 4-80 RATION’S effect on M.OFR) and at 44 percent range for 
the focal retailer (see Figure 4-81 RATION’S effect on R1.OFR). The higher long-term 
order fill rates under a retail promotions demand shock may reflect the initial high order 
fill rate coupled with low subsequent order fill rates for both parties directly involved in 
the retail promotions demand shock. When the manufacturer utilizes a Uniform rationing 
strategy and when Retailer 1 responds with Correction gaming, the interaction of these 
elements is more evident compared to other rationing strategies.  A Uniform rationing 
strategy allocates inventory equally to all retailers and therefore their order fill rate is 
generally the same absolute number after the receiving their retail promotions order. 
Coupled with Retailer 1’s Correction gaming response, the initial high retail promotions 
order fill rate’s beneficial rate is compounded over time, resulting in a higher long-term 
order fill rate. 
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Figure 4-1 RATION * PROMOTIONS * R1.GAME effect on M.OFR 
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Figure 4-2 RATION * PROMOTIONS * R1.GAME effect on R1.OFR 
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4.3.2.2 Interaction of RATION * PROMOTIONS * RA.GAME 
The second three-way interaction with at least medium effect sizes, RATION * 
PROMOTIONS * RA.GAME show a significant effect at p<0.001 on CV, M.OFR, 
R1.OFR, RA.OFR, RB.OFT, RC.OFR, and OPP.LOSS. Partial η2 values indicate 
medium and small effects respectively on the manufacturer’s order fulfillment rate 
(partial η2 = 0.512) and the manufacturer’s opportunity loss (partial η2 = 0.232). See Table 
4-13. Following, profile plots are shown for those relationships with at least a medium 
sized effect. 
Figure 4-3 shows the profile plot of RATION * PROMOTIONS * RA.GAME 
effect on M.OFR. According to this plot, when the manufacturer utilize a Uniform 
rationing strategy, when A Retailers respond with either No gaming or Overreaction 
gaming, and when there is a retail promotions demand shock, over the long-term, the 
manufacturer will experience higher order fulfillment rates than if there were no retail 
promotions demand shock. As with the three-way interaction of RATION * 
PROMOTIONS * R1.GAME (section 4.3.2.1), this interaction reveals the differential 
impact of a Uniform rationing strategy when coupled with a retail promotions demand 
shock.  
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Figure 4-3 RATION * PROMOTIONS * RA.GAME effect on M.OFR 
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4.3.2.3 Interaction of RATION * R1.GAME * RA.GAME 
The third three-way interaction with at least medium effect sizes, RATION * 
R1.GAME * RA.GAME show a significant effect at p<0.001 on eight dependent 
variables: CV, M.OFR, R1.OFR, RA.OFR, RB.OFR, RC.OFR, OPP.LOSS and C.COST. 
Partial η2 values indicate large effects on the manufacturer’s demand variance (partial η2 
= 0.876), the manufacturer’s order fulfillment rate (partial η2 = 0.980), Retailer 1’s order 
fill rate (partial η2 = 0.936), A Retailers’ order fill rate (partial η2 = 0.878), B Retailers’ 
order fill rate (partial η2 = 0.959), C Retailers’ order fill rate (partial η2 = 0.892), and the 
manufacturer’s opportunity loss (partial η2 = 0.951). See Table 4-13. Following, profile 
plots are shown for those relationships with at least a medium sized effect. 
Figure 4-4 shows the profile plot of RATION * R1.GAME * RA.GAME effect on 
CV. Figure 4-5 shows the profile plot of RATION * R1.GAME * RA.GAME effect on 
M.OFR. Figure 4-6 shows the profile plot of RATION * R1.GAME * RA.GAME effect 
on R1.OFR. Figure 4-7 shows the profile plot of RATION * R1.GAME * RA.GAME 
effect on RA.OFR. Figure 4-8 shows the profile plot of RATION * R1.GAME * 
RA.GAME effect on RB.OFR. Figure 4-9 shows the profile plot of RATION * 
R1.GAME * RA.GAME effect on RC.OFR. Figure 4-10 shows the profile plot of 
RATION * R1.GAME * RA.GAME effect on OPP.LOSS. 
For the manufacturer and large retailers, when the manufacturer utilizes a Uniform 
rationing strategy and the focal retailer (Retailer 1) as well as A Retailers responds with 
shortage gaming, there is a greater range of outcomes compared to when the 
manufacturer utilizes other rationing strategies. The manufacturer experiences a greater 
range in demand variance (Figure 4-4), order fulfillment rates (Figure 4-5), and 
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opportunity loss (Figure 4-10). At the same time, large retailers such as the focal retailer 
and A Retailers also experience a greater range in order fill rates under this specific three-
way interaction (Figures 4-6 and 4-7). However, smaller retailers such as B and C 
Retailers experience the opposite. A Uniform rationing strategy coupled with any 
response by the focal retailer and A Retailers yields a consistently high order fill rate of 
100 percent (Figures 4-8 and 4-9).  
One interesting outcome to note would be the convergence of outcomes when the 
manufacturer utilizes a Uniform rationing strategy for larger retailers. Regardless of the 
level of response from the focal retailer and A Retailers, a Uniform rationing strategy 
yields three distinct levels of order fill rates (at approximately 70 percent, 30 percent, and 
10 percent) for the focal retailer (Figure 4-6) and A Retailers (Figure 4-7). These results 
are clustered by specific shortage gaming responses by either the focal retailer (Figure 4-
6) or by A Retailers (Figure 4-7). Although the results show three clusters of outcomes, 
they actually reflect the imperviousness of a Uniform rationing strategy to shortage 
gaming, as each distinct cluster of order fill rate reflect the amount of inflation under a 
particular shortage gaming response scenario coupled with the unchanging amount of 
inventory allocated under the Uniform rationing strategy. 
With regard to the manufacturer’s demand variance, the specific three-way 
interaction of the focal retailer’s No gaming, A Retailers’ Correction gaming, and a 
Uniform rationing strategy yields the highest observed demand variance of 0.220 (Figure 
4-4). If a Proportional rationing strategy is substituted in this specific interaction, the 
lowest observed demand variance of 0.081 results (Figure 4-4).  
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Figure 4-4 RATION * R1.GAME * RA.GAME effect on CV 
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Figure 4-5 RATION * R1.GAME * RA.GAME effect on M.OFR 
0.756 0.715 
0.843 
0.279 
0.165 
0.376 
0.10 
0.20 
0.30 
0.40 
0.50 
0.60 
0.70 
0.80 
0.90 
Proportional Linear Uniform 
E
st
im
at
ed
 M
ar
gi
na
l M
ea
ns
 
Manufacturer Order Rationing 
R1 No Gaming; 
RA No Gaming 
R1 No Gaming; 
RA Correction Gaming 
R1 No Gaming; 
RA Overreaction Gaming 
R1 CorrectionGaming; 
RA No Gaming 
R1 Correction Gaming; 
RA Correction Gaming 
R1 Correction Gaming; 
RA Overreaction Gaming 
R1 Overreaction Gaming; 
RA No Gaming 
R1 Overreaction Gaming; 
RA Correction Gaming 
R1 Overreaction Gaming; 
RA Overreaction Gaming 
  
 144 
 
Figure 4-6 RATION * R1.GAME * RA.GAME effect on R1.OFR 
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Figure 4-7 RATION * R1.GAME * RA.GAME effect on RA.OFR 
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Figure 4-8 RATION * R1.GAME * RA.GAME effect on RB.OFR 
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Figure 4-9 RATION * R1.GAME * RA.GAME effect on RC.OFR 
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Figure 4-10 RATION * R1.GAME * RA.GAME effect on OPP.LOSS 
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4.3.2.4 Interaction of RATION * R1.GAME * RB.GAME 
The fourth three-way interaction with at least a medium effect size, RATION * 
R1.GAME * RB.GAME show a significant effect at p<0.001 on eight dependent 
variables: CV, M.OFR, R1.OFR, RA.OFR, RB.OFR, RC.OFR, OPP.LOSS and C.COST. 
Partial η2 values indicate large effects on A Retailers’ order fill rate (partial η2 = 0.852), B 
Retailers’ order fill rate (partial η2 = 0.917), and C Retailers’ order fill rate (partial η2 = 
0.869). Partial η2 values indicate medium effects on the manufacturer’s order fulfillment 
rate (partial η2 = 0.760) and the focal retailer’s order fill rate (partial η2 = 0.618). There 
were also small effects on the manufacturer’s demand variance (partial η2 = 0.314). See 
Table 4-13. Following, profile plots are shown for those relationships with at least a 
medium sized effect. 
Figure 4-11 shows the profile plot of RATION * R1.GAME * RB.GAME effect on 
M.OFR. Figure 4-12 shows the profile plot of RATION * R1.GAME * RB.GAME effect 
on R1.OFR. Figure 4-13 shows the profile plot of RATION * R1.GAME * RB.GAME 
effect on RA.OFR. Figure 4-14 shows the profile plot of RATION * R1.GAME * 
RB.GAME effect on RB.OFR. Figure 4-15 shows the profile plot of RATION * 
R1.GAME * RB.GAME effect on RC.OFR.  
The interaction of manufacturer order rationing with both focal retailer’s (Retailer 
1) and B Retailers’ shortage gaming yields different outcomes depending on different 
combinations of order rationing strategies and shortage gaming responses. With regard to 
impact on the manufacturer’s order fulfillment rate, specific combinations of the three-
way interaction results in a range of outcomes (Figure 4-11). Under a Proportional 
rationing strategy scenario, combinations of focal retailer and B Retailers’ shortage 
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gaming response yields a range of 39 to 68 percent order fulfillment rate. Under a Linear 
rationing strategy scenario, the manufacturer’s order fulfillment rate ranges from 31 
percent to 70 percent. Finally, under a Uniform strategy, the manufacturer experiences 
order fulfillment rates from 34 to 51 percent (Figure 4-11). 
In general, the specific interaction of No gaming by focal retailer and B Retailers 
results in the higher observed mean order fill rates for all parties within a given 
manufacturer order rationing scenario, particularly under a Proportional or Linear 
strategy (Figures 4-11, 4-12, 4-13, 4-14 and 4-15). Interactions of shortage gaming by 
either focal retailer or B Retailers results in the lower observed mean order fill rates for 
all parties within a given manufacturer order rationing scenario, particularly under a 
Proportional or Linear manufacturer order rationing scenario (Figures 4-11, 4-12, 4-13, 4-
14 and 4-15). 
 When the manufacturer utilizes a Uniform rationing strategy, B and C Retailers 
benefit, as they experience 100 percent order fill rates regardless of A or B Retailers’ 
responses under this strategy (Figures 4-14 and 4-15). A Retailers do not benefit under 
this order rationing scenario as the Uniform strategy results in a low order fill rate of 43.7 
percent regardless of other retailers’ actions (Figure 4-13). Under a Uniform rationing 
strategy, the focal retailer’s order fill rates are grouped into three clusters according to its 
own shortage gaming responses (Figure 4-12). These results are similar to the effects of 
RATION * RI.GAME * RA.GAME on R1.OFR (Figure 4-6) and RA.OFR (Figure 4-7). 
Although the results show three clusters of outcomes, they actually reflect the 
imperviousness of a Uniform rationing strategy to shortage gaming, as each distinct 
cluster of order fill rate reflect the amount of inflation under a particular shortage gaming 
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response scenario coupled with the unchanging amount of inventory allocated under the 
Uniform rationing strategy. 
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Figure 4-11 RATION * R1.GAME * RB.GAME effect on M.OFR 
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Figure 4-12 RATION * R1.GAME * RB.GAME effect on R1.OFR 
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Figure 4-13 RATION * R1.GAME * RB.GAME effect on RA.OFR 
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Figure 4-14 RATION * R1.GAME * RB.GAME effect on RB.OFR 
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Figure 4-15 RATION * R1.GAME * RB.GAME effect on RC.OFR 
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4.3.2.5 Interaction of RATION * RA.GAME * RB.GAME 
The fifth three-way interaction with at least medium effect sizes, RATION * 
RA.GAME * RB.GAME show a significant effect at p<0.001 on eight dependent 
variables: CV, M.OFR, R1.OFR, RA.OFR, RB.OFR, RC.OFR, OPP.LOSS and C.COST. 
Partial η2 values indicate large effects on the manufacturer’s order fulfillment rate (partial 
η2 = 0.923), Retailer 1’s order fill rate (partial η2 = 0.963), A Retailers’ order fill rate 
(partial η2 = 0.915), B Retailers’ order fill rate (partial η2 = 0.953), and C Retailers’ order 
fill rate (partial η2 = 0.942). There was also a medium effect on the manufacturer’s 
demand variance (partial η2 = 0.635), See Table 4-13. Following, profile plots are shown 
for those relationships with at least a medium sized effect. 
Figure 4-16 shows the profile plot of RATION * RA.GAME * RB.GAME effect on 
CV. Figure 4-17 shows the profile plot of RATION * RA.GAME * RB.GAME effect on 
M.OFR. Figure 4-18 shows the profile plot of RATION * RA.GAME * RB.GAME effect 
on R1.OFR. Figure 4-19 shows the profile plot of RATION * RA.GAME * RB.GAME 
effect on RA.OFR. Figure 4-20 shows the profile plot of RATION * RA.GAME * 
RB.GAME effect on RB.OFR. Figure 4-21 shows the profile plot of RATION * 
RA.GAME * RB.GAME effect on RC.OFR.  
The plots show that the interaction of manufacturer order rationing with A and B 
Retailers’ shortage gaming yields different outcomes depending on different 
combinations of order rationing strategies and shortage gaming responses. When the 
manufacturer utilizes a Uniform rationing strategy, higher demand variance results, 
particularly when combined with Correction gaming by A Retailers (Figure 4-16). 
Consequently, this specific set of interactions also results in the lowest observed order 
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fulfillment rates for the manufacturer (Figure 4-17). The Uniform rationing strategy 
benefits B and C Retailers, as they experience 100 percent order fill rates regardless of A 
or B Retailers’ responses under this strategy (Figures 4-20 and 4-21). A Retailers appear 
to benefit under this particular order rationing scenario if they do not engage in shortage 
gaming (Figure 4-19), however, this result reflects the inclusion of order inflation by A 
Retailers in the order fill rate calculation. Although the results under a Uniform rationing 
strategy scenario show three clusters of outcomes, the results reflect the imperviousness 
of a Uniform rationing strategy to shortage gaming, as each distinct level of order fill rate 
reflect the amount of inflation under a particular shortage gaming response scenario 
coupled with the unchanging amount of inventory allocated under the Uniform rationing 
strategy. 
In general, the specific interaction of No gaming by A and B Retailers results in the 
highest observed mean order fill rates for all retailers within a Proportional or Linear 
manufacturer order rationing scenario (Figures 4-18, 4-19, 4-20, and 4-21). The specific 
interaction of Correction gaming by A Retailers and either Correction or Overreaction 
gaming by B Retailers results in the lowest observed mean order fill rates for all retailers 
within a Proportional or Linear manufacturer order rationing scenario (Figures 4-18, 4-
19, 4-20, and 4-21).  
Overall, these results are similar to the results obtained from the three-way 
interaction of RATION * R1.GAME * RB.GAME (see section 4.3.2.4). 
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Figure 4-16 RATION * RA.GAME * RB.GAME effect on CV 
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Figure 4-17 RATION * RA.GAME * RB.GAME effect on M.OFR 
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Figure 4-18 RATION * RA.GAME * RB.GAME effect on R1.OFR 
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Figure 4-19 RATION * RA.GAME * RB.GAME effect on RA.OFR 
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Figure 4-20 RATION * RA.GAME * RB.GAME effect on RB.OFR 
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Figure 4-21 RATION * RA.GAME * RB.GAME effect on RC.OFR 
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4.3.2.6 Interaction of RATION * RA.GAME * RC.GAME 
The sixth three-way interaction with at least medium effect sizes, RATION * 
RA.GAME * RC.GAME show a significant effect at p<0.001 on eight dependent 
variables: CV, M.OFR, R1.OFR, RA.OFR, RB.OFR, RC.OFR, OPP.LOSS and C.COST. 
Partial η2 values indicate medium effects on B Retailers’ order fill rate (partial η2 = 0.583) 
and C Retailers’ order fill rate (partial η2 = 0.714). See Table 4-13. Following, profile 
plots are shown for those relationships with at least a medium sized effect. 
Figure 4-22 shows the profile plot of RATION * RA.GAME * RC.GAME effect on 
RB.OFR while Figure 4-23 shows the profile plot of RATION * RA.GAME * 
RC.GAME effect on RC.OFR.  
The interaction of manufacturer order rationing, A Retailers’ shortage gaming, and 
C Retailers’ shortage gaming impact both B and C Retailers strongly. If the manufacturer 
utilizes a Uniform strategy, neither B nor C Retailers are affected by shortage gaming 
from other retailers connected in the inventory ordering and fulfillment feedback loop 
(Figures 4-22 and 4-23). However, if the manufacturer utilizes either a Proportional or 
Linear strategy, mean order fill rates are lower than 100 percent. 
For B Retailers specifically, order fill rates appear to be primarily influenced by the 
interaction of shortage gaming by A Retailers along with the manufacturer’s rationing 
strategy as evidenced by clusters of outcomes when A Retailers either do not shortage 
game, Correction games, or Overreaction games (Figure 4-22). B Retailers suffer the 
lowest observed order fill rates when the manufacturer utilizes a Linear strategy and 
when A Retailers respond with Overreaction gaming, regardless of C Retailers’ response. 
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Figure 4-22 RATION * RA.GAME * RC.GAME effect on RB.OFR 
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Figure 4-23 RATION * RA.GAME * RC.GAME effect on RC.OFR 
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4.3.2.7 Interaction of RATION * RB.GAME * RC.GAME 
The seventh three-way interaction with at least medium effect sizes, RATION * 
RB.GAME * RC.GAME show a significant effect at p<0.001 on eight dependent 
variables: CV, M.OFR, R1.OFR, RA.OFR, RB.OFR, RC.OFR, OPP.LOSS and C.COST. 
Partial η2 values indicate a medium effect on C Retailers’ order fill rate (partial η2 = 
0.641). See Table 4-13. 
Figure 4-24 shows the profile plot of RATION * RB.GAME * RC.GAME effect on 
RC.OFR. This plot shows that a Uniform rationing strategy benefits C Retailers 
regardless of shortage gaming from B and C Retailers, consistently yielding 100 percent 
fill rates (Figure 4-24). In contrast, when the manufacturer utilizes a Proportional 
rationing strategy, specific interactions involving shortage gaming by B Retailers results 
in lower order fill rates for C Retailers compared to when B Retailers do not shortage 
game. Under a Linear order rationing strategy, order fill rates for C Retailers are 
generally low, ranging from approximately 22 percent to zero percent. 
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Figure 4-24 RATION * RB.GAME * RC.GAME effect on RC.OFR 
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4.3.2.8 Interaction of R1.GAME * RA.GAME * RB.GAME 
The eighth three-way interaction with at least medium effect sizes, R1.GAME * 
RA.GAME * RB.GAME show a significant effect at p<0.001 on eight dependent 
variables: CV, M.OFR, R1.OFR, RA.OFR, RB.OFR, RC.OFR, OPP.LOSS and C.COST. 
Partial η2 values indicate large effects on A Retailers’ order fill rate (partial η2 = 0.827) 
and B Retailers’ order fill rate (partial η2 = 0.823). There were medium effects on the 
manufacturer’s demand variance (partial η2 = 0.553), the manufacturer’s order fulfillment 
rate (partial η2 = 0.720), Retailer 1’s order fill rate (partial η2 = 0.790), C Retailers’ order 
fill rate (partial η2 = 0.747), and the manufacturer’s opportunity loss (partial η2 = 0.778). 
See Table 4-13. 
Figure 4-25 shows the profile plot of R1.GAME * RA.GAME * RB.GAME effect 
on CV. Figure 4-26 shows the profile plot of R1.GAME * RA.GAME * RB.GAME 
effect on M.OFR. Figure 4-27 shows the profile plot of R1.GAME * RA.GAME * 
RB.GAME effect on R1.OFR. Figure 4-28 shows the profile plot of R1.GAME * 
RA.GAME * RB.GAME effect on RA.OFR. Figure 4-29 shows the profile plot of 
R1.GAME * RA.GAME * RB.GAME effect on RB.OFR Figure 4-30 shows the profile 
plot of R1.GAME * RA.GAME * RB.GAME effect on RC.OFR. Figure 4-31 shows the 
profile plot of R1.GAME * RA.GAME * RB.GAME effect on OPP.LOSS. 
The plots indicate that the specific three-way interaction of Correction gaming by 
all large and medium sized retailers results in the highest observed demand variance 
(Figure 4-25) and lowest observed order fulfillment rates for the manufacturer (Figure 4-
26), the focal retailer (Figure 4-27), A Retailers (Figure 4-28), B Retailers (Figure 4-29), 
and C Retailers (Figure 4-30). However, Correction gaming by the focal retailer, A 
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Retailers, and B Retailers also results in low opportunity loss for the manufacturer, 
similar in impact from No gaming by all three parties (Figure 4-31). In this situation, the 
manufacturer’s excess inventory is taken up by the combined inflated orders from the 
three groups of retailers. In contrast, when A and B Retailers engage in Correction 
gaming, but Retailer 1 engages in Overreaction gaming, the manufacturer’s opportunity 
loss is increased to 84,266 units of true unfilled demand over the five year period 
observed (Figure 4-31). With regard to the manufacturer’s opportunity loss, the impact of 
a consistent Overreaction gaming response rather than compounded dynamic Correction 
gaming response by Retailer 1 appears to limit the detrimental impact of shortage gaming 
by the three groups of retailers in this interaction. This general pattern is also seen in the 
two-way interaction of R1.GAME * RA.GAME (see section 4.3.3.7 and Figure 4-65). 
The addition of shortage gaming by B retailers appears to exacerbate the detrimental 
impact of shortage gaming by Retailer 1 and A Retailers. For example, the specific three-
way interaction of B Retailers’ Correction gaming, A Retailers’ Correction Gaming, and 
Retailer 1’s Correction gaming generally yields greater opportunity loss when compared 
to the three-way interaction of B Retailers’ No gaming, A Retailers’ Correction Gaming, 
and Retailer 1’s Correction gaming (Figure 4-31). 
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Figure 4-25 R1.GAME * RA.GAME * RB.GAME effect on CV 
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Figure 4-26 R1.GAME * RA.GAME * RB.GAME effect on M.OFR 
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Figure 4-27 R1.GAME * RA.GAME * RB.GAME effect on R1.OFR 
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Figure 4-28 R1.GAME * RA.GAME * RB.GAME effect on RA.OFR 
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Figure 4-29 R1.GAME * RA.GAME * RB.GAME effect on RB.OFR 
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Figure 4-30 R1.GAME * RA.GAME * RB.GAME effect on RC.OFR 
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Figure 4-31 R1.GAME * RA.GAME * RB.GAME effect on OPP.LOSS 
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4.3.3 Univariate Results – Two-Way Interactions 
Two-way interactions with significant relationships to dependent variables are 
shown in Table 4-14. There were fourteen different significant two-way interactions, 
totaling 107 significant relationships with dependent variables. Of these relationships, ten 
different two-way interactions with 41 significant relationships with dependent variables 
show partial η2 values over 0.5, indicating at least a medium effect. Due to the 
simulation’s large sample size, small differences between groups are statistically 
significant. For clarity of interpretation, the remaining discussion on two-way univariate 
results will focus on those relationships with at least a medium effect size in order for 
differences of practical significance to be identified. 
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Table 4-14 Univariate Results - Two-Way Interactions 
Between Effects Tests – Two-Way Interactions 
Source Dependent Variable F df Sig. Partial η
2 Observed Power 
RATION * 
PROMOTIONS 
 
CV 1198.893 2 0.000 0.145 1.000 
M.OFR 16020.473 2 0.000 0.695 ** 1.000 
R1.OFR 22788.297 2 0.000 0.764 ** 1.000 
RA.OFR 66.354 2 0.000 0.009 1.000 
RB.OFR 37.670 2 0.000 0.005 1.000 
RC.OFR 30.176 2 0.000 0.004 1.000 
OPP.LOSS 2081.021 2 0.000 0.228 * 1.000 
 
RATION * 
R1.GAME 
 
CV 8988.325 4 0.000 0.718 ** 1.000 
M.OFR 158189.316 4 0.000 0.978 *** 1.000 
R1.OFR 1168985.724 4 0.000 0.997 *** 1.000 
RA.OFR 135671.928 4 0.000 0.975 *** 1.000 
RB.OFR 188650.062 4 0.000 0.982 *** 1.000 
RC.OFR 89898.354 4 0.000 0.962 *** 1.000 
OPP.LOSS 2906.985 4 0.000 0.452 * 1.000 
C.COST 436.363 4 0.000 0.110 1.000 
 
RATION * 
RA.GAME 
 
CV 31398.292 4 0.000 0.899 *** 1.000 
M.OFR 494704.616 4 0.000 0.993 *** 1.000 
R1.OFR 480540.095 4 0.000 0.993 *** 1.000 
RA.OFR 1061724.777 4 0.000 0.997 *** 1.000 
RB.OFR 540940.874 4 0.000 0.994 *** 1.000 
RC.OFR 387202.776 4 0.000 0.991 *** 1.000 
OPP.LOSS 64817.313 4 0.000 0.948 *** 1.000 
C.COST 436.363 4 0.000 0.110 1.000 
 
RATION * 
RB.GAME 
 
CV 2634.739 4 0.000 0.428 * 1.000 
M.OFR 233732.873 4 0.000 0.985 *** 1.000 
R1.OFR 271028.311 4 0.000 0.987 *** 1.000 
RA.OFR 242397.747 4 0.000 0.986 *** 1.000 
RB.OFR 90419.333 4 0.000 0.962 *** 1.000 
RC.OFR 91675.316 4 0.000 0.963 *** 1.000 
OPP.LOSS 9880.825 4 0.000 0.737 ** 1.000 
C.COST 8.962 4 0.000 0.003 0.999 
Partial η2: *** Large effect size, ** Medium effect size, * Small effect size 
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Table 4-14 Univariate Results – Two-Way Interactions (continued) 
Between Effects Tests – Two-Way Interactions 
Source Dependent Variable F df Sig. Partial η
2 Observed Power 
RATION * 
RC.GAME 
 
CV 1099.509 4 0.000 0.238 * 1.000 
M.OFR 23240.858 4 0.000 0.868 *** 1.000 
R1.OFR 7919.444 4 0.000 0.692 ** 1.000 
RA.OFR 7786.298 4 0.000 0.688 ** 1.000 
RB.OFR 4767.988 4 0.000 0.575 ** 1.000 
RC.OFR 97154.960 4 0.000 0.965 *** 1.000 
OPP.LOSS 1281.653 4 0.000 0.267 * 1.000 
C.COST 6.577 4 0.000 0.002 0.992 
 
PROMOTIONS 
* R1.GAME 
 
CV 3024.460 2 0.000 0.300 * 1.000 
M.OFR 23868.225 2 0.000 0.772 ** 1.000 
R1.OFR 26189.020 2 0.000 0.788 ** 1.000 
RA.OFR 446.406 2 0.000 0.060 1.000 
RB.OFR 211.692 2 0.000 0.029 1.000 
RC.OFR 317.859 2 0.000 0.043 1.000 
OPP.LOSS 3792.526 2 0.000 0.350 * 1.000 
 
PROMOTIONS 
* RA.GAME 
 
CV 22.135 2 0.000 0.003 1.000 
M.OFR 3750.713 2 0.000 0.347 * 1.000 
RA.OFR 64.145 2 0.000 0.009 1.000 
RB.OFR 21.763 2 0.000 0.003 1.000 
RC.OFR 16.464 2 0.000 0.002 1.000 
OPP.LOSS 1614.826 2 0.000 0.186 1.000 
 
PROMOTIONS 
* RB.GAME 
 
CV 8.405 2 0.000 0.001 0.965 
M.OFR 28.692 2 0.000 0.004 1.000 
R1.OFR 161.277 2 0.000 0.022 1.000 
RA.OFR 26.133 2 0.000 0.004 1.000 
RB.OFR 7.553 2 0.001 0.001 0.945 
RC.OFR 14.424 2 0.000 0.002 0.999 
OPP.LOSS 5.820 2 0.003 0.001 0.873 
Partial η2: *** Large effect size, ** Medium effect size, * Small effect size 
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Table 4-14 Univariate Results – Two-Way Interactions (continued) 
Between Effects Tests – Two-Way Interactions 
Source Dependent Variable F df Sig. Partial η
2 Observed Power 
R1.GAME * 
RA.GAME 
 
CV 1242.735 4 0.000 0.261 * 1.000 
M.OFR 35506.655 4 0.000 0.910 *** 1.000 
R1.OFR 47156.044 4 0.000 0.930 *** 1.000 
RA.OFR 31569.161 4 0.000 0.900 *** 1.000 
RB.OFR 83817.663 4 0.000 0.960 *** 1.000 
RC.OFR 29266.652 4 0.000 0.893 *** 1.000 
OPP.LOSS 875349.896 4 0.000 0.996 *** 1.000 
C.COST 883.711 4 0.000 0.201 * 1.000 
 
R1.GAME * 
RB.GAME 
 
CV 2981.599 4 0.000 0.458 * 1.000 
M.OFR 14096.256 4 0.000 0.800 *** 1.000 
R1.OFR 7325.202 4 0.000 0.675 ** 1.000 
RA.OFR 19208.271 4 0.000 0.845 *** 1.000 
RB.OFR 27580.035 4 0.000 0.887 *** 1.000 
RC.OFR 22108.835 4 0.000 0.863 *** 1.000 
OPP.LOSS 998.473 4 0.000 0.221 * 1.000 
C.COST 34.766 4 0.000 0.010 1.000 
 
R1.GAME * 
RC.GAME 
 
CV 40.903 4 0.000 0.011 1.000 
M.OFR 262.240 4 0.000 0.069 1.000 
R1.OFR 327.554 4 0.000 0.085 1.000 
RA.OFR 187.462 4 0.000 0.051 1.000 
RB.OFR 704.237 4 0.000 0.167 1.000 
RC.OFR 943.607 4 0.000 0.211 * 1.000 
OPP.LOSS 24.427 4 0.000 0.007 1.000 
C.COST 25.226 4 0.000 0.007 1.000 
 
RA.GAME * 
RB.GAME 
 
CV 11488.230 4 0.000 0.765 ** 1.000 
M.OFR 76383.969 4 0.000 0.956 *** 1.000 
R1.OFR 120640.325 4 0.000 0.972 *** 1.000 
RA.OFR 68102.154 4 0.000 0.951 *** 1.000 
RB.OFR 58178.096 4 0.000 0.943 *** 1.000 
RC.OFR 46948.850 4 0.000 0.930 *** 1.000 
OPP.LOSS 4283.687 4 0.000 0.549 ** 1.000 
C.COST 34.766 4 0.000 0.010 1.000 
Partial η2: *** Large effect size, ** Medium effect size, * Small effect size 
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Table 4-14 Univariate Results – Two-Way Interactions (continued) 
Between Effects Tests – Two-Way Interactions 
Source Dependent Variable F df Sig. Partial η
2 Observed Power 
RA.GAME * 
RC.GAME 
 
CV 294.301 4 0.000 0.077 1.000 
M.OFR 941.453 4 0.000 0.211 * 1.000 
R1.OFR 1077.240 4 0.000 0.234 * 1.000 
RA.OFR 269.128 4 0.000 0.071 1.000 
RB.OFR 2771.255 4 0.000 0.440 * 1.000 
RC.OFR 5090.443 4 0.000 0.591 ** 1.000 
OPP.LOSS 189.010 4 0.000 0.051 1.000 
C.COST 25.226 4 0.000 0.007 1.000 
 
RB.GAME * 
RC.GAME 
 
CV 429.843 4 0.000 0.109 1.000 
M.OFR 189.898 4 0.000 0.051 1.000 
R1.OFR 218.524 4 0.000 0.058 1.000 
RA.OFR 188.868 4 0.000 0.051 1.000 
RB.OFR 576.505 4 0.000 0.141 1.000 
RC.OFR 2531.791 4 0.000 0.418 * 1.000 
OPP.LOSS 226.795 4 0.000 0.060 1.000 
C.COST 25.226 4 0.000 0.007 1.000 
Partial η2: *** Large effect size, ** Medium effect size, * Small effect size 
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4.3.3.1 Interaction of RATION * PROMOTIONS 
The first two-way interaction with at least medium effect sizes, RATION * 
PROMOTIONS show a significant effect at p<0.001 on seven dependent variables: CV, 
M.OFR, R1.OFR, RA.OFR, RB.OFR, RC.OFR, and OPP.LOSS. Partial η2 values 
indicate medium effects on the manufacturer’s order fulfillment rate (partial η2 = 0.695) 
and Retailer 1’s order fill rate (partial η2 = 0.764). See Table 4-14. 
Figure 4-32 shows the profile plot of RATION * PROMOTIONS effect on M.OFR 
and Figure 4-33 shows the profile plot of RATION * PROMOTIONS effect on R1.OFR.  
The interaction of different manufacturer rationing strategies with retail promotions 
demand shock impacts order fulfillment rates for the manufacturer as well as order fill 
rates for the focal retailer (Figure 4-32 and Figure 4-33). If the manufacturer utilizes 
either a Proportional or a Linear rationing strategy, the results indicate that the strategy is 
robust to the impact of retail promotions demand shock. Note that there are no 
differences in the estimated marginal means for Proportional and Linear rationing 
strategies between Promotions and No promotions for M.OFR (Figure 4-32) and R1.OFR 
(Figure 4-33).  
When the manufacturer utilizes a Uniform strategy, a retail promotions demand 
shock results in higher order fill rates compared to No promotions for the manufacturer as 
well as the focal retailer (Figures 4-32 and 4-33). As discussed in section 4.3.2.1 
Interaction of RATION * PROMOTIONS * R1.GAME, these results may seem 
counterintuitive since a retail promotions shock is hypothesized to set of a feedback cycle 
of excessive demand and low order fill (see section 2.4 Experimental Design and 
Hypotheses) However, the higher estimated marginal mean under a retail promotions 
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demand shock may be an artifact of the simulation. The simulation allows Retailer 1 to 
gain directly from ordering additional inventory for their retail promotions because the 
single retail promotions order is met by the manufacturer at a minimum of 80 percent 
order fill (see section 3.4.2.3 Retail Promotions Demand Shock). Subsequent quarters 
within the simulation are subject to the normal functioning of inventory ordering and 
fulfillment per each scenario’s rules, which in general yields order fill rates in the 40 to 
50 percent range for the manufacturer (see Figure 4-80 RATION’S effect on M.OFR) and 
for the focal retailer (see Figure 4-81 RATION’S effect on R1.OFR). The results of this 
specific interaction may reflect the initial high order fill rate coupled with low subsequent 
order fill rates for both parties involved in attending to the retail promotions demand 
shock. These results are evident when the manufacturer utilizes a Uniform rationing 
strategy because the strategy allocates the same absolute amount of inventory regardless 
of shortage gaming whereas outcomes under a Proportional or Linear rationing strategy 
reflects higher fill rates as a result of order rationing and may thus mask the initial high 
order fill rate from the retail promotion demand. The higher long-term order fill rates 
under a retailer promotions demand shock may reflect the initial high order fill rate 
coupled with low subsequent order fill rates for both parties directly involved in the retail 
promotions demand shock. These results should also be considered in context of relevant 
three-way interactions such as the interaction of RATION * PROMOTIONS * 
R1.GAME (see section 4.3.2.1) and the interaction of RATION * PROMOTIONS * 
RA.GAME (see section 4.3.2.2), where shortage gaming actions from the focal retailer 
and A Retailers are masked in this two-way interaction. 
Finally, although this interaction is significant with medium level effects, its 
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practical significance may be limited. Within the Uniform level, differences between 
Promotions and No promotions are 3.5 percent (3.5 = 45.4 - 41.9) and 4.5 percent (4.5 = 
47.0 - 42.5) for M.OFR and R1.OFR respectively.   
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Figure 4-32 RATION * PROMOTIONS effect on M.OFR 
 
 
Figure 4-33 RATION * PROMOTIONS effect on R1.OFR 
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4.3.3.2 Interaction of RATION * R1.GAME 
The second two-way interaction with at least medium effect sizes, RATION * 
R1.GAME show a significant effect at p<0.001 on eight dependent variables: CV, 
M.OFR, R1.OFR, RA.OFR, RB.OFR, RC.OFR, OPP.LOSS, and C.COST. Partial η2 
values indicate large effects on the manufacturer’s demand variance (partial η2 = 0.718), 
the manufacturer’s order fulfillment rate (partial η2 = 0.978), Retailer 1’s order fill rate 
(partial η2 = 0.997), A Retailers’ order fill rates (partial η2 = 0.975), B Retailers’ order fill 
rates (partial η2 = 0.982), and C Retailers’ order fill rates (partial η2 = 0.962). See Table 4-
14. 
Figure 4-34 shows the profile plot of RATION * R1.GAME effect on CV. Figure 4-
35 shows the profile plot of RATION * R1.GAME effect on M.OFR. Figure 4-36 shows 
the profile plot of RATION * R1.GAME effect on R1.OFR. Figure 4-37 shows the 
profile plot of RATION * R1.GAME effect on RA.OFR. Figure 4-38 shows the profile 
plot of RATION * R1.GAME effect on RB.OFR. Figure 4-39 shows the profile plot of 
RATION * R1.GAME effect on RC.OFR.  
The plots indicate that the interaction of Uniform order rationing strategy by the 
manufacturer and Correction shortage gaming by the focal retailer results in detrimental 
results for the manufacturer and for the focal retailer. Figure 4-34 shows that demand 
variance is increased when there is an interaction of Uniform order rationing strategy and 
Correction gaming, compared to No gaming. This interaction also results in the lowest 
observed order fulfillment rates for the manufacturer at 31.2 percent (Figure 4-35) and 
order fill rates for the focal retailer at 18 percent (Figure 4-36). However, note that these 
results reflect the inclusion of order inflation by the focal retailer coupled with a similar 
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absolute inventory allocation in the calculation of order fill rate (Figure 4-36). Three 
levels of outcomes are observed as the denominator reflects No gaming, Correction 
gaming, and Overreaction gaming levels of order inflation while the numerator reflects a 
similar absolute inventory allocation under the Uniform rationing rule. 
The specific interaction of manufacturer Linear order rationing and Retailer 1 
Correction gaming benefits other large type A Retailers best (Figure 4-37), as this 
interaction results in the highest order fill rates for A Retailers if Retailer 1 engages in 
shortage gaming. Overall, A Retailers suffer decreased order fill rates when Retailer 1 
engages in shortage gaming compared to No gaming. In contrast to the effect on A 
Retailers, the interaction of manufacturer Linear order rationing strategy and Retailer 1 
shortage gaming also results in the lowest order fill rates for B and C retailers (Figures 4-
38 and 4-39). 
A Uniform order rationing strategy appears to be robust against Retailer 1 shortage 
gaming, as there are no differences in order fill rates for A retailers (Figure 4-37), B 
retailers (Figure 4-38), and C retailers (Figure 4-39). However, this rationing strategy 
results in low order fill rates for all. 
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Figure 4-34 RATION * R1.GAME effect on CV 
 
 
Figure 4-35 RATION * R1.GAME effect on M.OFR 
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Figure 4-36 RATION * R1.GAME effect on R1.OFR 
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Figure 4-38 RATION * R1.GAME effect on RB.OFR 
 
 
Figure 4-39 RATION * R1.GAME effect on RC.OFR  
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4.3.3.3 Interaction of RATION * RA.GAME  
The third two-way interaction with at least medium effect sizes, RATION * 
RA.GAME show a significant effect at p<0.001 on eight dependent variables: CV, 
M.OFR, R1.OFR, RA.OFR, RB.OFR, RC.OFR, OPP.LOSS and C.COST. Partial η2 
values indicate large effects on the manufacturer’s demand variance (partial η2 = 0.899), 
the manufacturer’s order fulfillment rate (partial η2 = 0.993), Retailer 1’s order fill rate 
(partial η2 = 0.993), A Retailers’ order fill rate (partial η2 = 0.997), B Retailers’ order fill 
rate (partial η2 = 0.994), C Retailers’ order fill rate (partial η2 = 0.991), and the 
manufacturer’s opportunity loss (partial η2 = 0.948). See Table 4-14. 
Figure 4-40 shows the profile plot of RATION * RA.GAME effect on CV. Figure 
4-41 shows the profile plot of RATION * RA.GAME effect on M.OFR.  Figure 4-42 
shows the profile plot of RATION * RA.GAME effect on R1.OFR. Figure 4-43 shows 
the profile plot of RATION * RA.GAME effect on RA.OFR. Figure 4-44 shows the 
profile plot of RATION * RA.GAME effect on RB.OFR. Figure 4-45 shows the profile 
plot of RATION * RA.GAME effect on RC.OFR. Figure 4-46 shows the profile plot of 
RATION * RA.GAME effect on OPP.LOSS. 
When the manufacturer utilizes a Uniform rationing strategy and the largest 
customers utilizes a Correction shortage gaming response, outcomes for the manufacturer 
and large customers suffer in comparison to other combinations of order rationing 
strategies and shortage gaming responses. Quarterly order inflation adjustments by A 
Retailers, who represent the largest retailer order volume, coupled with the 
manufacturer’s Uniform rationing strategy results in high relative demand variance 
(Figure 4-40). This specific interaction also results in the lowest observed order 
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fulfillment rates for the manufacturer (Figure 4-41) as well as for themselves (Figure 4-
43). It also results in the highest observed opportunity loss for the manufacturer (Figure 
4-46). Over the long-term, this interaction shows the compounded impact of feedback 
loops and decision policies. When A Retailers respond to inventory shortage with 
Correction gaming, they inflate orders by observed shortage. Coupled with a Uniform 
rationing strategy, where inventory is essentially allocated regardless of order volume, a 
low allocation compared to their order and the response based on that low allocation 
increases in impact over time. 
However, smaller retailers such as type B and C customers benefit from a Uniform 
rationing strategy. Figure 4-44 and Figure 4-45 show that a Uniform rationing strategy it 
is most robust when A Retailers engages in shortage gaming, as there are no differences 
in estimated marginal means for their respective order fill rates across the range of 
Retailers A’s shortage gaming responses. 
A Linear rationing strategy is more robust against A Retailers’ Correction gaming, 
and benefits the manufacturer, the focal retailer, and A Retailers. When A Retailers 
engage in Correction gaming and when the manufacturer utilizes a Linear rationing 
strategy, order fill rates for the manufacturer (Figure 4-41), the focal retailer (Figure 4-
42), and A Retailers (Figure 4-43) are higher relative to other combinations of rationing 
strategies and shortage gaming responses.   
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Figure 4-40 RATION * RA.GAME effect on CV 
 
 
Figure 4-41 RATION * RA.GAME effect on M.OFR 
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Figure 4-42 RATION * RA.GAME effect on R1.OFR 
 
 
Figure 4-43 RATION * RA.GAME effect on RA.OFR 
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Figure 4-44 RATION * RA.GAME effect on RB.OFR 
 
 
Figure 4-45 RATION * RA.GAME effect on RC.OFR 
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Figure 4-46 RATION * RA.GAME effect on OPP.LOSS 
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4.3.3.4 Interaction of RATION * RB.GAME  
The fourth two-way interaction with at least medium effect sizes, RATION * 
RB.GAME show a significant effect at p<0.001 on eight dependent variables: CV, 
M.OFR, R1.OFR, RA.OFR, RB.OFR, RC.OFR, OPP.LOSS, and C.COST. Partial η2 
values indicate large effects on the manufacturer’s order fulfillment rate (partial η2 = 
0.985), Retailer 1’s order fill rate (partial η2 = 0.987), A Retailers’ order fill rate (partial 
η2 = 0.986), B Retailers’ order fill rate (partial η2 = 0.962), and C Retailers’ order fill rate 
(partial η2 = 0.963). There were also medium effects on the manufacturer’s opportunity 
loss (partial η2 = 0.737). See Table 4-14. 
Figure 4-47 shows the profile plot of RATION * RB.GAME effect on M.OFR. 
Figure 4-48 shows the profile plot of RATION * RB.GAME effect on R1.OFR. Figure 4-
49 shows the profile plot of RATION * RB.GAME effect on RA.OFR. Figure 4-50 
shows the profile plot of RATION * RB.GAME effect on RB.OFR. Figure 4-51 shows 
the profile plot of RATION * RB.GAME effect on RC.OFR. Figure 4-52 shows the 
profile plot of RATION * RB.GAME effect on OPP.LOSS. 
The interaction of manufacturer’s order rationing strategies and shortage gaming by 
B Retailers, show that a Uniform rationing strategy is robust against either form of 
shortage gaming by B Retailers whereas Proportional or Linear rationing strategies result 
in variable outcomes depending on the level of shortage gaming. When the manufacturer 
utilizes a Proportional rationing strategy and when B Retailers respond with either level 
of shortage gaming, order fill rates for all parties decrease by approximately the same 
amount compared to scenarios where B Retailers respond with No gaming (Figures 4-47, 
4-48, 4-49, 4-50, and 4-51). 
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The specific interaction of a Linear rationing strategy with Correction gaming 
results in the lower order fill rates compared with B Retailers’ Overreaction gaming. 
However, this is observed for the manufacturer (Figure 4-47) and for large retailers only 
(Figures 4-48 and 4-49 respectively). For medium and small retailers, the manufacturer’s 
Linear rationing strategy results in generally poor order fill rates, regardless of B 
Retailers’ ordering behavior (Figure 4-50 and 4-51). This specific interaction also results 
in higher opportunity loss for the manufacturer, compared to other both Overreaction 
gaming or No gaming by B Retailers (Figure 4-52). A Linear rationing strategy shorts 
each retailer an equal absolute amount. Order fill rates shows the impact of this rationing 
rule coupled with the impact of large orders as well as large order inflation since these 
actions serve to increase the denominator used in calculating order fill rates. 
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Figure 4-47 RATION * RB.GAME effect on M.OFR 
 
 
Figure 4-48 RATION * RB.GAME effect on R1.OFR 
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Figure 4-49 RATION * RB.GAME effect on RA.OFR 
 
 
Figure 4-50 RATION * RB.GAME effect on RB.OFR 
0.585 
0.764 
0.424 0.447 
0.514 
0.461 
0.690 
0.40 
0.45 
0.50 
0.55 
0.60 
0.65 
0.70 
0.75 
0.80 
Proportional Linear Uniform 
E
st
im
at
ed
 M
ar
gi
na
l M
ea
ns
 
Manufacturer Order Rationing 
RB No Gaming RB Correction Gaming RB Overreaction Gaming 
0.585 
0.247 
1.000 
0.447 
0.264 
0.461 
0.198 
0.10 
0.20 
0.30 
0.40 
0.50 
0.60 
0.70 
0.80 
0.90 
1.00 
1.10 
Proportional Linear Uniform 
E
st
im
at
ed
 M
ar
gi
na
l M
ea
ns
 
Manufacturer Order Rationing 
RB No Gaming RB Correction Gaming RB Overreaction Gaming 
  
 203 
 
Figure 4-51 RATION * RB.GAME effect on RC.OFR 
 
 
Figure 4-52 RATION * RB.GAME effect on OPP.LOSS  
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4.3.3.5 Interaction of RATION * RC.GAME  
The fifth two-way interaction with at least medium effect sizes, RATION * 
RC.GAME show a significant effect at p<0.001 on eight dependent variables: CV, 
M.OFR, R1.OFR, RA.OFR, RB.OFR, RC.OFR, OPP.LOSS and C.COST. Partial η2 
values indicate large effects on the manufacturer’s order fulfillment rate (partial η2 = 
0.868), and Retailers C’s order fill rate (partial η2 = 0.965). There were medium effects on 
Retailer 1’s order fill rate (partial η2 = 0.692), A Retailers’ order fill rate (partial η2 = 
0.688), and B Retailers’ order fill rate (partial η2 = 0.575). See Table 4-14. 
Figure 4-53 shows the profile plot of RATION * RC.GAME effect on M.OFR. 
Figure 4-54 shows the profile plot of RATION * RC.GAME effect on R1.OFR. Figure 4-
55 shows the profile plot of RATION * RC.GAME effect on RA.OFR. Figure 4-56 
shows the profile plot of RATION * RC.GAME effect on RB.OFR. Finally, Figure 4-57 
shows the profile plot of RATION * RC.GAME effect on RC.OFR. 
The interaction of manufacturer’s order rationing strategies and shortage gaming by 
C Retailers result in similar outcomes as the interaction of the manufacturer’s order 
rationing strategies and shortage gaming by B Retailers (see section 4.3.3.3 Interaction of 
RATION * RB.GAME). Outcomes do not change under a Uniform rationing strategy 
across the range of C Retailer’s No gaming and shortage gaming responses (Figures 4-53 
through 4-57). 
The interaction of a Proportional rationing strategy and C Retailers’ shortage 
gaming result in a similar decrease in order fill rates for the manufacturer (Figure 4-53), 
Retailer 1 (Figure 4-54), and A Retailers (Figure 4-55). However, the specific interaction 
of a Linear rationing strategy and Correction gaming by C Retailers appears to decrease 
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order fill rates when compared to Overreaction gaming for the manufacturer (Figure 4-
53), Retailer 1 (Figure 4-54), A retailers (Figure 4-55). For B Retailers, the results 
suggest little practical difference between different levels of the interaction as evidenced 
by Figure 4-56. When C Retailers engage in Correction gaming and when the 
manufacturer utilizes a Linear order rationing strategy, C Retailers benefit from inflating 
their orders, as evidenced by their relative higher order fill rate under this scenario 
(Figure 4-57). 
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Figure 4-53 RATION * RC.GAME effect on M.OFR 
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Figure 4-55 RATION * RC.GAME effect on RA.OFR 
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Figure 4-57 RATION * RC.GAME effect on RC.OFR 
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4.3.3.6 Interaction of PROMOTIONS * R1.GAME  
The sixth two-way interaction with at least medium effect sizes, PROMOTIONS * 
R1.GAME show a significant effect at p<0.001 on seven dependent variables: CV, 
M.OFR, R1.OFR, RA.OFR, RB.OFR, RC.OFR, and OPP.LOSS. Partial η2 values 
indicate medium effects on the manufacturer’s order fulfillment rate (partial η2 = 0.772), 
and Retailer 1’s order fill rate (partial η2 = 0.788). See Table 4-14. 
Figure 4-58 shows the profile plot of PROMOTIONS * R1.GAME effect on 
M.OFR and Figure 4-59 shows the profile plot of PROMOTIONS * R1.GAME effect on 
R1.OFR.  
The impact of a retail promotions demand shock coupled with Correction gaming 
by Retailer 1 results in higher order fill rates for the manufacturer (Figure 4-58) and for 
Retailer 1 (Figure 4-59) compared with no promotions demand shock. However, under 
Overreaction gaming, a retail promotions demand shock changes minimally. These 
results indicate that when Retailer 1 engages in Overreaction shortage gaming, the 
addition of a retail promotions demand shock does not make much impact long-term, 
possibly because the single retail promotions demand shock order is obscured by 
subsequent consistent Overreaction orders (2 times the actual demand by Retailer 1) over 
the five year period observed. When Retailer 1 engages in Correction gaming, their 
orders are dynamically increased by the previous quarter’s unmet demand, and therefore 
a retail promotions demand shock and the high order fill rate resulting from the 
simulation’s parameters (see section 3.4.2.3 Retail Promotions Demand Shock) serves to 
start Retailer 1 at a higher order fill rate level than they would otherwise over the five 
year period observed. 
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Figure 4-58 PROMOTIONS * R1.GAME effect on M.OFR 
 
 
Figure 4-59 PROMOTIONS * R1.GAME effect on R1.OFR 
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4.3.3.7 Interaction of R1.GAME * RA.GAME  
The seventh two-way interaction with at least medium effect sizes, R1.GAME * 
RA.GAME show a significant effect at p<0.001 on eight dependent variables: CV, 
M.OFR, R1.OFR, RA.OFR, RB.OFR, RC.OFR, OPP.LOSS and C.COST. Partial η2 
values indicate large effects on the manufacturer’s order fulfillment rate (partial η2 = 
0.910), Retailer 1’s order fill rate (partial η2 = 0.930), A Retailers’ order fill rate (partial 
η2 = 0.900), B Retailers’ order fill rate (partial η2 = 0.960), C Retailers’ order fill rate 
(partial η2 = 0.893), and the manufacturer’s opportunity loss (partial η2 = 0.996). See 
Table 4-14. 
Figure 4-60 shows the profile plot of R1.GAME * RA.GAME effect on M.OFR. 
Figure 4-61 shows the profile plot of R1.GAME * RA.GAME effect on R1.OFR. Figure 
4-62 shows the profile plot of R1.GAME * RA.GAME effect on RA.OFR. Figure 4-63 
shows the profile plot of R1.GAME * RA.GAME effect on RB.OFR. Figure 4-64 shows 
the profile plot of R1.GAME * RA.GAME effect on RC.OFR. Figure 4-65 shows the 
profile plot of R1.GAME * RA.GAME effect on OPP.LOSS. 
The profile plots show that shortage gaming by the focal retailer (Retailer 1) and A 
Retailers is generally detrimental to all parties involved in the inventory ordering and 
fulfillment feedback cycle. Compared to No gaming by Retailer 1 and A Retailers, 
shortage gaming by both parties decreases the manufacturer’s order fill rates (Figure 4-
60) and decreases all retailers’ order fill rates (Figures 4-61 through 4- 64). 
When compared to other combinations of shortage gaming between the two parties, 
the specific interaction of A Retailers’ Correction gaming and either level of shortage 
gaming by Retailer 1 results in the lowest observed order fulfillment rates for the 
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manufacturer (Figure 4-60) and the lowest observed fill rates for A Retailers (Figure 4-
62), B Retailers (Figure 4-63), and C Retailers (Figure 4-64). Retailer 1 experiences 
equally low order fill rates regardless of the type of shortage gaming exercised by A 
Retailers (Figure 4-61). 
When Retailer 1 does not shortage game, it experiences lower order fill rates when 
A retailers employ Overreaction gaming compared to Correction gaming (Figure 4-61). 
Likewise, when A Retailers do not shortage game, they experience lower order fill rates 
when Retailer 1 employ Overreaction gaming compared to Correction gaming (Figure 4-
62). 
With regard to the manufacturer’s opportunity loss, if both Retailer 1 and A 
Retailers utilize either Correction gaming or Overreaction gaming, the manufacturer’s 
opportunity loss is similar to scenarios where both do not shortage game. However, if 
Retailer 1 employs Correction gaming and A Retailers employs Overreaction gaming, or 
vice versa, the manufacturer’s opportunity loss is increased from 18,353 units to 60,304 
units and 72,911 units respectively. Although this result masks an additional interaction 
of shortage gaming by B retailers, the overall pattern is also evident in that observed in 
the three-way interaction of R1.GAME * RA.GAME * RB.GAME (see section 4.3.2.8 
and Figure 4-31).  
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Figure 4-60 R1.GAME * RA.GAME effect on M.OFR 
 
 
Figure 4-61 R1.GAME * RA.GAME effect on R1.OFR 
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Figure 4-62 RI.GAME * RA.GAME effect on RA.OFR 
 
 
Figure 4-63 RI.GAME * RA.GAME effect on RB.OFR 
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Figure 4-64 R1.GAME * RA.GAME effect on RC.OFR 
 
 
Figure 4-65 R1.GAME * RA.GAME effect on OPP.LOSS  
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4.3.3.8 Interaction of R1.GAME * RB.GAME  
The eighth two-way interaction with at least medium effect sizes, R1.GAME * 
RB.GAME show a significant effect at p<0.001 on eight dependent variables: CV, 
M.OFR, R1.OFR, RA.OFR, RB.OFR, RC.OFR, OPP.LOSS and C.COST. Partial η2 
values indicate large effects on the manufacturer’s order fulfillment rate (partial η2 = 
0.800), A Retailers’ order fill rate (partial η2 = 0.845), B Retailers’ order fill rate (partial 
η2 = 0.887), and C Retailers’ order fill rate (partial η2 = 0.863). There was a medium effect 
on Retailer 1’s order fill rate (partial η2 = 0.930). See Table 4-14. 
Figure 4-66 shows the profile plot of R1.GAME * RB.GAME effect on M.OFR. 
Figure 4-67 shows the profile plot of R1.GAME * RB.GAME effect on R1.OFR. Figure 
4-68 shows the profile plot of R1.GAME * RB.GAME effect on RA.OFR. Figure 4-69 
shows the profile plot of R1.GAME * RB.GAME effect on RB.OFR. Figure 4-70 shows 
the profile plot of R1.GAME * RB.GAME effect on RC.OFR.  
The profile plots show that the interaction of Retailer 1 shortage gaming and B 
Retailers’ shortage gaming results in similar outcomes as the interaction of Retailer 1 and 
A Retailers’ shortage gaming (see section 4.3.3.7). Shortage gaming by B Retailers 
results in decreased order fill rates when compared to No gaming (Figures 4-66 through 
4-70). The interaction of shortage gaming by B Retailers and Retailer 1 result in 
decreased order fill rates compared to scenarios where either party does not shortage 
game (Figures 4-66 through 4-70). 
When compared to other combinations of shortage gaming between the two parties, 
the specific interaction of B Retailers’ Correction gaming and either level of shortage 
gaming by Retailer 1 results in the lowest observed order fill rates for the manufacturer 
  
 217 
(Figure 4-66), Retailer 1 (Figure 4-67), A Retailers (Figure 4-68), and C Retailers (Figure 
4-70).  
B Retailers generally experience higher order fill rates if they do not engage in 
shortage gaming (Figure 4-69), however, when Retailer 1 engages in Overreaction 
gaming, Correction gaming by B Retailers results in higher order fill rates of 1.5 percent 
compared to No gaming or 3.3 percent compared to Overreaction gaming by B Retailers. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4-66 R1.GAME * RB.GAME effect on M.OFR 
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Figure 4-67 R1.GAME * RG.GAME effect on R1.OFR 
 
Figure 4-68 R1.GAME * RB.GAME effect on RA.OFR 
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Figure 4-69 R1.GAME * RB.GAME effect on RB.OFR 
 
Figure 4-70 R1.GAME * RB.GAME effect on RC.OFR  
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4.3.3.9 Interaction of RA.GAME * RB.GAME 
The ninth two-way interaction with at least medium effect sizes, RA.GAME * 
RB.GAME show a significant effect at p<0.001 on eight dependent variables: CV, 
M.OFR, R1.OFR, RA.OFR, RB.OFR, RC.OFR, OPP.LOSS and C.COST. Partial η2 
values indicate large effects on the manufacturer’s order fulfillment rate (partial η2 = 
0.956), Retailer 1’s order fill rate (partial η2 = 0.972), A Retailers’ order fill rates (partial 
η2 = 0.951), B Retailers’ order fill rates (partial η2 = 0.943), and C Retailers’ order fill 
rates (partial η2 = 0.930). There were also medium effects on the manufacturer’s demand 
variance (partial η2 = 0.765) and on the manufacturer’s opportunity loss (partial η2 = 
0.549). See Table 4-14.  
Figure 4-71 shows the profile plot of RA.GAME * RB.GAME effect on CV. 
Figure 4-72 shows the profile plot of RA.GAME * RB.GAME effect on M.OFR. Figure 
4-73 shows the profile plot of RA.GAME * RB.GAME effect on R1.OFR. Figure 4-74 
shows the profile plot of RA.GAME * RB.GAME effect on RA.OFR. Figure 4-75 shows 
the profile plot of RA.GAME * RB.GAME effect on RB.OFR. Figure 4-76 shows the 
profile plot of RA.GAME * RB.GAME effect on RC.OFR. Finally, Figure 4-77 shows 
the profile plot of RA.GAME * RB.GAME effect on OPP.LOSS. 
The plots indicate that the interaction of shortage gaming by both A and B 
Retailers result in detrimental outcomes for all parties involved in the inventory ordering 
and fulfillment feedback loop. Shortage gaming by either A or B Retailers decrease order 
fill rates for all compared to No gaming by either party (Figures 4-72 through 4-76). 
When compared to other combinations of shortage gaming between the two parties, 
the specific interaction of B Retailers’ Correction gaming and either level of shortage 
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gaming by A Retailers results in the lowest observed order fill rates for the manufacturer 
(Figure 4-72), Retailer 1 (Figure 4-73), A Retailers (Figure 4-74), and C Retailers (Figure 
4-76).  
B Retailers generally experience higher order fill rates if they do not engage in 
shortage gaming Figure 4-75), however, when A Retailers engages in Overreaction 
gaming, Correction gaming by B Retailers results in higher order fill rates of 2.8 percent 
compared to No gaming or 5.8 percent compared to Overreaction gaming by B Retailers. 
This result is similar to that observed for RB.OFR when there is an interaction between 
R1.GAME and RB.GAME (section 4.3.3.9). 
The specific interaction of Correction gaming by both A and B Retailers also results 
in the highest observed demand variance (Figure 4-71) as well as the highest observed 
loss of opportunity for the manufacturer (Figure 4-77).  
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Figure 4-71 RA.GAME * RB.GAME effect on CV 
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Figure 4-73 RA.GAME * RB.GAME effect on R1.OFR 
 
Figure 4-74 RA.GAME * RB.GAME effect on RA.OFR 
0.701 
0.588 
0.495 
0.628 
0.343 
0.390 
0.616 
0.500 
0.474 
0.20 
0.30 
0.40 
0.50 
0.60 
0.70 
0.80 
No Gaming Correction Gaming Overreaction Gaming 
E
st
im
at
ed
 M
ar
gi
na
l M
ea
ns
 
A Retailers Shortage Gaming 
RB No Gaming RB Correction Gaming RB Overreaction Gaming 
0.795 
0.469 0.510 
0.700 
0.275 
0.410 
0.698 
0.388 
0.490 
0.10 
0.20 
0.30 
0.40 
0.50 
0.60 
0.70 
0.80 
0.90 
No Gaming Correction Gaming Overreaction Gaming 
E
st
im
at
ed
 M
ar
gi
na
l M
ea
ns
 
A Retailers Shortage Gaming 
RB No Gaming RB Correction Gaming RB Overreaction Gaming 
  
 224 
 
Figure 4-75 RA.GAME * RB.GAME effect on RB.OFR 
 
Figure 4-76 RA.GAME * RB.GAME effect on RC.OFR 
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Figure 4-77 RA.GAME * RB.GAME effect on OPP.LOSS 
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4.3.3.10 Interaction of RA.GAME * RC.GAME 
The tenth two-way interaction with at least medium effect sizes, RA.GAME * 
RC.GAME show a significant effect at p<0.001 on eight dependent variables: CV, 
M.OFR, R1.OFR, RA.OFR, RB.OFR, RC.OFR, OPP.LOSS and C.COST. However, 
partial η2 values indicate a medium effect on C Retailers’ order fill rate only (partial η2 = 
0.591). See Table 4-14.  
Figure 4-78 shows the profile plot of RA.GAME * RC.GAME effect on RC.OFR. 
This plot indicates that if A Retailers engage in shortage gaming, C Retailers benefit by 
engaging in Correction gaming. This action results in higher long-term order fill rates 
compared to when C Retailers either do not shortage game or if they engage in 
Overreaction gaming.  
 
 
Figure 4-78 RA.GAME * RC.GAME effect on RC.OFR 
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4.3.4 Univariate Results - Main Effects 
Main effects with significant relationships to dependent variables are shown in 
Table 4-15. All independent variables yielded significant relationships with dependent 
variables at p < 0.001 with the exception of the impact of PROMOTIONS on RC.OFR (p 
< 0.01). Many of the relationships also show at least a small effect with partial η2 values 
over 0.2. The remaining discussion will focus on significant relationships. 
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Table 4-15 Univariate Results - Main Effects 
Between Effects Tests – Main Effects 
Source Dependent Variable F df Sig. Partial η
2 Observed Power 
RATION 
 
CV 235450.757 2 0.000 0.971 *** 1.000 
M.OFR 245473.193 2 0.000 0.972 *** 1.000 
R1.OFR 1160116.077 2 0.000 0.994 *** 1.000 
RA.OFR 2093688.190 2 0.000 0.997 *** 1.000 
RB.OFR 18887457.540 2 0.000 1.000 *** 1.000 
RC.OFR 35577606.919 2 0.000 1.000 *** 1.000 
OPP.LOSS 92511.993 2 0.000 0.929 *** 1.000 
C.COST 436.363 2 0.000 0.058 1.000 
 
PROMOTIONS 
 
CV 3253.065 1 0.000 0.188 1.000 
M.OFR 16996.635 1 0.000 0.547 ** 1.000 
R1.OFR 20000.038 1 0.000 0.587 ** 1.000 
RC.OFR 8.654 1 0.003 0.001 0.837 
OPP.LOSS 1779.429 1 0.000 0.112 1.000 
 
R1.GAME 
 
CV 6313.192 2 0.000 0.473 * 1.000 
M.OFR 951068.121 2 0.000 0.993 *** 1.000 
R1.OFR 1790176.154 2 0.000 0.996 *** 1.000 
RA.OFR 463270.951 2 0.000 0.985 *** 1.000 
RB.OFR 472836.783 2 0.000 0.985 *** 1.000 
RC.OFR 219420.213 2 0.000 0.969 *** 1.000 
OPP.LOSS 9770.804 2 0.000 0.581 ** 1.000 
C.COST 883.711 2 0.000 0.111 1.000 
 
RA.GAME 
 
CV 18140.011 2 0.000 0.720 ** 1.000 
M.OFR 3907481.075 2 0.000 0.998 *** 1.000 
R1.OFR 1445588.910 2 0.000 0.995 *** 1.000 
RA.OFR 5030571.196 2 0.000 0.999 *** 1.000 
RB.OFR 1538878.983 2 0.000 0.995 *** 1.000 
RC.OFR 773480.508 2 0.000 0.991 *** 1.000 
OPP.LOSS 173800.862 2 0.000 0.961 *** 1.000 
C.COST 883.711 2 0.000 0.111 1.000 
Partial η2: *** Large effect size, ** Medium effect size, * Small effect size 
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Table 4-15 Univariate Results – Main Effects (continued) 
Between Effects Tests – Main Effects 
Source Dependent Variable F df Sig. Partial η
2 Observed Power 
RB.GAME 
 
CV 1841.876 2 0.000 0.207 * 1.000 
M.OFR 691343.278 2 0.000 0.990 *** 1.000 
R1.OFR 631898.768 2 0.000 0.989 *** 1.000 
RA.OFR 628006.141 2 0.000 0.989 *** 1.000 
RB.OFR 109720.568 2 0.000 0.940 *** 1.000 
RC.OFR 356606.315 2 0.000 0.981 *** 1.000 
OPP.LOSS 29214.848 2 0.000 0.806 *** 1.000 
C.COST 34.766 2 0.000 0.005 1.000 
 
RC.GAME 
 
CV 1136.676 2 0.000 0.139 1.000 
M.OFR 39673.475 2 0.000 0.849 *** 1.000 
R1.OFR 14770.531 2 0.000 0.677 ** 1.000 
RA.OFR 15234.551 2 0.000 0.684 ** 1.000 
RB.OFR 10000.188 2 0.000 0.587 ** 1.000 
RC.OFR 67535.012 2 0.000 0.906 *** 1.000 
OPP.LOSS 2283.243 2 0.000 0.245 * 1.000 
C.COST 25.226 2 0.000 0.004 1.000 
Partial η2: *** Large effect size, ** Medium effect size, * Small effect size 
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4.3.4.1 Main Effect of RATION 
The first main effect, RATION, show a significant effect at p<0.001 on all eight 
dependent variables: CV, M.OFR, R1.OFR, RA.OFR, RB.OFR, RC.OFR, OPP.LOSS 
and C.COST. Partial η2 values indicate large effects on the manufacturer’s demand 
variance (partial η2 = 0.971), the manufacturer’s order fulfillment rate (partial η2 = 0.972), 
Retailer 1’s order fill rate (partial η2 = 0.994), A Retailers’ order fill rates (partial η2 = 
0.997), B Retailers’ order fill rates (partial η2 = 1.000), C Retailers’ order fill rates (partial 
η2 = 1.000), and on the manufacturer’s opportunity loss (partial η2 = 0.929). Overall, 
manufacturer order rationing strategies strongly impacts long-term performance measures 
as all partial η2 values range from 0.929 to 1.000 except for the very small impact of 
RATION on C.COST (partial η2 = 0.058). See Table 4-15. 
Figure 4-79 shows the profile plot of RATION’s effect on CV. Figure 4-80 shows 
the profile plot of RATION’s effect on M.OFR. Figure 4-81 shows the profile plot of 
RATION’s effect on R1.OFR, RA.OFR, RB.OFR, and RC.OFR. Figure 4-82 shows the 
profile plot of RATION’s effect on OPP.LOSS. Finally, Figure 4-83 shows the profile 
plot of RATION’s effect on C.COST. Scheffe post hoc tests, the most conservative of 
post hoc tests with respect to Type I error according to Hair and colleagues (2010, page 
379), for each dependent variable show significant differences (p<0.001) between 
estimated marginal means of each level of RATION with the exception of C.COST. For 
this outcome, there was no difference between a Proportional and a Linear Strategy 
(p=0.787). 
Figure 4-79 indicates that a Uniform strategy results in higher demand variance 
than either a Proportional or Linear strategies. Consequently, Figure 4-80 shows that a 
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Uniform strategy also results in the lowest order fill rate for the manufacturer. A Uniform 
strategy appears to be most beneficial for the B and C type, smaller volume retailers. This 
strategy results in a 100 percent fill rate for those retailers. However, it limits the amount 
of inventory allocated to larger volume type A retailers, resulting in a mean fill rate of 
approximately 42 percent (see Figure 4-81). This strategy also results in higher loss of 
opportunity for the manufacturer. All else being equal, a Uniform strategy yields a 23 
percent higher loss of opportunity due to unfilled true demand than that of a Proportional 
strategy, or a 21 percent higher loss of opportunity than that of a Linear strategy (see 
Figure 4-70). In addition, a Uniform strategy results in 733 to 900 percent higher 
quarterly inventory carrying costs compared to either a Proportional or a Linear strategy 
respectively (Figure 4-83). 
For the manufacturer, a Proportional strategy results in similar outcomes compared 
to a Linear strategy. Both limit demand variance to approximately 0.100 (see Figure 4-
79), limits order fill rate to approximately 50 percent (see Figure 4-80), and limits 
opportunity loss to approximately 40,000-41,000 units per quarter (see Figure 4-82).  
For retailers, a Proportional strategy results in equivalent order fill rates for each 
representative retailer, approximately 50 percent (see Figure 4-81). This strategy 
essentially treats all of the manufacturer’s customers equally, regardless of the volume 
they purchase. A Linear strategy exhibits a range of outcomes for each representative 
retailer. It is most beneficial to the larger volume retailers with fill rates above 60 percent, 
compared to the smaller volume retailers with fill rates of 8 to 24 percent (see Figure 4-
81). Under a Linear strategy, A Retailers fare better than others. 
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Figure 4-79 RATION'S effect on CV 
 
Figure 4-80 RATION'S effect on M.OFR 
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Figure 4-81 RATION'S effect on R1.OFR, RA.OFR, RB.OFR, and RC.OFR 
 
 
Figure 4-82 RATION'S effect on OPP.OSS 
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Figure 4-83 RATION'S effect on C.COST 
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4.3.4.2 Main Effect of PROMOTIONS 
The second main effect, PROMOTIONS, show a significant effect at p<0.001 on 
four dependent variables: CV, M.OFR, R1.OFR, and OPP.LOSS. There was also a 
significant effect at p<0.01 on RC.OFR. Partial η2 values indicate medium effects on the 
manufacturer’s order fulfillment rate (partial η2 = 0.547) as well as on Retailer 1’s order 
fill rate (partial η2 = 0.587). There was a very small effect on the manufacturer’s demand 
variance (partial η2 = 0.188), C Retailers’ order fill rates (partial η2 = 0.001), and the 
manufacturer’s opportunity loss (partial η2 = 0.112). See Table 4-15. 
Figure 4-84 shows the profile plot of PROMOTIONS’ effect on CV, Figure 4-85 
shows the profile plot of PROMOTIONS’ effect on M.OFR, and Figure 4-86 shows the 
profile plot of PROMOTIONS’ effect on R1.OFR. Finally, Figure 4-87 shows the profile 
plot of PROMOTIONS’ effect on RC.OFR while Figure 4-88 shows the profile plot of 
PROMOTIONS’ effect on OPP.LOSS. 
The impact of a retail promotions demand shock results in consistent outcomes for 
long-term demand variance (Figure 4-84), the manufacturer’s order fill rate (Figure 4-
85), and on Retailer 1’s order fill rate (Figure 4-86). This main effect increases demand 
variance, increases the manufacturer’s order fill rates, and increases the focal retailer’s 
(Retailer 1) fill rate. Intuitively, if demand variance is increased, then additional negative 
outcomes such as decreased order fill rates would also result. These results show an 
opposite effect on the manufacturer and the focal retailer that can be explained by the 
nature of the retail promotions demand itself. Within the simulation, the focal retailer is 
designated as the customer who demands and receives a large, unexpected order for their 
promotional efforts. Thus, their order fill rate reflects the successful order and fill of the 
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retail promotions demand. The manufacturer’s fill rate also reflects this action. Overall, 
these results suggest that a retail promotions demand shock primarily impact the demand 
variance experienced by the manufacturer. Its impact on the manufacturer’s order fill rate 
and the focal retailer’s order fill rate may reflect the simulation’s parameters regarding 
how retail promotions demand shocks are addressed. 
Among relationships with less than a small effect (partial η2 < 0.2), the impact of a 
retail promotions demand shock results in an increase in order fill rates for C Retailers 
(Figure 4-87) and a decrease in opportunity loss for the manufacturer (Figure 4-88). 
While these relationships are statistically significant, their practical significance is small. 
The long-term impact of retail promotions demand shock results in an increase of 0.001 
(0.001 = 0.526-0.525) in C Retailers’ order fill rates and a decrease of 842 units in 
opportunity loss (842 = 44,093-43,251) over the five-year period assessed.  
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Figure 4-84 PROMOTIONS' effect on CV 
 
Figure 4-85 PROMOTIONS' effect on M.OFR 
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Figure 4-86 PROMOTIONS' effect on R1.OFR 
 
Figure 4-87 PROMOTIONS' effect on RC.OFR 
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Figure 4-88 PROMOTIONS' effect on OPP.LOSS 
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4.3.4.3 Main Effect of R1.GAME 
The third main effect, R1.GAME, show a significant effect at p<0.001 on eight 
dependent variables: CV, M.OFR, R1.OFR, RA.OFR, RB.OFR, RC.OFR, OPP.LOSS 
and C.COST. Partial η2 values indicate large effects on the manufacturer’s order 
fulfillment rate (partial η2 = 0.993), Retailer 1’s order fill rate (partial η2 = 0.996), A 
Retailers’ order fill rates (partial η2 = 0.985), B Retailers’ order fill rates (partial η2 = 
0.985), and C Retailers’ order fill rates (partial η2 = 0.969). There was also a medium 
effect on the manufacturer’s opportunity loss (partial η2 = 0.581). Finally, partial η2 values 
indicate a very small effect on the manufacturer’s cost of carrying inventory (partial η2 = 
0.111). See Table 4-15. 
Figure 4-89 shows the profile plot of R1.GAME’s effect on CV. Figure 4-90 shows 
the profile plot of R1.GAME’s effect on M.OFR. Figure 4-91 shows the profile plot of 
R1.GAME’s effect on R1.OFR, RA.OFR, RB.OFR, and RC.OFR. Figure 4-92 shows the 
profile plot of R1.GAME’s effect on OPP.LOSS. Finally, Figure 4-93 shows the profile 
plot of R1.GAME’s effect on C.COST. Scheffe post hoc tests for each dependent variable 
show significant differences (p<0.001) between estimated marginal means of each level 
of R1.GAME with the exception of C.COST. For this outcome, there was no difference 
between Correction and Overreaction Gaming (p=1.000). 
The profile plots show that in general, there is a negative impact on long-term 
system performance when the focal retailer engages in shortage gaming. When compared 
to No gaming, the manufacturer’s order fulfillment rates decreases by approximately 11.8 
to 14.6 percent (Figure 4-90) and all retailers’ order fill rates decreases, including its own 
order fill rate (Figure 4-91). In comparison to No gaming, Retailer 1’s order fill rate 
  
 241 
decreases by approximately 16.7 to 23.0 percent, A Retailers’ order fill rates decreases by 
approximately 8.3 to 9.8 percent, B Retailers’ order fill rates decreases by approximately 
7.5 to 12.2 percent, and C Retailers’ order fill rates decreases by approximately 5.6 to 6.9 
percent (Figure 4-91). However, shortage gaming also results in zero inventory that is 
carried over from quarter to quarter for the manufacturer, and they therefore do not incur 
additional inventory carrying costs in this situation (Figure 4-93). 
The profile plots show differences in impact when the focal retailer engages in 
Correction versus Overreaction shortage gaming. Correction gaming increases demand 
variance as predicted but Overreaction gaming decreases demand variance, when both are 
compared to No gaming (Figure 4-89). These results reflect differences in consistency of 
orders. Order inflation based on the Overreaction shortage gaming response, where actual 
demand is consistently doubled, compared to the Correction shortage gaming response, 
where actual demand is adjusted dynamically each quarter, results in different outcomes 
over the five year period assessed. 
Similarly, Correction gaming by the focal retailer results in less opportunity loss for 
the manufacturer compared to No gaming while Overreaction gaming results in more 
opportunity loss, when both are compared to No gaming (Figure 4-92). When the focal 
retailer corrects and adjusts their orders based on last quarter’s unfilled orders (Correction 
gaming), over time, the compounded effect of the order inflation results in excessive 
levels of order inflation, which pushes the manufacturer past its capacity consistently. In 
contrast, when the focal retailer consistently orders double their actual need 
(Overreaction gaming) over time, this action may cause enough stress on the system to 
cause difficulties in order fulfillment but may not be large enough to take up all of the 
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manufacturer’s additional inventory, and therefore results in a higher amount of true 
demand that is unmet by the manufacturer. Note that these results also mask interactions. 
The same pattern is evident in the three-way interaction of R1.GAME * RA.GAME * 
RB.GAME (see section 4.3.2.8 and Figure 4-31) and in the two-way interaction of 
R1.GAME * RA.GAME (see section 4.3.3.7 and Figure 4-65). 
Overall, when the focal retailer engages in shortage gaming, the manufacturer 
suffers in the form of a significant decrease in order fill rates (Figure 4-90) and variable 
changes in demand variance (Figure 4-89) as well as opportunity loss (Figure 4-92). 
However, the manufacturer also benefits by having their inventory carrying costs 
decreased (Figure 4-93). All retailers suffer significant decreases in order fill rates when 
Retailer 1 engages in shortage gaming (Figure 4-91). For Retailer 1, they do not benefit 
by engaging in shortage gaming as its mean order fill rates are significantly lower 
compared to when it does not shortage game, however consistently Overreaction gaming 
yields higher order fill rates than dynamically Correction gaming (Figure 4-91).  
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Figure 4-89 R1.GAME'S effect on CV 
 
Figure 4-90 R1.GAME'S effect on M.OFR 
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Figure 4-91 R1.GAME'S effect on R1.OFR, RA.OFR, RB.OFR, and RC.OFR 
 
 
Figure 4-92 R1.GAME'S effect on OPP.LOSS 
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Figure 4-93 R1.GAME'S effect on C.COST  
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4.3.4.4 Main Effect of RA.GAME 
The fourth main effect, RA.GAME, show a significant effect at p<0.001 on eight 
dependent variables: CV, M.OFR, R1.OFR, RA.OFR, RB.OFR, RC.OFR, OPP.LOSS 
and C.COST. Partial η2 values indicate large effects on the manufacturer’s order 
fulfillment rate (partial η2 = 0.998), Retailer 1’s order fill rate (partial η2 = 0.995), A 
Retailers’ order fill rates (partial η2 = 0.999), B Retailers’ order fill rates (partial η2 = 
0.995), C Retailers’ order fill rates (partial η2 = 0.991), and on the manufacturer’s 
opportunity loss (partial η2 = 0.961). There was also a medium effect on the 
manufacturer’s demand variance (partial η2 = 0.720) and a very small effect on the 
manufacturer’s inventory carrying cost (partial η2 = 0.111). See Table 4-15. 
Figure 4-94 shows the profile plot of RA.GAME’s effect on CV. Figure 4-95 shows 
the profile plot of RA.GAME’s effect on M.OFR. Figure 4-96 shows the profile plot of 
RA.GAME’s effect on R1.OFR, RA.OFR, RB.OFR, and RC.OFR. Figure 4-97 shows the 
profile plot of RA.GAME’s effect on OPP.LOSS. Finally, Figure 4-98 shows the profile 
plot of RA.GAME’S effect on C.COST. Scheffe post hoc tests for each dependent 
variable show significant differences (p<0.001) between estimated marginal means of 
each level of RA.GAME with the exception of C.COST. For this outcome, there was no 
difference between Correction and Overreaction Gaming (p=1.000). 
Shortage gaming by A Retailers, representing Retailers 2 and 3 in supply inventory 
competition, has a strong impact on long-term system performance. Shortage gaming, 
whether in Correction or Overreaction form, results in lower order fill rates for the 
manufacturer (Figure 4-95) and for all retailers (Figure 4-96). Both forms of shortage 
gaming also result in higher loss of opportunity for the manufacturer compared to No 
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shortage gaming (Figure 4-97). Shortage gaming by A Retailers also limits the 
manufacturer’s inventory carrying costs, because the additional demand results in zero 
excess inventory from quarter to quarter (Figure 4-98).  
Differences between specific forms of shortage gaming can be seen in the impact on 
demand variance (Figure 4-94). Correction gaming results in higher demand variance 
compared to No gaming whereas Overreaction gaming results in lower demand variance 
compared to No gaming. These results suggest that when large A Retailers consistently 
order double their actual demand from the manufacturer, collectively these retailers who 
command approximately 48 percent of the manufacturer’s order volume can suppress the 
manufacturer’s observed demand variance by dampening total demand with their large 
order relative to other retailers. This outcome is similar to the impact of Overreaction 
shortage gaming by Retailer 1 (see section 4.3.4.3 and Figure 4-89). 
Overall, Correction gaming by A Retailers appears to be more detrimental than 
Overreaction gaming for the manufacturer, resulting in the highest levels of demand 
variance (Figure 4-94) as well as the lowest levels of manufacturer order fill rate (Figure 
4-95). In addition, shortage gaming in general by A Retailers appears to be detrimental to 
all retailers involved the inventory ordering and fulfillment feedback loop, including 
themselves. This is due to the negative impact of shortage gaming on retailer order fill 
rates (Figure 4-96). Correction gaming by A Retailers results in lower order fill rates for 
themselves compared to Overreaction gaming (Figure 4-96). In a similar fashion to 
Retailer 1 shortage gaming (see section 4.3.4.3 and Figure 4-91), A Retailers do not 
benefit by engaging in shortage gaming as their mean order fill rates are significantly 
lower compared to No shortage gaming, however Overreaction gaming yields higher 
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order fill rates than Correction gaming (Figures 4-96 and 4-91). 
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Figure 4-94 RA.GAME'S effect on CV 
 
Figure 4-95 RA.GAME'S effect on M.OFR 
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Figure 4-96 RA.GAME'S effect on R1.OFR, RA.OFR, RB.OFR, and RC.OFR 
 
Figure 4-97 RA.GAME'S effect on OPP.LOSS 
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Figure 4-98 RA.GAME'S effect on C.COST 
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4.3.4.5 Main Effect of RB.GAME 
The fifth main effect, RB.GAME, show a significant effect at p<0.001 on eight 
dependent variables: CV, M.OFR, R1.OFR, RA.OFR, RB.OFR, RC.OFR, OPP.LOSS 
and C.COST. Partial η2 values indicate large effects on the manufacturer’s order 
fulfillment rate (partial η2 = 0.990), Retailer 1’s order fill rate (partial η2 = 0.989), A 
Retailers’ order fill rates (partial η2 = 0.989), B Retailers’ order fill rates (partial η2 = 
0.940), C Retailers’ order fill rates (partial η2 = 0.981), and on the manufacturer’s 
opportunity loss (partial η2 = 0.806). There was also a small effect on the manufacturer’s 
demand variance (partial η2 = 0.207) and a very small effect on the manufacturer’s 
inventory carrying cost (partial η2 = 0.005). See Table 4-15. 
Figure 4-99 shows the profile plot of RB.GAME’s effect on CV. Figure 4-100 
shows the profile plot of RB.GAME’s effect on M.OFR. Figure 4-101 shows the profile 
plot of RB.GAME’s effect on R1.OFR, RA.OFR, RB.OFR, and RC.OFR. Figure 4-102 
shows the profile plot of RB.GAME’s effect on OPP.LOSS. Lastly, Figure 4-103 shows 
the profile plot of RB.GAME’s effect on C.COST. Scheffe post hoc tests for each 
dependent variable show significant differences (p<0.001) between estimated marginal 
means of each level of RB.GAME with the exception of C.COST. For this outcome, there 
was no difference between a Correction and Overreaction Gaming (p=1.00). 
Shortage gaming by B Retailers, representing Retailers 4 through 7, has a strong 
impact on order fill rates. Both forms of shortage gaming by B Retailers negatively 
impacts order fill rates for all entities involved (Figures 4-100 and 4-101). In addition, the 
manufacturer’s opportunity loss for not filling true demand is increased with both forms 
of shortage gaming (Figure 4-102) while the manufacturer’s inventory carrying costs are 
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decreased (Figure 4-103).  
Statistical differences between Correction and Overreaction shortage gaming also 
exist. Correction gaming by B Retailers decreases the manufacturer’s long-term demand 
variance by 0.003 (0.003 = 0.123 – 0.117) whereas Overreaction gaming decreases 
demand variance by 0.001 (0.001 = 0.123-0.122). See Figure 4-99. While these results 
are statistically significant, they may be limited in practical significance due to the small 
change between different levels of RB.GAME. In addition, the effect size of 
RB.GAME’s impact on CV is small (partial η2 = 0.207) compared to partial η2 values of 
0.806 to 0.990 for other dependent variables, indicating the limited relative importance of 
this relationship.  
Among relationships with large effect sizes, Correction gaming by B Retailers 
appears to be more detrimental than Overreaction gaming to the manufacturer, resulting 
lower order fill rates (Figure 4-100). For large retailers such as Retailer 1 and A retailers, 
Correction gaming by B Retailers also appears to be more detrimental than Overreaction 
gaming, resulting in lower order fill rates compared to Overreaction gaming (Figure 4-
101).  
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Figure 4-99 RB.GAME'S effect on CV 
 
 
Figure 4-100 RB.GAME'S effect on M.OFR 
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Figure 4-101 RB.GAME'S effect on R1.OFR, RA.OFR, RB.OFR, and RC.OFR 
 
 
Figure 4-102 RB.GAME'S effect on OPP.LOSS 
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Figure 4-103 RB.GAME'S effect on C.COST  
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4.3.4.6 Main Effect of RC.GAME 
The final main effect, RC.GAME, show a significant effect at p<0.001 on eight 
dependent variables: CV, M.OFR, R1.OFR, RA.OFR, RB.OFR, RC.OFR, OPP.LOSS 
and C.COST. Partial η2 values indicate large effects on the manufacturer’s order 
fulfillment rate (partial η2 = 0.849) and C retailers’ order fill rates (partial η2 = 0.906). 
There were also medium effects on Retailer 1’s order fill rate (partial η2 = 0.677), A 
Retailers’ order fill rates (partial η2 = 0.684), and B Retailers’ order fill rate (partial η2 = 
0.587). Small effects exist for the manufacturer’s opportunity loss (partial η2 = 0.245) 
while very small effects were observed for the manufacturer’s demand variance (partial 
η2 = 0.139) and inventory carrying cost (partial η2 = 0.004). See Table 4-15. 
Figure 4-104 shows the profile plot of RC.GAME’s effect on CV. Figure 4-105 
shows the profile plot of RC.GAME’s effect on M.OFR and Figure 4-106 shows the 
profile plot of RC.GAME’s effect on R1.OFR, RA.OFR, RB.OFR, and RC.OFR. Figure 
4-107 shows the profile plot of RC.GAME’s effect on OPP.LOSS. Lastly, Figure 4-108 
shows the profile plot of RC.GAME’s effect on C.COST. Scheffe post hoc tests for each 
dependent variable show significant differences (p<0.001) between estimated marginal 
means of each level of RC.GAME with the exception of CV and C.COST. For CV, there 
was no difference between No Gaming and Overreaction gaming (p=1.000). For 
C.COST, there was no difference between Correction and Overreaction gaming 
(p=0.763). 
Shortage gaming by C Retailers, representing Retailers 8 and 9, yields similar 
outcomes as shortage gaming by B Retailers (see section 4.3.4.5). Shortage gaming 
decreases order fill rates for the manufacturer (Figure 4-105) and for other retailers 
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(Figure 4-106) in comparison to No gaming by C Retailers. Shortage gaming also 
increases the manufacturer’s opportunity loss (Figure 4-107) and decreases inventory 
carrying costs (Figure 4-108).  
Similar to B Retailers, Correction shortage gaming by C Retailers decreases 
demand variance for the manufacturer (Figure 4-104). While these results are statistically 
significant, they may be limited in practical significance. The absolute change in demand 
variance (Figure 4-104), from No gaming (CV = 0.122) to Correction gaming (CV = 
0.118) is minimal and the overall effect size of this test is very small (partial η2 = 0.139).  
Overall, C Retailers benefit from their own Correction gaming which yields the 
highest relative order fill rates for themselves, whereas Overreaction gaming does not 
yield a practically different order fill rate compared to No gaming (Figure 4-106).  
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Figure 4-104 RC.GAME'S effect on CV 
 
Figure 4-105 RC.GAME'S effect on M.OFR 
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Figure 4-106 RC.GAME'S effect on R1.OFR, RA.OFR, RB.OFR, and RC.OFR 
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Figure 4-108 RC.GAME'S effect on C.COST  
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4.3.4.7 Comparison of Supply Inventory Competition Main Effects 
In this simulation, supply inventory competition consists of shortage gaming by 
retailers other than the focal retailer (Retailer 1). Although main effects of shortage 
gaming by A Retailers, B Retailers, and C Retailers are shown in sections 4.3.4.4, 4.3.4.5, 
and 4.3.4.6, the results were not presented in relation to each other. This section provides 
a comparison of the main effects of shortage gaming by A Retailers, B Retailers, and C 
Retailers for each dependent variable. 
Figure 4-109 shows a comparison of the profile plots for RA.GAME, RB.GAME, 
and RC.GAME’s effect on CV. Figure 4-110 shows a comparison of the profile plots for 
RA.GAME, RB.GAME, and RC.GAME’s effect on M.OFR. Figure 4-111 shows a 
comparison of the profile plots for RA.GAME, RB.GAME, and RC.GAME’s effect on 
R1.OFR. Figure 4-112 shows a comparison of the profile plots for RA.GAME, 
RB.GAME, and RC.GAME’s effect on RA.OFR. Figure 4-113 shows a comparison of 
the profile plots for RA.GAME, RB.GAME, and RC.GAME’s effect on RB.OFR. Figure 
4-114 shows a comparison of the profile plots for RA.GAME, RB.GAME, and 
RC.GAME’s effect on RC.OFR. Figure 4-115 shows a comparison of the profile plots for 
RA.GAME, RB.GAME, and RC.GAME’s effect on OPP.LOSS. Finally, Figure 4-116 
shows a comparison of the profile plots for RA.GAME, RB.GAME, and RC.GAME’s 
effect on C.COST. 
Shortage gaming by A Retailers differs from shortage gaming by B or C Retailers 
in their effects on the manufacturer’s demand variance. Figure 4-109 shows that 
Correction gaming by A Retailers increases demand variance while Overreaction gaming 
by A Retailers decreases demand variance relative to No gaming. In comparison, 
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Correction gaming by B or C Retailers appears to decrease demand variance while 
Overreaction gaming results in little change from No gaming. Partial η2 values indicate 
differences in effect sizes between the three types of retailers (Table 4-15). There were 
large effects from RA.GAME (partial η2 = 0.720) whereas RB.GAME and RC.GAME 
demonstrated small or very small effects (partial η2 = 0.207 and partial η2 = 0.139 
respectively). These results suggest that the impact of B and C Retailers is smaller than 
the impact of A Retailers. Furthermore, as discussed in sections 4.3.4.5 Main Effect of 
RB.GAME and 4.3.4.6 Main Effect of RC.GAME, while there is statistical significance in 
the results for RB.GAME and RC.GAME, there may be limited practical significance 
regarding long-term demand variance. The main result of supply inventory competition 
on CV involves shortage gaming from A Retailers. When A Retailers dynamically adjust 
and over-order based on their previous quarter’s unmet demand, long-term demand 
variance is increased. When A Retailers consistently over-order with double their actual 
demand, this action appears to suppress the manufacturer’s observed demand variance.  
The impact of various retailer types in supply inventory competition is seen in 
effects on order fulfillment rates for the manufacturer as well as in order fill rates for each 
retailer type. Shortage gaming by A, B, and C Retailers significantly decrease the 
manufacturer’s order fulfillment rates when compared to No gaming (Table 4-15). Profile 
plots indicate that shortage gaming by A Retailers produce the greatest detrimental 
impact, indicated by the lowest absolute order fulfillment rates whereas shortage gaming 
by C Retailers produce the least detrimental impact, indicated by the highest absolute 
order fill rates under both forms of shortage gaming (Figure 4-110). This pattern is also 
generally seen in the impact of shortage gaming by A, B, and C Retailers on order fill 
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rates for all retailers (Figures 4-111 through 4-114). Of note would be the detrimental 
effect of RA.GAME on its own order fill rates, more so than shortage gaming by other 
retailers (Figure 4-112). Also, while shortage gaming by both A and B Retailers 
decreases order fill rates for C Retailers, these small retailers benefit from Correction 
shortage gaming compared to No gaming (Figure 4-114). This result is in contrast to the 
impact of shortage gaming by A and B Retailers on their own order fill rates. In those 
instances, the highest order fill rates result from No shortage gaming (Figures 4-112 and 
4-113).  
Shortage gaming by A, B, and C Retailers also impact the manufacturer in the form 
of increased opportunity loss (Figure 4-115) and decreased inventory carrying costs 
(Figure 4-116). Specifically, Correction shortage gaming by A Retailers results in the 
highest absolute opportunity loss (Figure 4-115) while any shortage gaming by A 
Retailers result in zero excess inventory and zero inventory carrying costs (Figure 4-115). 
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Figure 4-109 Comparison of RA.GAME, RB.GAME, and RC.GAME'S effect on CV 
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Figure 4-111 Comparison of RA.GAME, RB.GAME, and RC.GAME'S effect on 
R1.OFR 
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Figure 4-113 Comparison of RA.GAME, RB.GAME, and RC.GAME'S effect on 
RB.OFR 
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Figure 4-115 Comparison of RA.GAME, RB.GAME, and RC.GAME'S effect on 
OPP.LOSS 
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4.4 HYPOTHESES TESTING 
This section discusses support for the hypotheses based on the preceding results 
analysis. A summary of hypotheses tests is provided in Table 4-16.  
Table 4-16 Summary of Hypotheses Tests 
Hypotheses Results 
H1 Manufacturer order rationing strategies significantly 
impact long-term system performance in the form of: 
 
a. the manufacturer’s demand variance,  
b. the manufacturer’s order fill rates,  
c. the focal retailer’s order fill rate,  
d. other retailers’ order fill rates,  
e. the manufacturer’s cost of lost opportunity, and  
f. the manufacturer’s inventory carrying cost 
 
 
 
a. SUPPORTED 
b. SUPPORTED 
c. SUPPORTED 
d. SUPPORTED 
e. SUPPORTED 
f. SUPPORTED 
H2 Uniform order rationing strategy, compared to either 
Proportional or Linear order rationing strategies, has a 
greater positive impact on:  
 
a. increasing the manufacturer’s demand variance,  
b. decreasing the manufacturer’s order fill rates,  
c. decreasing focal retailer order fill rate,  
d. decreasing other retailers’ order fill rates, 
e. increasing the manufacturer’s cost of lost 
opportunity, and 
f. increasing the manufacturer’s inventory carrying cost 
 
 
 
 
a. SUPPORTED 
b. SUPPORTED 
c. SUPPORTED 
d. Partially Supported 
e. SUPPORTED 
f. SUPPORTED 
H3 Focal retailer (Retailer 1) shortage gaming directly 
impacts long-term system performance by: 
 
a. increasing the manufacturer’s demand variance,  
b. decreasing the manufacturer’s order fill rates,  
c. decreasing focal retailer order fill rate,  
d. decreasing other retailers’ order fill rates, 
e. increasing the manufacturer’s cost of lost 
opportunity, and 
f. increasing the manufacturer’s inventory carrying cost 
 
 
 
a. Partially Supported 
b. SUPPORTED 
c. SUPPORTED 
d. SUPPORTED 
e. Partially Supported 
f. Not Supported 
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Table 4-16 Summary of Hypotheses Tests (continued) 
Hypotheses Results 
H4 For the focal retailer (Retailer 1), Correction shortage 
gaming when compared to Overreaction shortage 
gaming, has a greater positive impact on:  
 
a. increasing the manufacturer’s demand variance,  
b. decreasing the manufacturer’s order fill rates,  
c. decreasing focal retailer order fill rate,  
d. decreasing other retailers’ order fill rates, 
e. increasing the manufacturer’s cost of lost 
opportunity, and 
f. increasing the manufacturer’s inventory carrying cost 
 
 
 
 
a. Not Supported 
b. SUPPORTED 
c. SUPPORTED 
d. Not Supported 
e. Not Supported 
f. Partially Supported 
H5 Supply inventory competition, in the form of either 
Correction or Overreaction gaming by retailers other 
than the focal retailer directly impacts long-term 
system performance by: 
 
a. increasing the manufacturer’s demand variance,  
b. decreasing the manufacturer’s order fill rates,  
c. decreasing focal retailer order fill rate,  
d. decreasing other retailers’ order fill rates, 
e. increasing the manufacturer’s cost of lost 
opportunity, and 
f. increasing the manufacturer’s inventory carrying cost 
 
 
 
 
 
a. Partially Supported 
b. SUPPORTED 
c. SUPPORTED 
d. SUPPORTED 
e. SUPPORTED 
f. Not Supported 
H6 Supply inventory competition from retailers ordering a 
larger volume compared to other retailers will exhibit a 
greater positive impact on:  
 
a. increasing the manufacturer’s demand variance,  
b. decreasing the manufacturer’s order fill rates,  
c. decreasing focal retailer order fill rate,  
d. decreasing other retailers’ order fill rates, 
e. increasing the manufacturer’s cost of lost 
opportunity, and 
f. increasing the manufacturer’s inventory carrying cost 
 
 
 
 
a. Partially Supported 
b. SUPPORTED 
c. Partially Supported 
d. SUPPORTED 
e. SUPPORTED 
f. SUPPORTED 
H7 Retail promotions demand shock directly impacts long-
term system performance by: 
 
a. increasing the manufacturer’s demand variance,  
b. decreasing the manufacturer’s order fill rates,  
c. decreasing the focal retailer’s order fill rate,  
d. decreasing other retailers’ order fill rates, 
e. increasing the manufacturer’s cost of lost 
opportunity, and 
f. increasing the manufacturer’s inventory carrying cost 
 
 
 
a. SUPPORTED 
b. Not Supported 
c. Not Supported 
d. Not Supported 
e. Not Supported 
f. Not Supported 
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Table 4-16 Summary of Hypotheses Tests (continued) 
Hypotheses Results 
H8 The two-way interaction of manufacturer order 
rationing and focal retailer shortage gaming 
significantly impact long-term system performance in 
the form of: 
 
a. the manufacturer’s demand variance,  
b. the manufacturer’s order fill rates,  
c. the focal retailer’s order fill rate,  
d. other retailers’ order fill rates,  
e. the manufacturer’s cost of lost opportunity, and  
f. the manufacturer’s inventory carrying cost 
 
 
 
 
 
a. SUPPORTED 
b. SUPPORTED 
c. SUPPORTED 
d. SUPPORTED 
e. SUPPORTED 
f. SUPPORTED 
H9 The two-way interaction of manufacturer order 
rationing and supply inventory competition 
significantly impact long-term system performance in 
the form of: 
 
a. the manufacturer’s demand variance,  
b. the manufacturer’s order fill rates,  
c. the focal retailer’s order fill rate,  
d. other retailers’ order fill rates,  
e. the manufacturer’s cost of lost opportunity, and  
f. the manufacturer’s inventory carrying cost 
 
 
 
 
 
a. SUPPORTED 
b. SUPPORTED 
c. SUPPORTED 
d. SUPPORTED 
e. SUPPORTED 
f. SUPPORTED 
H10 The two-way interaction of manufacturer order 
rationing and retail promotions demand shock 
significantly impact long-term system performance in 
the form of: 
 
a. the manufacturer’s demand variance,  
b. the manufacturer’s order fill rates,  
c. the focal retailer’s order fill rate,  
d. other retailers’ order fill rates,  
e. the manufacturer’s cost of lost opportunity, and  
f. the manufacturer’s inventory carrying cost 
 
 
 
 
 
a. SUPPORTED 
b. SUPPORTED 
c. SUPPORTED 
d. SUPPORTED 
e. SUPPORTED 
f. Not Supported 
H11 The two-way interaction of focal retailer shortage 
gaming and supply inventory competition significantly 
impact long-term system performance in the form of: 
 
a. the manufacturer’s demand variance,  
b. the manufacturer’s order fill rates,  
c. the focal retailer’s order fill rate,  
d. other retailers’ order fill rates,  
e. the manufacturer’s cost of lost opportunity, and  
f. the manufacturer’s inventory carrying cost 
 
 
 
 
a. SUPPORTED 
b. SUPPORTED 
c. SUPPORTED 
d. SUPPORTED 
e. SUPPORTED 
f. SUPPORTED 
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Table 4-16 Summary of Hypotheses Tests (continued) 
Hypotheses Results 
H12 The two-way interaction of focal retailer shortage 
gaming and retail promotions demand shock 
significantly impact long-term system performance in 
the form of: 
 
a. the manufacturer’s demand variance,  
b. the manufacturer’s order fill rates,  
c. the focal retailer’s order fill rate,  
d. other retailers’ order fill rates,  
e. the manufacturer’s cost of lost opportunity, and  
f. the manufacturer’s inventory carrying cost 
 
 
 
 
 
a. SUPPORTED 
b. SUPPORTED 
c. SUPPORTED 
d. SUPPORTED 
e. SUPPORTED 
f. Not Supported 
H13 The two-way interaction of supply inventory 
competition and retail promotions demand shock 
significantly impact long-term system performance in 
the form of: 
 
a. the manufacturer’s demand variance,  
b. the manufacturer’s order fill rates,  
c. the focal retailer’s order fill rate,  
d. other retailers’ order fill rates,  
e. the manufacturer’s cost of lost opportunity, and  
f. the manufacturer’s inventory carrying cost 
 
 
 
 
 
a. Partially Supported 
b. Partially Supported 
c. Partially Supported 
d. Partially Supported 
e. Partially Supported 
f. Not Supported 
H14 The three-way interaction of manufacturer order 
rationing, focal retailer shortage gaming, and supply 
inventory competition significantly impact long-term 
system performance in the form of: 
 
a. the manufacturer’s demand variance,  
b. the manufacturer’s order fill rates,  
c. the focal retailer’s order fill rate,  
d. other retailers’ order fill rates,  
e. the manufacturer’s cost of lost opportunity, and  
f. the manufacturer’s inventory carrying cost 
 
 
 
 
 
a. SUPPORTED 
b. SUPPORTED 
c. SUPPORTED 
d. SUPPORTED 
e. SUPPORTED 
f. SUPPORTED 
H15 The three-way interaction of manufacturer order 
rationing, focal retailer shortage gaming, and retail 
promotions demand shock significantly impact long-
term system performance in the form of: 
 
a. the manufacturer’s demand variance,  
b. the manufacturer’s order fill rates,  
c. the focal retailer’s order fill rate,  
d. other retailers’ order fill rates,  
e. the manufacturer’s cost of lost opportunity, and  
f. the manufacturer’s inventory carrying cost 
 
 
 
 
 
a. SUPPORTED 
b. SUPPORTED 
c. SUPPORTED 
d. SUPPORTED 
e. SUPPORTED 
f. Not Supported 
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Table 4-16 Summary of Hypotheses Tests (continued) 
Hypotheses Results 
H16 The three-way interaction of manufacturer order 
rationing, supply inventory competition, and retail 
promotions demand shock significantly impact long-
term system performance in the form of: 
 
a. the manufacturer’s demand variance,  
b. the manufacturer’s order fill rates,  
c. the focal retailer’s order fill rate,  
d. other retailers’ order fill rates,  
e. the manufacturer’s cost of lost opportunity, and  
f. the manufacturer’s inventory carrying cost 
 
 
 
 
 
a. Partially Supported 
b. Partially Supported 
c. Partially Supported 
d. Partially Supported 
e. Partially Supported 
f. Not Supported 
H17 The three-way interaction of focal retailer shortage 
gaming, supply inventory competition, and retail 
promotions demand shock significantly impact long-
term system performance in the form of: 
 
a. the manufacturer’s demand variance,  
b. the manufacturer’s order fill rates,  
c. the focal retailer’s order fill rate,  
d. other retailers’ order fill rates,  
e. the manufacturer’s cost of lost opportunity, and  
f. the manufacturer’s inventory carrying cost 
 
 
 
 
 
a. Partially Supported 
b. Partially Supported 
c. Partially Supported 
d. Partially Supported 
e. Partially Supported 
f. Not Supported 
H18 The four-way interaction of manufacturer order 
rationing, focal retailer shortage gaming, supply 
inventory competition, and retail promotions demand 
shock significantly impact long-term system 
performance in the form of: 
 
a. the manufacturer’s demand variance,  
b. the manufacturer’s order fill rates,  
c. the focal retailer’s order fill rate,  
d. other retailers’ order fill rates,  
e. the manufacturer’s cost of lost opportunity, and  
f. the manufacturer’s inventory carrying cost 
 
 
 
 
 
 
a. Partially Supported 
b. Partially Supported 
c. Partially Supported 
d. Partially Supported 
e. Partially Supported 
f. Not Supported 
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4.4.1 Hypothesis H1 
This hypothesis states that, “Manufacturer order rationing strategies significantly 
impact long-term system performance in the form of: a. the manufacturer’s demand 
variance, b. the manufacturer’s order fill rates, c. focal retailer order fill rate, d. other 
retailers’ order fill rates, e. the manufacturer’s cost of lost opportunity, and f. the 
manufacturer’s inventory carrying cost.” All tests indicate that manufacturer order 
rationing strategy significantly and strongly impacts performance. Multivariate and 
univariate test results (Tables 4-10 and 4-15) indicate that effects of order rationing 
strategies on all dependent variables are statistically significant at p<0.001. In addition, 
evaluation of partial η2 values and marginal means plots indicate a strong effect on all 
outcome variables with the exception of the impact on C.COST, which is statistically 
significant with a very small effect (Table 4-15 and Figures 4-79 through 4-83). 
Therefore, Hypotheses H1a through H1f are supported. 
4.4.2 Hypothesis H2 
This hypothesis states that, “Uniform order rationing strategy, compared to either 
Proportional or Linear order rationing strategies, has a greater positive impact on: a. 
increasing the manufacturer’s demand variance, b. decreasing the manufacturer’s order 
fill rates, c. decreasing focal retailer order fill rate, d. decreasing other retailers’ order 
fill rates, e. increasing the manufacturer’s cost of lost opportunity, and f. increasing the 
manufacturer’s inventory carrying cost.” Main effect plots indicate that Uniform order 
rationing strategy has a greater positive impact than Proportional or Linear order 
rationing strategies on increasing the manufacturer’s demand variance (Figure 4-79), 
decreasing the manufacturer’s order fill rates (Figure 4-80), decreasing the focal retailer’s 
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order fill rate (Figure 4-81), increasing the manufacturer’s cost of lost opportunity 
(Figure 4-82), and increasing the manufacturer’s inventory carrying cost (Figure 4-83). 
Therefore Hypotheses H2a, H2b, H2c, H2e, and H2f are supported. However, there is 
only partial support for Hypothesis H2d. Figure 4-81 shows that while a Uniform order 
rationing strategy decreases large retailers’ (A Retailers) order fill rates compared to 
other order rationing strategies, for medium and small retailers (B and C Retailers), a 
Uniform order rationing strategy provides 100 percent order fill rates, a higher order fill 
rate than the retailers would receive under a Proportional or Linear order rationing 
strategy.  
4.4.3 Hypothesis H3 
This hypothesis states that, “Focal retailer (Retailer 1) shortage gaming directly 
impacts long-term system performance by: a. increasing the manufacturer’s demand 
variance, b. decreasing the manufacturer’s order fill rates, c. decreasing focal retailer 
order fill rate, d. decreasing other retailers’ order fill rates, e. increasing the 
manufacturer’s cost of lost opportunity, and f. increasing the manufacturer’s inventory 
carrying cost.” Both multivariate and univariate test results (Tables 4-10 and 4-15) show 
a significant effect at p<0.001 of Retailer 1’s shortage gaming on all outcome variables. 
Profile plots show that when compared to No shortage gaming, both Correction and 
Overreaction gaming decreases the manufacturer’s order fill rates (Figure 4-90), 
decreases the focal retailer’s order fill rate (Figure 4-91), and decreases other retailers’ 
order fill rates (Figure 4-91). Therefore, Hypotheses H3b, H3c, and H3d are supported.  
There is also partial support for Hypotheses H3a and H3e. Figure 4-89 shows that 
while Correction gaming increases the manufacturer’s demand variance, Overreaction 
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gaming results in lower demand variance compared to No gaming. Additionally, Figure 
4-92 shows that in comparison with No gaming, the manufacturer’s cost of lost 
opportunity increases with Overreaction gaming but decreases with Correction gaming.  
Finally, there is no support for Hypothesis H3f. Figure 4-93 shows that when the 
focal retailer shortage games, the manufacturer does not incur inventory carrying costs as 
there is no inventory carried over from the previous quarter. 
4.4.4 Hypothesis H4 
This hypothesis states that, “For the focal retailer (Retailer 1), Correction 
shortage gaming when compared to Overreaction shortage gaming, has a greater 
positive impact on: a. increasing the manufacturer’s demand variance, b. decreasing the 
manufacturer’s order fill rates, c. decreasing focal retailer order fill rate, d. decreasing 
other retailers’ order fill rates, e. increasing the manufacturer’s cost of lost opportunity, 
and f. increasing the manufacturer’s inventory carrying cost.” Main effect plots show 
that Correction gaming does not specifically have a greater positive impact on increasing 
the manufacturer’s demand variance (Figure 4-89). Instead, Correction gaming results in 
an increase in demand variance compared to No gaming, whereas Overreaction gaming 
results in a decrease in demand variance compared to No gaming. Therefore Hypothesis 
H4a is not supported.  
Hypotheses H4b and H4c are supported. Main effect plots show that Overreaction 
gaming results in less of a positive impact on the manufacturer’s order fill rates as well as 
the focal retailer’s order fill rates when compared to Correction gaming (Figure 4-90 and 
4-91 respectively). Overreaction gaming compare to Correction gaming does show a 
greater positive impact on order fill rates for all other retailers (Figure 4-91), and 
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therefore H4d is not supported.  
With regard to Hypothesis H4e, Overreaction versus Correction gaming by the 
focal retailer results in variable outcomes with regard to the manufacturer’s opportunity 
loss, thus H4e is not supported. Finally, both forms of shortage gaming result in a 
decrease of the manufacturer’s inventory carrying costs to zero, reflecting the lack of 
excess inventory each quarter (Figure 4-93), indicating partial support for Hypothesis 
H4f.    
4.4.5 Hypothesis H5 
This hypothesis states that, “Supply inventory competition, in the form of either 
Correction or Overreaction gaming by retailers other than the focal retailer directly 
impacts long-term system performance by: a. increasing the manufacturer’s demand 
variance, b. decreasing the manufacturer’s order fill rates, c. decreasing focal retailer 
order fill rate, d. decreasing other retailers’ order fill rates, e. increasing the 
manufacturer’s cost of lost opportunity, and f. increasing the manufacturer’s inventory 
carrying cost.” Both multivariate and univariate test results (Tables 4-10 and 4-15) show 
a significant effect at p<0.001 of the impact of RA.GAME, RB.GAME, and RC.GAME 
on all outcome variables. Profile plots show that Correction gaming by A Retailers 
increases demand variance whereas Overreaction gaming does not. This relationship has 
a larger effect on the dependent variable than the effect of shortage gaming by B and C 
Retailers’ on demand variance (Table 4-15). For B and C Retailers, both forms of 
shortage gaming results in limited impact on demand variance when compared to No 
gaming (Figure 4-109). Thus, H5a is partially supported.  
Shortage gaming in both forms by the three types of retailers decrease the 
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manufacturer’s order fill rates (Figure 4-110), decrease the focal retailer’s order fill rates 
(Figure 4-111), decrease other retailers’ order fill rates (Figures 4-112 through 4-114) and 
increase the manufacturer’s cost of lost opportunity (Figure 4-115). Therefore, H5b, H5c, 
H5d, and H5e are all supported. Lastly, H5f is not supported. Shortage gaming by A, B, 
and C Retailers results in lower excess inventory carrying costs for the manufacturer 
compared to No gaming (Figure 4-116).  
4.4.6 Hypothesis H6 
This hypothesis states that, “Supply inventory competition from retailers ordering 
a larger volume compared to other retailers will exhibit a greater positive impact on: a. 
increasing the manufacturer’s demand variance, b. decreasing the manufacturer’s order 
fill rates, c. decreasing focal retailer order fill rate, d. decreasing other retailers’ order 
fill rates, e. increasing the manufacturer’s cost of lost opportunity, and f. increasing the 
manufacturer’s inventory carrying cost.” A comparison of main effects plots for A, B, 
and C Retailer shortage gaming shows that Correction shortage gaming by A Retailers, 
who collectively order approximately 46 percent of the manufacturer’s total demand, 
does increase the manufacturer’s demand variance (Figure 4-109). However, 
Overreaction gaming does not and these results vary from that of B and C retailers. Thus 
H6a is partially supported. Supply inventory competition from A Retailers compared to B 
and C Retailers does exhibit a greater positive impact on decreasing the manufacturer’s 
order fill rates, yielding the lowest absolute order fill rates (Figure 4-110). Therefore H6b 
is supported. Hypotheses H6d, H6e, and H6f are also supported. In general, this pattern is 
also seen in terms of other retailers order fill rates (Figure 4-112 through 4-114), the 
manufacturer’s opportunity costs (Figure 4-115), and the manufacturer’s inventory 
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carrying costs (Figure 4-116). Finally, for H6c, the impact of supply inventory 
competition from A Retailers on the focal retailer’s order fill rates yields the lowest 
absolute order fill rates under Overreaction gaming, but does not for Correction gaming 
(Figure 4-111). Instead, Correction gaming by B Retailers results in lower order fill rates 
compared to A Retailers. Thus, H6c is partially supported. 
4.4.7 Hypothesis H7 
This hypothesis states that, “Retail promotions demand shock directly impacts 
long-term system performance by: a. increasing the manufacturer’s demand variance, b. 
decreasing the manufacturer’s order fill rates, c. decreasing focal retailer order fill rate, 
d. decreasing other retailers’ order fill rates, e. increasing the manufacturer’s cost of lost 
opportunity, and f. increasing the manufacturer’s inventory carrying cost.” Multivariate 
test results (Table 4-10) show a significant effect at p<0.001 of retail promotions demand 
shock on the multivariate variable. However, univariate test results (Table 4-15) show 
mixed effects on outcome variables. There was a significant effect at p<0.001 on four 
dependent variables: demand variance, the manufacturer’s order fill rates, Retailer 1’s 
order fill rates, and the manufacturer’s opportunity loss. There was also a significant 
effect at p<0.01 on C retailer’s order fill rates. There was no significant effect on A 
Retailer order fill rates, B Retailer’s order fill rates, and the manufacturer’s inventory 
carrying costs. Profile plots show that when compared to no promotions, a retail 
promotions demand shock increases the manufacturer’s demand variance (Figure 4-84), 
thus supporting Hypothesis H7a. However, the remaining hypotheses are unsupported. A 
retail promotions demand shock increases the manufacturer’s order fill rates (Figure 4-
85), increases the focal retailer’s order fill rates (Figure 4-86), decreases the 
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manufacturer’s cost of lost opportunity (Figure 4-88) Therefore, Hypotheses H7b, H7c, 
and H3e are not supported. Hypothesis H7d is also not supported as there was no 
significant effect of retail promotions demand shock on A and B Retailer’s order fill rates 
and the significant effect of retail promotions demand shock increased C Retailer’s order 
fill rates (Figure 4-87). Lastly, H7f is also not supported as there was no significant effect 
on inventory carrying cost. 
4.4.8 Hypothesis H8 
This hypothesis states that, “The two-way interaction of manufacturer order 
rationing and focal retailer shortage gaming significantly impact long-term system 
performance in the form of: a. the manufacturer’s demand variance, b. the 
manufacturer’s order fill rates, c. the focal retailer’s order fill rate, d. other retailers’ 
order fill rates, e. the manufacturer’s cost of lost opportunity, and f. the manufacturer’s 
inventory carrying cost.” All tests indicate that the interaction of manufacturer order 
rationing and focal retailer shortage gaming significantly and strongly impacts 
performance. Multivariate and univariate test results (Tables 4-9 and 4-14) indicate that 
effects of this two-way interaction on all dependent variables are statistically significant 
at p<0.001. In addition, evaluation of partial η2 values indicates a strong effect (partial η2 
> 0.8) on all outcome variables with the exception of the impact on the manufacturer’s 
inventory carrying costs, which is statistically significant but with a very small effect 
(partial η2 = 0.110). See Table 4-14. Therefore, Hypotheses H8a through H8f are 
supported. 
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4.4.9 Hypothesis H9 
This hypothesis states that, “The two-way interaction of manufacturer order 
rationing and supply inventory competition significantly impact long-term system 
performance in the form of: a. the manufacturer’s demand variance, b. the 
manufacturer’s order fill rates, c. the focal retailer’s order fill rate, d. other retailers’ 
order fill rates, e. the manufacturer’s cost of lost opportunity, and f. the manufacturer’s 
inventory carrying cost.” The interaction of manufacturer order rationing and supply 
inventory competition significantly and strongly impacts performance. Supply inventory 
competition involves shortage gaming from A, B, or C Retailers. Multivariate and 
univariate test results (Tables 4-9 and 4-14) indicate that impacts of this two-way 
interaction on all dependent variables are statistically significant at p<0.001.  
Specifically for A Retailers in supply inventory competition, evaluation of partial 
η2 values indicates a strong effect (partial η2 > 0.8) on all outcome variables with the 
exception of the impact on the manufacturer’s inventory carrying costs, which is 
statistically significant but with a very small effect (partial η2 = 0.110). See Table 4-14. 
For B Retailers, partial η2 values indicate a strong effect (partial η2 > 0.8) on all outcome 
variables with the exception of the manufacturer’s opportunity loss (medium effect, 
partial η2 = 0.737) and the manufacturer’s demand variance (small effect, partial η2 = 
0.428). Lastly, for C Retailers, partial η2 values show at least a small effect (partial η2 > 
0.2) on all outcome variables with the exception of inventory carrying costs (partial η2 = 
0.002). Overall, these results show support for Hypotheses H9a through H9f. 
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4.4.10 Hypothesis H10 
This hypothesis states that, “The two-way interaction of manufacturer order 
rationing and retail promotions demand shock significantly impact long-term system 
performance in the form of: a. the manufacturer’s demand variance, b. the 
manufacturer’s order fill rates, c. the focal retailer’s order fill rate, d. other retailers’ 
order fill rates, e. the manufacturer’s cost of lost opportunity, and f. the manufacturer’s 
inventory carrying cost.” The interaction of manufacturer order rationing and retailer 
promotions demand shock significantly impacts performance. Multivariate and univariate 
test results (Tables 4-9 and 4-14) indicates that impact of this two-way interaction on all 
dependent variables are statistically significant at p<0.001 for all dependent variables 
with the exception of the manufacturer’s inventory carrying cost. 
However, the two-way interaction’s effects are weak. Evaluation of partial η2 
values indicates a medium effect (partial η2 > 0.5) on the manufacturer’s order fill rate 
and the focal retailer’s order fill rate only. There was a small effect (partial η2 = 0.228) on 
the manufacturer’s opportunity loss. Otherwise, partial η2 values were very small, ranging 
from 0.004 to 0.145 for significant relationships. See Table 4-14. These results show 
support for Hypotheses H10a through H10e, while Hypothesis 10f is not supported. 
4.4.11 Hypothesis H11 
This hypothesis states that, “The two-way interaction of focal retailer shortage 
gaming and supply inventory competition significantly impact long-term system 
performance in the form of: a. the manufacturer’s demand variance, b. the 
manufacturer’s order fill rates, c. the focal retailer’s order fill rate, d. other retailers’ 
order fill rates, e. the manufacturer’s cost of lost opportunity, and f. the manufacturer’s 
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inventory carrying cost.” The interaction of focal retailer shortage and supply inventory 
competition from either A, B, or C Retailers significantly and strongly impacts 
performance. Multivariate and univariate test results (Tables 4-9 and 4-14) indicate that 
impacts of this two-way interaction on all dependent variables are statistically significant 
at p<0.001.  
The effects of this interaction is strong when A Retailers shortage game, compare 
to when C retailers shortage game. The specific interaction of focal retailer and A 
Retailers’ shortage gaming yields significant relationships with primarily high partial η2 
values, ranging from 0.893 to 0.996. The effect on two outcomes, demand variance and 
inventory carrying costs, were small (partial η2 = 0.261 and 0.201 respectively). The 
specific interaction of focal retailer and B retailers’ shortage gaming also yielded four 
relationships with large effects, two relationships with medium effects, two relationships 
with small effects, and only one relationship with very small effects. In contrast, the 
specific interaction of focal retailer and C Retailers’ shortage gaming yielded primarily 
very small effects, ranging from partial η2 values of 0.007 to 0.167. Only one 
relationship, with C Retailer’s order fill rate, was classified as a small effect (partial η2 = 
0.211). Overall, Hypotheses H11a through H11f are supported. 
4.4.12 Hypothesis H12 
This hypothesis states that, “The two-way interaction of focal retailer shortage 
gaming and retail promotions demand shock significantly impact long-term system 
performance in the form of: a. the manufacturer’s demand variance, b. the 
manufacturer’s order fill rates, c. the focal retailer’s order fill rate, d. other retailers’ 
order fill rates, e. the manufacturer’s cost of lost opportunity, and f. the manufacturer’s 
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inventory carrying cost.” The interaction of focal retailer shortage gaming and retailer 
promotions demand shock significantly impacts performance. Multivariate and univariate 
test results (Tables 4-9 and 4-14) indicates that impact of this two-way interaction on all 
dependent variables are statistically significant at p<0.001 for all dependent variables 
with the exception of the manufacturer’s inventory carrying cost. 
However, the two-way interaction’s effects are mixed. Evaluation of partial η2 
values indicates two medium sized effects (partial η2 > 0.5) on the manufacturer’s order 
fill rate and the focal retailer’s order fill rate. There were also two small sized effects 
(partial η2 > 0.2) on the manufacturer’s demand variance and opportunity loss. Otherwise, 
partial η2 values were very small in size, ranging from 0.029 to 0.060 for significant 
relationships. See Table 4-14. These results show support for Hypotheses H12a through 
H12e, but Hypothesis 12f is not supported. 
4.4.13 Hypothesis H13 
This hypothesis states that, “The two-way interaction of supply inventory 
competition and retail promotions demand shock significantly impact long-term system 
performance in the form of: a. the manufacturer’s demand variance, b. the 
manufacturer’s order fill rates, c. the focal retailer’s order fill rate, d. other retailers’ 
order fill rates, e. the manufacturer’s cost of lost opportunity, and f. the manufacturer’s 
inventory carrying cost.” The interaction of supply inventory competition from A, B, or 
C Retailers and retail promotions demand shock results in variable impact on long-term 
system performance. Multivariate results indicate that the two-way interaction is 
significant at p<0.001 for supply inventory competition involving A and B Retailers but 
not for C Retailers (Table 4-9). Univariate test results (Table 4-14) indicate that the 
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impact of this two-way interaction involving A retailers are significant on all dependent 
variables at p<0.001, with the exception of its impact on the focal retailer’s order fill rate 
and on the manufacturer’s inventory carrying cost. For the two-way interaction involving 
B Retailers, there is a significant effect at p<0.01 on all dependent variables with the 
exception of the manufacturer’s inventory carrying costs (Table 4-14). 
Evaluation of partial η2 values indicates a weak effect of this interaction. Each 
significant relationship yielded very small effect sizes (partial η2 < 0.2) on all outcome 
variables with one exception. The specific interaction of A Retailers shortage gaming and 
retail promotions demand shock and its impact on the manufacturer’s order fill rate 
(partial η2 = 0.347). See Table 4-14. Overall, these results show support for Hypotheses 
H13a through H13e. Hypothesis H13f is not supported. 
4.4.14 Hypothesis H14 
This hypothesis states that, “The three-way interaction of manufacturer order 
rationing, focal retailer shortage gaming, and supply inventory competition significantly 
impact long-term system performance in the form of: a. the manufacturer’s demand 
variance, b. the manufacturer’s order fill rates, c. the focal retailer’s order fill rate, d. 
other retailers’ order fill rates, e. the manufacturer’s cost of lost opportunity, and f. the 
manufacturer’s inventory carrying cost.” Multivariate and univariate test results indicate 
a significant effect at p<0.001of the three-way interaction of manufacturer order 
rationing, focal retailer shortage gaming, and supply inventory competition from either A, 
B, or C Retailers on all outcomes (Tables 4-8 and 4-13). 
Similar to the conclusions for Hypothesis H11, the effects of this interaction is 
strong when A Retailers shortage game, compare to when C Retailers shortage game. 
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Within the three-way interaction, A Retailers’ shortage gaming primarily yields 
significant relationships with high partial η2 values, ranging from 0.876 to 0.980, 
although the effect on inventory carrying costs was very small (partial η2 = 0.199). B 
Retailers’ shortage gaming within this three-way interaction also yielded three 
relationships with large effects, two relationships with medium effects, one relationship 
with small effects, and two relationships with very small effects. In contrast, C Retailers’ 
shortage gaming within this three-way interaction yielded primarily very small effects, 
There were five relationships ranging from partial η2 values of 0.008 to 0.142. Three 
relationships, with the focal retailer’s order fill rate, B Retailers’ order fill rates, and C 
Retailers’ order fill rates, was classified as a small effect (partial η2 =0.215, 0.240, and 
0.414 respectively). Overall, Hypotheses H14a through H14f are supported. 
4.4.15 Hypothesis H15 
This hypothesis states that, “The three-way interaction of manufacturer order 
rationing, focal retailer shortage gaming, and retail promotions demand shock 
significantly impact long-term system performance in the form of: a. the manufacturer’s 
demand variance, b. the manufacturer’s order fill rates, c. the focal retailer’s order fill 
rate, d. other retailers’ order fill rates, e. the manufacturer’s cost of lost opportunity, and 
f. the manufacturer’s inventory carrying cost.” Multivariate test results indicate a 
significant effect at p<0.001of the three-way interaction of manufacturer order rationing, 
focal retailer shortage gaming, and retailer promotions demand on the multivariate 
outcome (Table 4-8). However, univariate tests indicate significant impact on seven out 
of eight dependent outcomes (Table 4-13). There was no significant impact of this three-
way interaction on the manufacturer’s inventory carrying costs (Table 4-13). The impact 
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of this interaction is mixed. Partial η2 values indicate a strong effect on the 
manufacturer’s order fill rate (partial η2 = 0.821) and the focal retailer’s order fill rate 
(partial η2 = 0.850). There was also a small effect on the manufacturer’s demand variance 
(partial η2 = 0.320) and opportunity loss (partial η2 = 0.464). However, the impact of this 
interaction on A, B, and C Retailers’ order fill rates were very small (partial η2 = 0.061, 
0.065, and 0.079 respectively). The results support Hypotheses H15a through H15e. 
However, Hypothesis H15f is not supported. 
4.4.16 Hypothesis H16 
This hypothesis states that, “The three-way interaction of manufacturer order 
rationing, supply inventory competition, and retail promotions demand shock 
significantly impact long-term system performance in the form of: a. the manufacturer’s 
demand variance, b. the manufacturer’s order fill rates, c. the focal retailer’s order fill 
rate, d. other retailers’ order fill rates, e. the manufacturer’s cost of lost opportunity, and 
f. the manufacturer’s inventory carrying cost.” Multivariate test results indicate a 
significant effect at p<0.001of the three-way interaction of manufacturer order rationing, 
supply inventory competition from either A or B Retailers, and retailer promotions 
demand on the multivariate outcome (Table 4-8). However, if C Retailers are considered, 
multivariate test results indicate no significant impact of this three-way interaction on the 
multivariate outcome (p=0.992).  
Univariate test results (Table 4-14) indicate that the impact of this three-way 
interaction involving A Retailers is significant on all dependent variables at p<0.001, 
with the exception of its impact on the manufacturer’s inventory carrying cost. For the 
three-way interaction involving B retailers, there is a significant effect at p<0.001 on all 
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dependent variables with the exception of the manufacturer’s opportunity loss and 
inventory carrying costs (Table 4-14). 
Of the significant univariate relationships, partial η2 values indicate a generally 
weak effect on dependent variables, as most values are very small, ranging from 0.002 to 
0.054. Only the specific interaction of A retailers shortage gaming in supply inventory 
competition yielded medium and small sized effects on the manufacturer’s order fill rate 
(partial η2 = 0.512) and opportunity loss (partial η2 = 0.232). Overall, the results provide 
partial support for Hypotheses H16a through H16e, and no support for Hypothesis H16f. 
4.4.17 Hypothesis H17 
This hypothesis states that, “The three-way interaction of focal retailer shortage 
gaming, supply inventory competition, and retail promotions demand shock significantly 
impact long-term system performance in the form of: a. the manufacturer’s demand 
variance, b. the manufacturer’s order fill rates, c. the focal retailer’s order fill rate, d. 
other retailers’ order fill rates, e. the manufacturer’s cost of lost opportunity, and f. the 
manufacturer’s inventory carrying cost.” Multivariate test results indicate a significant 
effect at p<0.001of the three-way interaction of focal retailer shortage gaming, supply 
inventory competition from either A or B Retailers, and retailer promotions demand on 
the multivariate outcome (Table 4-8). However, if C Retailers are considered, 
multivariate test results indicate no significant impact of this three-way interaction on the 
multivariate outcome (p=0.994).  
Univariate test results (Table 4-14) indicate that the impact of this three-way 
interaction involving either A or B Retailers is significant on all dependent variables at 
p<0.001, with the exception of its impact on the manufacturer’s inventory carrying cost. 
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These relationships are weak as indicated by partial η2 values of 0.001 to 0.115. Only the 
specific interaction of A Retailers shortage gaming in supply inventory competition 
yielded a small sized effect on the manufacturer’s order fill rate (partial η2 = 0.344). 
Overall, the results provide partial support for Hypotheses H17a through H17e, and no 
support for Hypothesis H17f. 
4.4.18 Hypothesis H18 
This hypothesis states that, “The four-way interaction of manufacturer order 
rationing, focal retailer shortage gaming, supply inventory competition, and retail 
promotions demand shock significantly impact long-term system performance in the form 
of: a. the manufacturer’s demand variance, b. the manufacturer’s order fill rates, c. the 
focal retailer’s order fill rate, d. other retailers’ order fill rates, e. the manufacturer’s 
cost of lost opportunity, and f. the manufacturer’s inventory carrying cost.” Multivariate 
test results (Tables 4-7) indicate that effects of the four-way interaction all dependent 
variables are statistically significant at p<0.001 when considering supply inventory 
competition from A and B Retailers. However, supply inventory competition from C 
Retailers do not result in significant multivariate results (p=1.00, see Table 4-7). 
Univariate results for the four-way interaction including supply inventory competition 
from A Retailers show significant effect on all dependent variables at p<0.001, with the 
exception of the effect on inventory carrying cost (Table 4-12). This relationship was not 
significant. Likewise, univariate results for the four-way interaction including supply 
inventory competition from B Retailers show significant effect on all dependent variables 
at p<0.001, with the exception of the effects on opportunity loss and inventory carrying 
cost (Table 4-12). These relationships were not significant. 
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Evaluation of partial η2 values indicates a weak effect of this four-way interaction. 
Among supply inventory competition with A Retailers, there was a single medium sized 
effect on the manufacturer’s order fill rate and a small effect on opportunity loss. All 
other partial η2 values ranged from 0.027 to 0.064 for significant relationships (Table 4-
12). Among supply inventory competition with B Retailers, there were partial η2 values 
were very small, ranging from 0.003 to 0.006 (Table 4-12). Overall, these results indicate 
partial support for Hypotheses H18a through H18e and no support for Hypothesis H18f. 
  
  
  
 291 
CHAPTER 5 
CONCLUSION 
5.0 INTRODUCTION 
This chapter discusses the findings and implications of the research. First, the 
chapter discusses the key findings of this research. Second, the chapter discusses the 
theoretical contributions of this research. Third, the chapter discusses managerial 
implications for both manufacturers and retailers. Finally, the chapter concludes with 
limitations and suggestions for future research.  
 
5.1 DISCUSSION OF RESULTS 
This study explores the impact of supply inventory competition within a 
horizontal echelon in order to understand the full dynamics of business systems. Two 
research questions, 1. Does supply inventory competition impact vertical industrial 
business systems and 2. How can supply inventory competition impact the inventory 
ordering and fulfillment process in the context of a retail promotions demand shock over 
time, are addressed through a discrete event simulation experiment.  
In order to determine the impact of supply inventory competition, the research 
specifically examines the effects of manufacturer order rationing, retailer shortage 
gaming, and retail promotions demand shock on the long-term system performance of 
multiple retailers and a shared manufacturer connected by an inventory ordering and 
fulfillment feedback loop. Analysis of results suggests several findings, discussed below 
and summarized in Table 5-1 (located at the end of this section). 
First, manufacturer order rationing strategy strongly impact long-term system 
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performance. Eleven out of twelve hypotheses regarding the main effects of order 
rationing strategies (H1a through H1f; H2a through H2c; H2e and H2f) were supported 
and the remaining hypothesis (H2d) was partially supported, indicating the significant 
impact of order rationing strategy. Three types of order rationing strategies were 
examined. Results show that a Uniform rationing strategy results in clear differences in 
outcomes when compared to Proportional or Linear rationing strategies. A Uniform 
rationing strategy allocates inventory to retailers based solely on the number of retailers 
in the system. Order inflation by retailers does not impact the amount of inventory 
allocated under this strategy. As a consequence, large retailers who order large volumes 
suffer because their uniform allocation is small compared to their order. Small retailers 
benefit because their uniform allocation typically exceeds their order volume. In contrast, 
both Proportional and Linear rationing strategies are not only sensitive to order inflation 
by retailers but the results suggest that there is variance in how sensitive each strategy is 
to the magnitude of order inflation. Within either a Proportional or Linear order rationing 
strategy scenario, detrimental outcomes generally result from shortage gaming compared 
to no shortage gaming. In addition, the results reveal a greater range of outcomes from 
the interaction of Linear rationing strategy across the two shortage gaming responses, 
when compared to the interaction of Proportional rationing strategy across the two 
shortage gaming responses.  
Second, shortage gaming by either the focal retailer or other retailers (supply 
inventory competition) significantly impacts other parties involved in the inventory 
ordering and fulfillment feedback loop but there is variance in the manner in which the 
impact is felt. Thirteen out of twenty-four hypotheses regarding the main effects of 
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shortage gaming by all retailers (H3b through H3d; H4a and H4b; H5b through H5e; 
H6b; H6d through H6f) were supported. Of the remaining hypotheses, six were partially 
supported (H3a; H3e; H4f; H5a; H6a; H6c) while five were not supported (H3f; H4a; 
H4d and H4e; H5f). Results show that shortage gaming by focal, A, B, and C Retailers 
significantly decrease the manufacturer’s order fulfillment rates when compared to No 
gaming. In similar fashion, order fill rates for all retailers are also decreased. Additional 
measures of performance such as the manufacturer’s demand variance, opportunity loss, 
and inventory carrying costs are also significantly impacted. Overall, when retailers 
engage in shortage gaming, the system experiences detrimental long-term outcomes. 
However, shortage gaming also provides a range of risks and rewards to different parties 
within the system. Large retailers do not benefit from shortage gaming as their order fill 
rates decrease in scenarios when they inflate orders. In contrast, small retailers such as 
type C Retailers benefit from high order inflation (such as from Correction gaming) in the 
form of high order fill rates compared to No gaming, subject to the manufacturer’s use of 
an order inflation friendly strategy. The manufacturer benefits when retailers inflate 
orders because excess inventory is taken up, resulting in zero excess inventory carrying 
costs. Still, when there is excessive order inflation, the manufacturer suffers from high 
demand variance, low order fulfillment rates, and high opportunity loss. These results 
suggest that the positive and negative impact of shortage gaming should be considered 
relative to the manufacturer’s capacity. If there is sufficient slack in the manufacturer’s 
capacity, then a moderate level of shortage gaming may be beneficial because more 
inventory can be sold to retailers than their baseline need. Nevertheless, if shortage 
gaming is excessive and far exceeds capacity, then the resulting perturbations within the 
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inventory ordering and fulfillment feedback loop may outweigh any benefit in selling 
excess inventory. 
Third, a single retail promotions demand shock has limited long-term impact on 
system performance. Five out of six hypotheses regarding the main effects of retail 
promotions demand shock (H7b through H7f) were not supported, indicating limited 
impact. This simulation tested the effect of one retail promotions demand shock over a 
five-year period. Although results show significant differences between no retail 
promotions demand shock and a single retail promotions demand shock, the results 
indicate a strong effect on only the two entities directly involved. The manufacturer 
experiences increased demand variance, which supports hypothesis H7a, while both the 
manufacturer and the focal retailer experience higher mean order fill rates under a retail 
promotions demand shock. The direction of this change may be a result of the simulation 
parameters that stipulate a high order fill rate for the retail promotions request itself. As 
discussed in sections 4.3.2.1, 4.3.2.2, 4.3.3.1, and 4.3.3.6, when the manufacturer fills a 
retail promotions demand, the initial high level of order fulfillment is evident over the 
long-term for both the manufacturer and the retailer in the form of higher order fill rates, 
specifically when the manufacturer utilizes a Uniform rationing strategy.  
Finally, when considered overall, the interactions of order rationing, shortage 
gaming, and retail promotions demand shock significantly impact long-term system 
performance, but impacts on specific outcomes are not supported uniformly. For two-way 
interactions, twenty-eight out of thirty-six hypotheses were supported (H8a through H8f; 
H9a through H9f; H10a through H10e; H11a through H11f; H12a through H12e). Of the 
remaining two-way interaction hypotheses, five were partially supported (H13a through 
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H13e) and three were not supported (H10f; H12f; H13f). For three-way interactions, 
eleven out of twenty-four hypotheses were supported (H14a through H14f; H15a through 
H15e) while ten were partially supported (H16a through H16e; H17a through H17e). 
Three out of twenty-four hypotheses were not supported (H15f; H16f; H17f), again 
involving the impact on the manufacturer’s inventory carrying cost. For four-way 
interactions, five out of six total hypotheses were partially supported (H18a through 
H18e) and one hypothesis was not supported (H18f). Non-supported hypotheses for two-
way, three-way, and four-way interactions all relate to a specific outcome. The 
hypotheses each predicted significant impact of various interactions on the 
manufacturer’s inventory carrying cost. In some instances, demand from retailers 
consistently exceeded the manufacturer’s supply and no inventory was carried over from 
quarter to quarter, resulting in zero inventory carrying costs and non-support of the 
hypotheses. 
Overall, these results relate back to the research questions posed for this study. 
Research question 1 asked, does supply inventory competition impact vertical industrial 
business systems? The findings suggest that both vertical and horizontal entities within 
business systems are significantly impacted by each entity’s actions within the inventory 
ordering and fulfillment feedback loop. Research question 2 asked, how can supply 
inventory competition impact the inventory ordering and fulfillment process in the 
context of a retail promotions demand shock over time? The results reveal that 
interactions between manufacturer order rationing strategies, retailer shortage gaming 
responses, and retail promotions demand shock are complex, particularly when 
considered over time. There are both positive and negative impacts relative to each entity 
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within the inventory ordering and fulfillment feedback loop.  
 
Table 5-1 Summary of Results 
Manufacturer Order Rationing 
Main Effects • Strong impact on long-term system performance 
• Clear differences between Uniform (worst) and Proportional 
/ Linear strategies 
• Strategies also impact manufacturer and each retailer type 
differently 
• Large retailers suffer from low order fill rates under Uniform 
• Small retailers benefit from high order fill rates under 
Uniform 
• Proportional and Linear strategies generally result in 
detrimental outcomes for all parties 
Interaction with 
Focal Retailer 
Shortage Gaming 
• Interaction of specific strategies and shortage gaming 
response results in differences in outcomes 
• Although results are generally detrimental to other retailers, 
each retailer type is impacted differently 
Interaction with 
Retail 
Promotions 
Demand Shock 
• Impact is on parties involved directly in retail promotions 
demand shock (manufacturer and focal retailer) 
• Promotions increase demand variance and order fill rates 
long-term 
• Interaction of Uniform order rationing strategy and 
Correction shortage gaming results in higher long-term order 
fill rates for the manufacturer and focal retailer only, 
showing a compounding effect of high initial order fill with 
subsequent uniform allocation 
Interaction with 
Supply Inventory 
Competition 
• When A Retailers engage in shortage gaming, specific 
interaction of Uniform rationing strategy and Correction 
shortage gaming results in detrimental outcomes for the 
manufacturer and larger retailers but smaller retailers benefit 
in general from a Uniform strategy 
• When B Retailers engage in shortage gaming, specific 
interaction with a Proportional strategy results in similar 
detrimental outcomes regardless of level of shortage gaming 
while specific interaction with a Linear strategy results in 
variable outcomes depending on the level of shortage 
gaming 
• When C Retailers engage in shortage gaming, the results are 
similar to that of B Retailers, but with less of a detrimental 
impact 
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Table 5-1 Summary of Results (continued) 
Focal Retailer Shortage Gaming 
Main Effects • Strong impact on long-term system performance 
• Shortage gaming by focal retailer results in negative 
impact for focal retailer 
Interaction with 
Retail Promotions 
Demand Shock 
• The focal retailer benefits from its own retail promotions 
demand 
• Interaction of retail promotions demand shock and 
Correction shortage gaming by the focal retailer results in 
higher order fill rates long-term 
Interaction with 
Supply Inventory 
Competition 
• Interaction with shortage gaming by A, B, and C retailers 
generally exacerbates the negative impact of shortage 
gaming by the focal retailer to all entities involved in the 
inventory ordering and fulfillment feedback cycle 
 
Retail Promotions Demand Shock 
Main Effects • A single retail promotions demand shock has limited 
long-term impact on system performance 
• Biggest impact is on increasing the manufacturer’s 
demand variance, and increasing the manufacturer’s 
order fulfillment rate and increasing the focal retailer’s 
order fill rate 
Interaction with 
Supply Inventory 
Competition 
• Although significant interactions exist with A and B 
Retailers’ shortage gaming the interactions indicate 
minimal impact due to very small effect sizes 
 
Supply Inventory Competition 
Main Effects • Strong impact on long-term system performance 
• Shortage gaming by large retailers show stronger impact 
than shortage gaming by small retailers on other entities 
within the system 
• Shortage gaming by large retailers result in negative 
impact for themselves 
• Shortage gaming by small retailers result in positive 
impact for themselves 
• The manufacturer benefits by selling more inventory and 
reducing excess inventory carrying costs but also suffers 
from high demand variance and high opportunity loss 
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5.2 THEORETICAL CONTRIBUTIONS 
Three theoretical contributions emerge from this research. They are related to 
Forrester’s theory of industrial dynamics, order rationing strategies and shortage gaming 
responses, and retail promotions demand shock. 
5.2.1 Forrester’s Theory of Industrial Dynamics 
First, this research tests Forrester’s theory of industrial dynamics (1958; 1961). 
The results confirm the theory’s premise that economic and industrial activities can be 
characterized as information-feedback systems and that interaction of structural elements, 
time relationship delays, and amplification relevant decision policies will impact the 
stability and long-term performance of the system (Forrester 1961). 
In particular, supply inventory competition within the context of an inventory 
ordering and fulfillment feedback loop is shown to impact long-term system performance 
via interaction of order rationing strategies, shortage gaming responses, and retail 
promotions demand shock. These results also confirm Forrester’s assertion that 
considering competition among firms in an industry because “the factors interlocking 
their behavior are sufficiently strong” (1961, p336) is important. According to Größler 
and colleagues (2008), Forrester’s conceptualization of multiple business entities as a 
structural system with interdependencies paved the foundation for the idea that one firm’s 
activities can impact another firm’s performance. Yet, few supply chain management 
studies expand their investigation beyond a vertical dyad (e.g. Choi & Wu 2009; Wan & 
Evers 2011; Morgan 2007; Wathne & Heide 2004). Results from this study fill a gap in 
the literature as it explicitly incorporates multiple horizontal entities and their impact on 
the more commonly researched vertical supply chain system. The findings complement 
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vertically oriented supply chain management research by highlighting horizontally 
oriented inventory competition as an overlooked factor in supply chain management 
performance. In addition, the results suggest that identification of relevant supply chain 
entities in supply chain management research should take into account an entity’s role in 
existing feedback loops. 
5.2.2 Order Rationing Strategies and Shortage Gaming Responses 
Second, this research expands knowledge about the long-term impact of various 
rationing strategies and shortage gaming responses. Three rationing strategies were 
identified from the literature and tested within the research. The findings both confirm 
and extend extant literature regarding the differential impact of each rationing strategy 
(e.g. Cachon & Lariviere 1999b) through exploration of their overlooked interactions 
with shortage gaming responses. Unlike prior studies which employ an analytical 
approach, a simulation experiment methodology was utilized which allowed for the 
detailed examination of the comprehensive set of interactions for these variables 
identified through literature and manager input. The results also reveal complex 
interactions over time between order rationing strategies and shortage gaming responses 
from multiple retailers, which provides greater insight into the assumptions underlying 
the research models.  
Previous relevant research involving order rationing and shortage gaming had 
involved multiple retailers without competitive behavior (e.g. Cachon & Lariviere 
1999a), or assumed that competing retailers will all respond similarly in maximizing their 
expected payoff (e.g. Mallik & Harker 2004) in order to identify a mechanism to produce 
optimal supply chain profits. In contrast, this research involves multiple and competing 
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retailers of different volume classes who exhibit a range of shortage gaming responses. 
The results suggest that research models involving order rationing should explicitly 
account for competition among horizontal members of an echelon in order to capture a 
broader range of significant influences. Moreover, the assumption that multiple 
horizontal members of a customer echelon will behave in a similar fashion regarding 
their ordering behavior may overlook significant sources of variation within the inventory 
ordering and fulfillment process. The results also indicate the need for research models to 
make explicit order volume differences between customers. Large order volume 
customers are impacted differently than small order volume customers with regard to 
various order rationing strategies and competition from other customers. 
5.2.3 Retail Promotions Demand Shock 
Finally, this research contributes to a greater understanding of the consequences 
of a single retail promotions demand shock. Research specific to the demand impact of 
retail promotions is limited (Tokar et al. 2011) despite the pervasive use of retail 
promotions to stimulate consumer demand (Blattberg et al. 1995). However, demand 
shocks arising from retail promotions are generally considered detrimental in the supply 
chain management discipline. For example, retail promotions and the negative outcomes 
from demand shocks are mentioned in textbooks (e.g. Coyle et al. 2013 p52; Simchi-Levi 
et al. 2008 p161) and the literature (e.g. Lee 2004; Disney & Towill 2003; Daugherty et 
al. 2002; Fisher 1997) but do not go into much detail regarding the exact nature of impact 
from retail promotions demand shocks. Rather, the various articles focus on tangential 
supply chain topics. Coupled with increasing use of retail promotions to make sales 
(Huchzermeier & Iyer 2006), this marketing variable is seen to pose significant 
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management challenges to upstream supply chain entities. 
Interestingly, the results suggest that a single retail demand shock has a weak 
impact on system performance over time. Over the long-term (5 years) the system 
appears to recover from the demand shock, however over the short term the impact may 
be stronger in comparison. Therefore, an explicit identification of the time-period under 
study should be considered in research involving retail promotions demand shock. In 
addition, as this study investigated a single demand shock, it is possible that additional, 
overlapping demand shocks could produce negative outcomes congruent with beliefs 
expressed in literature. Thus, specification of the quantity of demand shocks under 
consideration should also be made in promotions research. Overall, the results regarding 
retail promotions demand shock suggests that additional research is required in order to 
understand the impact of retail promotions on supply chains. 
 
5.3 MANAGERIAL CONTRIBUTIONS 
Although the generalizability of results from a discrete event simulation 
experimental methodology is limited to the system that is modeled, the findings suggest 
two main managerial implications related to supply inventory competition as well as 
order rationing and shortage gaming.  
5.3.1 Managing Supply Inventory Competition 
 First and foremost, the findings suggest that managers facing supply and demand 
misalignment must be aware of the impact of supply inventory competition. The research 
shows /suggests that both vertical and horizontal entities within business systems are 
impacted by each entity’s actions within the inventory ordering and fulfillment feedback 
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loop. Actions may be taken to avoid excessive supply inventory competition through 
focused communication regarding capacity and overall demand. 
This research modeled an inventory ordering and fulfillment system in the US 
major appliances industry. The major appliance industry has yielded reports of 
collaboration initiatives between a manufacturer and retail customers. In particular, 
Whirlpool and its largest customers have embarked on Collaborative Planning, 
Forecasting, and Replenishment (CPFR) initiatives which coordinate forecasting, demand 
planning and order replenishment between the manufacturer and participating retailers 
(VICS 2010; Slone 2004; Sagar 2003). Although operational gains have been reported as 
a result of this structured collaboration between a manufacturer and its retail customers, 
the initiative does not solve all supply / demand misalignment issues. Within this 
framework of collaboration, supply inventory competition can still occur.  
Dittman (2012), Sagar (2003), and Slone (2004) describe the process of 
collaboration between a consumer durables manufacturer and a major retailer. The two 
companies followed a simple process wherein each created a forecast. On a weekly basis, 
they compared the two forecasts. They discussed any differences of more than 15 percent 
between the respective SKU forecasts and resolved the differences. Dittman (2012) 
relates an example where the two parties notes that the forecast for a certain SKU was 
more than 100 percent greater in the retailer’s forecast than in the supplier’s. Further 
discussion revealed that the retailer planned a promotion that had not been communicated 
to the supplier. According to Dittman (2012), this short conversation not only translated 
into a major improvement in forecast accuracy, but also avoided expediting costs for the 
supplier and provided a much better level of availability for the retailer. 
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Supply inventory competition can occur within these situations because retailers 
may still feel incentive to shortage game, particularly in the step when they resolve 
differences in forecast with the manufacturer. If a retail promotion is planned, a retailer 
may engage in shortage gaming without realizing the long-term impact of their actions on 
themselves and interconnected parties. Moreover, despite participation in supply chain 
collaboration initiatives, retailers in these situations are aware of their competitors and 
this awareness may impact their collaboration actions. For example, Croson and 
colleagues (2005) discuss the concept of coordination risk, where managers many not 
make long-term optimal decisions due to a fear that they cannot be sure how their supply 
partners and other parties will behave, despite understanding that they all contribute to a 
collective outcome (i.e. long-term system performance). If one retailer refrains from 
shortage gaming but suspects their competitors of doing so, then the competitors may 
gain inventory at the expense of the “honest” retailer. Croson et al. (2005) suggest that 
common knowledge of an optimal policy, a guarantee that others will use it, and 
coordination stock to buffer each party against the risk of non-optimal behavior by others 
may reduce how aggressively managers will respond to inventory shortage. If shortage 
gaming appears to be an issue within supply chain collaboration initiatives, these 
suggestions may be beneficial to all parties over the long-term. 
Shortage gaming from retailers who are not part of the CPFR initiative can also 
occur. The results show that shortage gaming from mid- and small- volume retailers can 
collectively impact the manufacturer and large-volume retailers. Although these retailers 
may not participate in a structured collaboration initiative such as CPFR, communication 
between managers should include information specific to the rationing process as a way 
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to limit reactions to shortage.  
In general, all parties connected by an inventory ordering and fulfillment feedback 
loop benefit if retailers do not engage in shortage gaming. While communication 
regarding actions to resolve supply / demand misalignment appears to be obvious 
prescriptive advice, communication from the manufacturer regarding not only the amount 
of demand that will be fulfilled, but also the process of allocation may temper retailers’ 
shortage gaming responses. In addition, communication regarding long-term outcomes 
arising from various shortage gaming scenarios may deter consistent shortage gaming 
responses. 
5.3.2 Managing Order Rationing and Shortage Gaming Interactions 
Second, the findings suggest that risk management scenarios may be developed to 
address specific incidences of rationing and shortage gaming interactions, or to 
prescriptively avoid specific interactions. Plans for allocating demand when demand 
exceeds supply is a major area within enterprise risk management initiatives (Chopra et 
al. 2013). 
The research shows that interactions between manufacturer order rationing 
strategies and retailer shortage gaming responses are complex, especially when 
considered over time. Please refer to Table 5-1 for a summary of results. Although these 
results are relevant to the system being modeled and are subject to the assumptions 
incorporated in the simulation model, the interaction of a Uniform rationing strategy with 
shortage gaming can be highlighted for prescriptive advice. For example, in situations 
where large-volume retailers appear to engage in shortage gaming, the use of a Uniform 
order rationing strategy by a manufacturer would exacerbate the negative situation from a 
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system perspective. Managers may benefit from utilizing a Linear order rationing strategy 
instead, as results show that this strategy is more robust for the manufacturer and large 
retailers against excessive shortage gaming from other large retailers (for example, see 
section 4.3.3.3 Interaction of RATION * RA.GAME). However, this action should also 
take into account the impact on small retailers. The results indicate that a Linear order 
rationing strategy results in lower order fill rates for small retailers compared to a 
Uniform or Proportional rationing strategy. 
Overall, an assessment of the positive or negative impact from these results must 
be considered from the perspective of each party. For the manufacturer, the differential 
impact of one order rationing strategy over another suggests that the choice of strategy 
must be aligned not only with its production and capacity goals but also with their 
management of each customer relationship. For retailers, the differential impact of 
shortage gaming in various forms suggests that their choice of response to shortage must 
be considered in light of their short and long-term benefit as well as their interconnected 
impact with other retailers. 
 
5.4 LIMITATIONS AND FUTURE RESEARCH 
This research supports the conclusion that supply inventory competition from 
horizontal members of a supply chain echelon impacts the more commonly investigated 
vertical business system. However, this study is subject to several limitations that may be 
addressed in future research. 
First, the use of a simulation methodology sets up an environment that may not be 
wholly reflective of the complexity of business situations. The simulation is modeled 
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upon one real-life industry focusing on a specific set of manufacturers and retailers, for a 
single product. Thus, the results may not generalize to additional industries with varying 
supply chain structures, different buyer-supplier dynamics, and various product demand 
characteristics. Future research can simulate diverse industries and product demand 
characteristics in order to determine the robustness of the results. 
Second, the simulation makes certain assumptions in order to limit the scope of 
analysis to the three major factors identified through literature and manager input. In 
particular, assumptions regarding the manufacturer’s treatment of a retail promotions 
demand shock and its subsequent order fulfillment represent one typical response as 
described through managerial interviews. However a range of responses exist as well as 
the possibility of multiple retail promotions demand shock from various retailers. The use 
of retail promotions to stimulate consumer demand has been described as pervasive 
(Blattberg et al. 1995), and it has been noted that the intensity and frequency of retail 
promotions have increased over time (Huchzermeier & Iyer 2006). As discussed in 
section 5.2.3, the results from this study suggest that a single retail demand shock has a 
weak impact on system performance over time, however it is possible that additional or 
overlapping demand shocks could produce negative outcomes congruent with beliefs 
expressed in literature. Overall, results regarding retail promotions demand shock 
suggests that additional research is required in order to understand the impact of retail 
promotions on supply chains. Future research should investigate the impact of a range of 
manufacturer responses as well as the impact of multiple retail promotions demand shock 
in order to determine differences in long-term system performance.  
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Third, assumptions regarding fixed production capacity were determined via 
interview data but the results may differ in light of higher or lower overall production 
capacity, or with adjustments to capacity and production throughout a year. Future 
research could investigate a range of production capacity in order to determine an optimal 
range that minimizes cost and mitigates the impact of shortage gaming. A more detailed 
simulation regarding production could also yield interesting results. This study treated 
production as a “black box” in order to focus the study on order rationing and shortage 
gaming between a manufacturer and its retailer customers. However, if production was 
simulated to reflect detailed procurement, inventory, and production processes; the 
impact on supplier management, inventory management, and capacity management can 
be determined. Moreover, the addition of an extra echelon of supply chain interaction in 
the form of raw materials suppliers could allow for bullwhip effect investigations.  
Finally, this study is exploratory as it focuses on demonstrating the significant 
impact of supply inventory competition from horizontal echelon members. Future 
research should expand upon this study by further delineating the dynamics of how 
supply inventory competition impact long-term system performance. For example, there 
is opportunity to refine the simulation with a higher degree of granularity. The simulation 
focused on a quarterly unit of analysis in accordance with interview data but simulating 
this system at a daily or weekly unit of analysis can provide an opportunity to investigate 
the impact of lead-times, transportation, storage, and the intersection of inventory reorder 
policies with shortage gaming. The simulation also models each retailer’s ordering 
actions to follow a single scenario if triggered by a hard signal of unfilled orders. Results 
from investigating the impact of dynamic decision rules over time may yield additional 
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insight into the effects of shortage gaming. Additional research incorporating symmetric 
information sharing, trust between the manufacturer and retailers, and the degree of 
coordination risk that each retailer experiences (Tokar et al. 2012; Croson et al. 2011) 
may also yield findings that illuminate the impact of supply inventory competition. 
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